INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

APRIL, 1904.

THE PROBLEM OF TELEOLOGY.*

A word by way of introduction on the imperfection of the philosophic vocabulary in respect to the subject under discussion, and the manifest inconveniences which spring from this imperfection. The term teleology signifies the science of ends. It is the counterpart of ætiology, or the science of causes. Now, in the case of cause, we have at our disposal for use the word cause itself, the word causation expressive of the action of a cause, and the invaluable word causality, denoting the principle itself or the nexus that subsists between a cause and its effect. In the case of the concept end we have the word itself and its Greek equivalent τέλος, and we have, as before said, the word which denotes the science that discusses or defines ends; but we have no term corresponding to causation and no unambiguous and accepted term corresponding to causality. In consequence we meet, even in careful philosophic writings, with such roundabout and unprecise phrases as "teleological causation," intended to describe the effect of a purpose or end in producing its own realization, whereas it can properly mean only the kind of causation which teleology, or the science of ends, has in view. But as the kind of causation which teleology has in view is manifold; as teleology is that branch of philosophy in which of all others the least agreement

*A paper read before the Philosophical Club of New York, January, 1904.

has been achieved, the fundamental concepts of which are least clarified, it is evident that such a phrase as "teleological causation" is infelicitous and likely to be confusing. For the progress of any department of human knowledge, it is desirable that the vocabulary be unequivocal; that each term shall suggest one meaning and one only. The word teleology, according to a recent writer, suggests at least fourteen different meanings, and hence the use of teleological as a descriptive adjective is, to say the least, inconvenient. What we most require in our discussion is a counterpart of the term causality to designate the principle involved or the kind of nexus which connects means with end. The term finality is sometimes employed for this purpose. It is not free from objection because, in common parlance, it means "the quality or state of being final, or settled, or arranged." But it is also used with a more restricted philosophic connotation, in the sense just indicated, as the counterpart of causality, and I shall, in this sense, adopt it in my paper.

A critique of the principle of finality, then, is my task, or, rather, the outline of such a critique, for the limits of space at my disposal will hardly permit of more. There are two main positions which may be distinguished. The notion of finality may be employed as a principle for the scientific explanation of nature. It may be banished from the field of nature as a principle of explanation, though retained as a heuristic principle to cover the gaps that exist in our causal explanation, and be employed mainly in the ethical field. The first position is capable of being stated, and has been stated in various forms; by Paley, for instance, in his argument from "the marks of Design," by Lotze, and by the absolute idealists. Without entering into a consideration of these various positions, I shall briefly allude, for the sake of developing my own view, to that conception of finality which underlies the design argument as put forth by Paley. The gist of his argument has been put thus: A plurality of elements independent of each other, when so arranged as to produce a rational and valuable result, implies an architectonic intelligence which desired and fore-knew this

result. The point to be noted is, that the stress is laid upon the entire independence of the elements; upon their deadness, their mutual uncongeniality, their lack of relation to one another. The force of Paley's argument depends on the fact of co-operation together with the circumstance that there is nothing in the nature of the co-operating members to account for the co-operation. The wheels and weights and hands and dial of a clock, the parts of any mechanism, for instance, have no intrinsic affinity for one another. Anyone who should examine each part singly, aside from a knowledge which he might have of the purpose in the mind of the mechanician, could never, by any stretch of the imagination, hit upon the shape or character of the machine in which this part is to perform its function. The relation of means to ends in this view of finality, therefore, is that the end or purpose is imprinted *ab extra;* that the means themselves are wholly incapable, when considered in themselves, of explaining the result to which, under outside constraint, they contribute. They are combined into purposeful operation by the despotism of extraneous mind. The passivity, the inertness, of the means is the evidence relied on to demonstrate that the rational and valuable result which they conspire to produce, is a result not of their own contriving, but can only be explained as due to the working of a superimposed intelligence. As opposed to this extrinsic notion of finality, we have in modern times the intrinsic notion as set forth in schemes of so-called immanent teleology, the point of which is to show that the plurality of elements are induced to combine by an inherent affinity; that plan or purpose is, as it were, self-active in them; that they are somehow themselves informed with spontaneous intelligence.

The finality doctrine, to which Paley gives blunt expression, was shaken long before the days of Darwin. But it cannot be denied that the prevalence of the Darwinian theory has served more and more to discredit the extrinsic view of finality, even in the popular estimation. The chief objections which Darwinism has advanced may be shortly summarized as follows: First, as to the method. The method of nature in the apparent prosecution of ends is not such as to argue the sure touch, the

deliberate selectiveness of a planful intelligent author. The method of nature is marked by "wasteful prodigality and blundering indirection." It is compared, in a famous passage of Lange's "History of Materialism," to that of a hunter who should fire a million shots at random in every direction, finally in the millionth instance hitting the object of his pursuit. In such manner millions of seeds are wasted before one takes root; in millions of instances sentiency, intellectual and moral promise, are heedlessly crushed; and the results which nature achieves may be compared to the flowers that bloom in graveyards, or to the prolific vegetation which the traveler notes as he passes over some such battlefield as that of Gettysburg. The method then is characterized by wasteful prodigality and blundering indirection. The result is reached in haphazard, hit-or-miss fashion. It looks as if it were the outcome of a lucky chance rather than of purpose.

Secondly, the result achieved itself is far from answering what we should have expected if it had been the offspring of design and wisdom. Under this head belong the following considerations: *(a)* Forms of life are often imperfect in the sense of being ill-adjusted to the functions which they appear intended to fulfil. Of this the existence of rudimentary organs which impede rather than aid the living organism in which they are found, is a familiar example. *(b)* The living types which are satisfying in one sense—in the sense, namely, of being suited to their environment—are unsatisfying from another point of view, because the environment is not such as to call out or to tolerate what ideally we should consider the best. In popular phrase the strong survive, but not the good—not, at all events, the best. *(c)* There is no such thing as symmetrical progress. Progress is interrupted. Periods of progress are followed by periods of stagnation or of retrogression. The forward wave is checked, and in the reflux of the wave individuals, peoples and races are submerged. *(d)* In respect to such progress as there is, we have not the assurance that it will be continuous. In fact, the probabilities, regarded from a naturalistic point of view, are against its being so. If, nevertheless, we dare to affirm the hope that

the forward movement will somewhere and somehow reach its perfect climax, it is on faith and not on the evidence of facts that we must rest such a hope. *(e)* Finally, Darwinism inverts the time relation of the terms denominated means and ends, and thus completely alters their significance. According to pre-Darwinian teleology, the idea of the end precedes, in time, the adoption of the means necessary to realize the end. The divine optician to whom is ascribed the construction of the human eye has in mind, to begin with, the result to be achieved, and then assembles the parts of the eye in such a way as to attain that result. From the Darwinian point of view the opposite is the case. An eye appears first, or the rudimentary beginnings of an eye. Its occurrence is due to chance, and thereafter as a consequence, as the effect of a cause, there comes into operation the function of seeing. The statement is no longer believed that we are equipped with eyes in order that we may see, but it is said that we see because we happen to have eyes. In other words, finality is reduced to causality. The *telos* is no longer a target nor a final cause of which means are the effect; but the so-called means have turned into mechanical causes, and the *telos* (no longer rightly so denominated) is their mechanical effect.

I am not prepared to say that Darwinism has triumphed along the whole line and routed its adversary, the old teleology, beyond the possibility of its repairing its fortunes. Darwinism does not account for the fact that nature is so ordered as to make a correspondence possible between organisms and environment. There are two series of so-called chance occurrences, between which there must be a certain parallelism in order to give room for adaptation. An environment must exist suitable to the maintenance of life forms, and the variations that occur in the organisms must be of such a kind as to correspond with the changing conditions of the environment. It is perfectly conceivable that variations might occur *ad infinitum* in the life forms which should have no relation to surrounding conditions, in which case organisms would wholly disappear. The fact that they do not disappear depends on a correspondence between two sets of variations so arranged that the struc-

tural change shall appear at the propitious moment—at the moment when the environment is of such a kind as to provide the opportunity for the persistence and development of the living thing. Further, Darwinism does not account for the circumstance that, however brought about, there is, after all, an ascending scale of life forms; that is to say, of forms, which in their complexity, their more perfect integration and differentiation, increasingly correspond to the rational ideal of unity amid diversity. The Darwinian, indeed, is in a position to maintain that the concurrence of the two series of variations is fortuitous; that amid the infinite number of chances the chance of this concurrence is one; and, as to the ascending series of types, he is able to affirm, without convincing contradiction on our side, that it is a mere *lusus naturae,* or sport, which is perfectly compatible with the doctrine of chance, and does not of necessity point beyond it. The fundamental criticism that applies to Darwinism, when conceived of, not as a working hypothesis, but as a theory of life, is based on our inability to accept the notion of chance as final; or, more precisely, the causal interpretation of nature as final. We are therefore compelled to admit that the superintending intelligence of the old teleology as a possibility has not been excluded, but the demonstrative force of the argument from "the marks of Design" has been broken. The claims of that argument on our acceptance, on grounds of experience, have been incalculably diminished by the inverted view of the origin of organs to which Darwinism has given currency.

The problem of pre-Darwinian teleology turned about the question whether the course of nature gives evidence of the operation of a planful intelligence similar in kind to the human artificer, however different in degree. The human artificer,—mechanic, architect, optician, was ever in the background,—was indeed the model on which the conception of a supreme architectonic intelligence had been fashioned. That the anthropomorphic pattern can thus be extended to nature was rendered doubtful, as we have just seen by the Darwinian theory. Darwinism delivered a front attack on the old teleology and shook it to its foundations. But, at the same time, a

far more insidious enemy appeared—an enemy who endeavored to destroy the teleological position by undermining it. If the question heretofore had been whether the principle of finality which is operative in human actions can be extended to nature, this new foe undertook to abolish the principle of finality from human action itself; to show that a true *telos,* a true purpose, even in the field of human conation, does not exist, and if not there, then nowhere else. If the Darwinian attack had made it questionable whether the human pattern can be applied to nature, the psychological attack undertook to reinterpret the human pattern itself, and to reduce finality, even in the case of man, to mere causality in disguise. The difficulty now is to justify the use of the term *telos* at all. For the notion of *telos,* or end, implies a certain finalness; implies, or seems to imply, a certain arrest in the ceaseless flux of antecedents and consequents; implies that the term of the causal series to which it is affixed stands forth at least in momentary fixity. And, if this be so, the prime question to decide is, whether there be such a thing as an end of pursuit for man; whether the so-called end is not an illusion. It is to this question that I shall now ask attention, and I shall endeavor to justify the notion of end by showing its relevancy and its indispensableness in the ethical field.

Kant defines an act of volition to be "an act which is determined by the anticipatory idea of the result of the act," but he fully admits that the forecast or anticipatory idea is the inevitable effect of precedent conditions, such as temperament, education—we should, perhaps, add heredity and the like; and in a well-known passage he says that if the whole history of the subject could be known, the voluntary acts of a man might be predicted with the same certainty as an eclipse. The metaphysical argumentation, by which he endeavors to reconcile this inflexible causality with freedom, need not here detain us.

The tendency of modern psychology is to proceed with more trenchant affirmation along the same path. All voluntary acts, we are told, depend on the memory of involuntary acts of the same sort previously performed. An impulsive quality or a tendency to issue in movements resides in all ideas what-

soever, provided they possess a certain degree of intensity. The mystery of volition is not thus explained, but is generalized. The conative impulse, which we are accustomed to associate with certain ideas called ends, is the property of all ideas whatsoever. Any idea which can manage to occupy the focus of consciousness against its competitors is sure to eventuate in appropriate action. It is true there are certain cases in which William James, for instance, leaves room for an express fiat or consent, for a "sheer heave" of the will by means of which an idea naturally feebler is fortified and held in place; but when he speaks in this wise James speaks in the character of the metaphysician. The psychologist as a psychologist tends to abolish the notion of finality altogether; to submerge it in causality. Are we able to rescue the conception of finality from his hands? Are we able to define the notion in such a way as to satisfy the requirements of moral science and practice without affronting the causal conception of the physical scientist? It is this object which I have in mind. I should like to contribute toward justifying the concept of finality, primarily in view of and for the sake of its ethical uses. Before doing so I shall briefly refer to Paulsen's attempt to establish a basis for a new teleology, and then, as succinctly as possible, shall indicate my own thought.

Paulsen says we regard the result of a movement as an end, in case it was willed and in case the result is felt with satisfaction. As regards the former part of this definition, one is at a loss what to make of it. Paulsen lays down two requirements in defining *telos*. The first is that the result of an action was willed; the second that it is felt with satisfaction. But what does he understand by will? He expels from the notion of will the pre-existence in consciousness of the idea of the result. He thus assimilates the operation of volition in man to the movements of plants and even to the processes of crystallization. There remains, as the specific difference which distinguishes the ends pursued by human beings from results of physical movements like the processes of crystallization, just the fact that in the case of men the results achieved are felt with satisfaction. One gets the impression that Paulsen's

voluntarism is a kind of automatism with sentiency, in the case of man and higher animals, superadded.

The problem is, how to account for the finality which attaches to an end. The procession of causes goes on without interruption, like a gang of prisoners marching in lock-step. Each cause takes hold of its effect; each effect becomes in turn cause of a subsequent effect. The notion of end implies that some terms of the series are singled out above others for the mind to rest on, and are conceived as themselves in a state of rest. Does feeling—the feeling of satisfaction of which Paulsen speaks—account for the repose, the arrest? But satisfaction is merely another name for the very phenomenon which we find it so difficult to grasp. Satisfaction means fullness, repletion; a cessation of the striving or outward-passing movement. Satisfaction is but another designation for the halt, however temporary, which we conceive to have taken place in the causal flux when we speak of ends; and to say, therefore, that the feeling of satisfaction explains the finality, is tantamount to saying that the feeling of a thing explains the thing. To transfer the arrest, as Paulsen seems to do, from the causal series to an essence or nature somehow standing aloof from the series and evaluating results as they appear, and to assert that this feeling is an ultimate datum beyond which we are not at liberty to extend our curiosity—this is but to elude the difficulty and not to remove it; for, in the first place, feeling, apart from the bodily changes and the mental representations of which it is the feeling, is perfectly empty. A feeling of satisfaction, or of a halt without a corresponding halt, having actually occurred, is inexplicable.

In the second place the feelings are purely subjective—infinitely variable from moment to moment even in the same individual, and in different individuals incomparable and incommensurable save in terms of the ideational elements to which they correspond. But an end or *telos* cannot be merely subjective any more than there can be a subjective cause. There cannot be such a thing as a cause private to the mental apprehension of a single individual. Every true cause is public; is objective. It is an antecedent which, though for the

time being it may be recognized only by a single person of larger mental grasp than his fellows, must be capable of recognition by all rational beings when sufficiently developed to repeat the observations and follow the reasoning of the original discoverer. And in like manner there can be no private or subjective ends. A subjective end is a caprice or whimsy, and not an end at all. An end is an objective limit of pursuit; is a result which all normally constituted minds must accept as binding upon activity the moment they are able to understand the terms in which it is expressed. And, since the very nature of a *telos* is thus bound up with its objective validity, it follows that subjective feeling, infinitely variable as it is in the same individual and incommensurable as between different individuals, cannot supply the foundation on which to rest the conception of end.

It may be objected to this that the case, as it has just been put, against the feelings, is over-stated; that there are normal feelings of a physical kind, such as the gratification which follows the satisfaction of the appetites, normal æsthetic feelings, normal intellectual and moral feelings, such as the feeling of love and reverence toward parents and the like. My reply is, that even these feelings are by no means normal in the sense of being exactly alike in different individuals, but only in the sense that they exhibit a certain resemblance; and, aside from this, that their normal or objective character, so far as it exists, is borrowed from the objective changes in the external world or the objective ideational relations to which they correspond. It is not my purpose to depreciate the important role which the feelings play in the economy of human life. Without the feeling of rightness, as William James has truly said, rightness as such would be a mere neutral or cold mental perception, devoid of the power to warm the heart or to stir the will into action. The feelings are the response of our whole being to the sensory stimuli that come from without, and to the ideational appeals that derive from within. It may be that the very core of the mystery of our being is hidden in these responses. All I maintain is, that if we wish to become intelligible to one another, if we wish to secure normality in the feelings themselves and

objectivity in the acts which they prompt, especially in the case of the higher class of feelings with which we are here concerned, we must resort to the ideational elements which they follow as satellites. And if there be such a thing as a feeling of satisfaction, it is in some note or characteristic combination which distinguishes the ideational elements that we must seek the justification of the conception of end, and not in the emotional counterpart of these ideational elements.

And now for the thesis which I wish to submit. The error generally committed, as I conceive, has been to seek for the *telos* along the line of a single causal series. The notion of *telos* is a bond that ties together a number of parallel causal series. An end may be defined as a term in a causal series, the existence of which, as end, depends on the simultaneous existence of corresponding or complementary terms, likewise ends, in other series. There is no such thing as a single end. An end is what it is only in a society of ends. By the same process and at the same instant in which it constitutes other ends, it becomes itself an end. The notion of an end is not properly orientated toward the series of antecedents which are called means leading up to it. These should more strictly be called causes producing their effect. The notion of end is properly orientated toward those simultaneous ends that flash up like answering lights in related series, beacon answering beacon as soon as the first torch of *telos* has been kindled. In fine, the concept end is a social concept; a systemic concept. The concept end cannot be justified by means of the category of sequence, namely, causality; but by means of the category of co-existence, namely, reciprocity. The several ends, it is true, lie each in its own causal series; but it is not their relation to the terms preceding them in the series that constitutes them ends, but their relation to parallel or complementary terms in other series with which they stand in systemic connection. An end is an element of a system, every other element of which is likwise an end.

Now, as member of a system, it may be considered in two ways: as a *terminus ad quem* and as a *terminus a quo*. As a *terminus ad quem*—that is, as constituted and sustained by the

associate members of a system, it is an end in the strictest acceptation of the word. As a *terminus a quo*— that is, as helping to constitute and sustain the associate members of its system, it is also a means. Every end is both end and means, and means not in its relation to causal antecedents in the same series, but means in its relation to its co-relative ends. It is possible to use the word means in two senses. In common parlance, and even in philosophic writings, these senses are not distinguished as they ought to be, and hence often confusion results. The ethical vocabulary, as I have already remarked in the beginning, is not sufficiently elaborated or clarified. In the one sense means is equivalent to a precedent term in the causal sequence—a term which is merely ministerial, merely leads up to what follows; a part of the general flux in which there is no halt, no arrest; which lacks altogether the quality of finality. In the other sense the word signifies an element of a system containing an implicit cross-reference to corresponding terms of related causal sequences. It signifies a term or element which is at one and the same time means and end, which is both relatively dependent and relatively independent, and which in so far justifies the arrest, the halt, the quality of finality which we have been discussing, and which is the crux and mystery of all teleology.

The fallacies thus far met with are due, in my view of the matter, to the persistent attempt to reconcile causality and finality by deriving the latter from the former. The two are to be kept distinct. They stand for two separate principles. Finality is as much a part of the aboriginal equipment of the mind as causality. They are to be harmonized by showing that they apply to different sets of conditions or problems. The category of causality establishes the nexus of necessity between antecedent and consequent in the same causal sequence. The category of finality establishes a relation of unity or synthesis, or co-operation between different parallel and co-existent causal sequences. There is at least no contradiction, to my mind, in assuming a distinct point of view for the latter purpose. There is no contradiction in supposing that we are supplied with a separate mode for apprehending these cross-references between

related terms of simultaneous causal series, just as we are supplied with a mode for apprehending the connection between anteriors and posteriors of the same series. If finality is an ultimate, we cannot of course explain it; but there is at least no contradiction to causality involved in supposing that certain terms, as they arise in the causal series, carry with them this earmark of cross-reference, and that this earmark or note is a factor not accounted for by precedent causes, though not at variance with them.

It is true that the gist of my contention, namely, that such a thing as a single end is unthinkable, is seemingly opposed to everyday experience. Do we not pursue isolated, marked-off ends all the time without at least the consciousness of their being connected with any congeners? We concentrate attention on the quest of food. The satisfaction of the appetite is for the time the only end we have in view, and we take the steps necessary to secure it; or we seek shelter and warmth, and for the time these are our ends; or some intellectual object is the aim. And how entirely it seems possible to restrict one's self to a single end appears to be proved by the example of the scholar who spends years of his life in the study of a minute point in philology, or of the scientific investigator who conducts experiment after experiment with a view to testing a single formula. Nevertheless reflection will show that appearances in this respect are deceitful. Even of the physical wants it holds true that each one of them, though it may come into consciousness singly, is conditioned by a complex structure or organism, and could only arise in connection with such an organism. There would be no such thing in the case of the higher animals at all events, as hunger and the quest for food which it incites, were there not also thirst, sexual desire, etc. Even physical need exists only in company with other needs, the physical end in the society of other ends. Still more is this true of the intellectual and volitional ends.

I have just used the word organism—used it reluctantly, and yet have been forced to use it for lack of a better. Yet it is necessary, at this last and most important turning point of my argument, to be careful lest by the associations which the word

organism calls up, I may misrepresent and falsify the idea I wish to cenvey. I have said "physical ends" and "organism," meaning thereby the animal body. In reality I do not believe that we can properly speak of physical ends, or that the word organism can properly be applied to the animal body. An organism is not a substantive thing at all, but a spiritual idea. By organism we understand: 1. A system which completely expresses the plurality implicit in an underlying unity; the totality of the parts that make up the whole. 2. And, *per consequence,* a system of members, no one of which could be spared; each one of which is indispensable in its place and unique as expressing some aspect of the whole not expressed by its fellow members. 3. And again, *per consequence,* a system in which each member is both means and end in the sense above defined; is both *terminus ad quem,* constituted and supported by the system, and *terminus a quo,* constituting and supporting the system. Measured by these tests, it turns out that the so-called organisms are not true organisms. Of no living body can it be shown that it represents the total plurality implicit in an underlying unity. Of no living body can it be shown that its so-called organs are indispensable in their places to such an extent that some other possibly more perfect organs might not be substituted in their stead. Of no living body can it be shown that the various organs perfectly support and maintain one another in their functions; that they are so adapted to each other as to secure reciprocally the highest fulfilment of function. They are called organisms because, to some extent, but most inadequately, they approximate to or adumbrate to the scheme of relations which the term organism postulates; but they are not true organisms. They are not models upon which we are to fashion our conception of the organic relation. On the contrary, they borrow the distinction of being called organisms from the light of the purely spiritual organic idea, the illumination of which is reflected upon them.

It follows, and this is my final proposition, that the notion of end as being bound up with the notion of organism, exists in idea only and not in fact; that it cannot serve us in the busi-

ness of explaining nature at all, but only of evaluating it; and that its principal use must be found in that field where ideas display their highest potency, namely, in the ethical field. The organic idea, the teleological idea, the principle of finality, is a directive of conduct. We are so to act as to convert human society into an organism, or rather ever to work in asymptotic approximation toward that ideal, though we know well that under finite conditions we shall never attain it. We are to regard each human being not as if he were already an end *per se,* but in such a way as to help him to become a *telos,* a true member of an organic system; that is to say, a personality, a distinctive self, unique in his expression of mental and moral possibility, and therefore indispensable in his place.

And it is in this direction that I see the lines of a new construction in ethics; of a new foundation for ethics. Not altruism, with its so-called good of others for an aim, nor egoism, with its *soi-disant* good of self, nor the Kantian formula, with the mathematical notion of equality underlying it; not the evolutionary formula, with its outlook on a general happiness which cannot even be defined, but just the idea of organism in its spiritual sense is, for me, the beginning of ethics—the beginning and the end. To express this highest idea, of which we are capable so far as possible in the finite material of human relations, is the aim. So act as to elicit what is autotelic (that is, mentally and morally unique) in the self of others, and thereby develop what is autotelic in thyself is the formula which I should choose.

The technical point of my paper lies in the contention that the end must not be sought in a single causal series; that there is no such thing as a single end, but that the very concept of end is social. The outcome, so far as the problem of teleology is concerned, is that there are no ends in nature, except such as ethically we read into nature. And therefore, also, there can be no such thing as an immanent teleology; for an immanent teleology would require that it be proved that the idea had also become fact—a proof which can never be furnished. The true field of teleology is in the realm of ethics. But after we have found and justified the concept *telos* there, we can then apply

it, by way of interpretation and not of explanation, to the universe at large. We can dwell on such analogies to the organic idea as we see in the structure and functions of living bodies; we can contemplate the whole of nature as shimmering in the radiance of the ethical ideal. For the primacy belongs to the will, the crisis and climax of our being is in action, and the principle of finality which we find necessary for the regulation of conduct may, therefore, be extended for the purpose of ethical evaluation to the entire scheme of things.

FELIX ADLER.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK.

THE ETHICS OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE.

We are face to face in England to-day with a curious contretemps in educational matters, which is assuming considerable proportions. We have grown accustomed to such characteristic phenomena as "conscientious objectors" in respect to vaccination, and the objectors to medical attendance on the part of the "Peculiar People," and later in the case of "Faith-healers and "Christian Scientists." These cases have been so exceptional and isolated in this country that they have attracted comparatively little attention, and possibly may be more easily justified on the ground that they are not likely to become a "universal law," according to Kant, than the present movement. The revolution of feeling in England, however, threatens to become somewhat serious; and as it seems probable that it will increase rather than decrease in the course of time, it calls for consideration and comment. Already nearly ten thousand summonses have been issued, and it is said that there are not less than sixty thousand "Passive Resisters" in England. The movement has its political and its distinctively religious aspect, whilst being an educational problem. Its moral bearings and issues are those with which we are now immediately concerned, and possibly these are the most important in the long run. These issues are rendered still more

important for the reason that although it might be shown that "Resisters" are fanatics, wrong-headed, seekers for a "cheap martyrdom," and "faddists," yet the facts that for the most part they are law-abiding citizens, who have never appeared before the magistrates as defaulters or criminals, and that they exert a wide-spread influence over the population, entitle them to respectful consideration and at least serious attention.

The actual ground of complaint or grievance need not here call for extended notice. The objection to the Education Acts of 1902 and 1903 is chiefly two-fold.[1] In the first place it is said that they do not provide adequate public control, and practically there is no direct representation on the educational authorities and boards of management. This is more entirely a question of politics, and we need not discuss it in this place. The other objection is that which is included in the Kenyon-Slaney clause, and that which immediately follows[2] which give the power of directing religious instruction in public elementary schools which are not provided by the educational authority to managers, who carry out the terms of the trust-deed subject to the decision of the bishop or other ecclesiastical authority as referee. Four out of six of these managers are appointed in accordance with the spirit and terms of the trust-deed. It thus eventuates that religious teaching, with the whole body of dogma and ritual that the schools in question were established to teach, is thrown upon the rates for maintenance, the buildings alone being contributed by the denomination whose doctrines are taught therein. The religious bodies of all persuasions are treated absolutely alike by this Act, and no charge of injustice can be brought against the Act, so far as its form is concerned, whatever its origin or intention. The "non-conformist conscience" is scandalized, however, at having to pay for teaching religious doctrine of any kind, or the tenets of any particular church, although there is no necessary objection to the teaching of morals, or of the Bible as literature. That the teaching of one Church should be devoted to the

[1] For the sake of brevity we omit the objection to the imposition of religious tests upon teachers.

[2] Education Act, 1902; Section 7, Paragraphs 6 and 7.

"unchurching" of all others, and that such teaching should be supported out of the rates, is a special form of the grievance. If it be objected that the application of public money to purposes of which a section of the taxpayers do not approve is inevitable, the reply would be that in this case it is directly and specifically stated for what purpose the money will be used, and that such is not the case with Imperial taxation.

We have thus tried to state as simply and as briefly as possible the grievance which it is proposed to remedy by the "Passive Resisters," and it is considered by them serious enough to justify their action in breaking the law at the dictates of conscience.

Let us grant that the grievance is a real and genuine one, and that there is something to be resisted, and that the motives and desires of these persons are morally justifiable, all of which would have to be considered from other points of view in order to make a complete case, are these persons morally justified under the circumstances in resisting the legalized demands for payment of rates? This is the question to which we have to address ourselves. In this endeavor we have to consider whether law-breaking is in this case a violation of any moral law.

Some have sought to vindicate the conduct of "Passive Resisters" on the ground that the law provides an optional mode of payment. This has actually been stated in the courts. There is the voluntary mode of payment, by which the money is paid over on demand; and on the other hand, there is the mode of recovery by distraint, which the law provides, which relieves the conscience of the payer, inasmuch as he can say, "I do not willingly pay, but if the law compels me, you must come and take it." In either case the law is satisfied, and such is the meaning of "*Passive* Resistance."

The objections to this attitude are many. It may well be questioned if the payment of rates or taxes is voluntary at all, since the account is presented in the form of a demand, and not a polite request. Inasmuch as payment is compulsory in any case, is not Passive Resistance merely an awkward, expensive, and an inconvenient mode of payment for all concerned?

Further, there can be no point or significance in the protest unless it is an act of law breaking. If it is nothing more than the choice of alternatives to which the law stands in an indifferent attitude, it seems to be absurd to throw needless obstacles in the way of the course of the law, since the result must be the same in either case. If "Resistance" means anything at all, it must mean resistance to an objectionable law that infringes upon the rights of conscience.

Besides these considerations, the wording of the warrant for distraint precludes any such supposition that distraint is a legalized form of payment. It is a summary measure (under the extension of the Act for Summary Jurisdiction) for the recovery of a lawful debt, payment of which has been refused.[1] Expert opinion supports the view that such resistance is illegal.

We may conclude therefore that Passive Resistance being a refusal to pay a legal charge is necessarily an illegal act.

The justification offered is invariably that the law of conscience, *i.e.*, the moral law, is superior to civil law, and that "we must obey God rather than man." For further support it is also adduced that whilst all other means of "killing the Act" should be tried, this will alone provide the remedy, and that civil and religious liberty has been won for us by acts which, whilst morally justifiable, were, according to the law of the times, illegal.

It will be convenient to take these reasons in reverse order. The examples that are generally adduced of lawlessness with a view to the overthrow of a harsh or unjust law are those of the resistance of the Parliament men to the Stuart kings, the action of the Puritan clergy in opposition to the Conventicle and Five Mile Acts, the case of John Hampden, the patriot, and the persistence in preaching on the part of John Bunyan and others. In recent years the violation of the Slave laws and the refusal to pay Church Rates are often given in support of

[1] The warrant for distraint contains these words: " . . . The said several sums have been duly demanded of them respectively, but they have not . . . paid the same sums . . . but they have refused and still do refuse to pay the same . . . and have not . . . shown to us sufficient cause for not paying the same."

a defiance of the recognized law, with good moral intentions and results.

In reply to these instances and the argument they are brought forward to support, it must be pointed out that if such acts were justifiable in an age when the rights and liberties of the individual subject were not respected, and when they might have done something towards securing the privileges we now enjoy, it does not by any means follow that they are justifiable at the present time. Since we are in possession of the full privileges of citizenship, the franchise, the rights of free speech, freedom of the press, the facilities for influencing public opinion, and every opportunity of bringing others by the force of persuasion to our own point of view, the justification afforded by the actions of our ancestors does not hold. In fact, it is a somewhat unfortunate ground to take, for it only serves to show that we are unworthy of the efforts made by our fathers on our behalf, inasmuch as we have employed our privileges and opportunities to so little purpose. What may have been excusable and right under a tyranny, may be entirely wrong in a country that is endowed with so large a measure of freedom and enjoys so fully the advantages of democratic institutions.

We have in our hands, as all will allow, an exceptional and unprecedented degree of political liberty, and every thoughtful person will surely agree that whatever resistance is offered to an obnoxious measure, every constitutional resource should first be exhausted. It would lead us too far into the purely political aspect of the question to inquire if every resource has been tried and failed. The writer is of opinion that the merits of any truly righteous case will not fail to appeal to the enlightened common-sense of Englishmen sooner or later, and that the justice of any cause will most certainly, in time, working through constitutional methods, move public opinion, against which nothing can continue to stand or effectually resist.

In the meantime, is it the duty of non-conformists to resist the course of the law? "Passive Resistance" is not a criminal act unless it is organized and inducements are brought to

bear upon others by those who "resist," with a view to secure their refusal to pay, in which case it amounts to conspiracy. Inasmuch as it is, however, in the eyes of the law a refusal, and therefore a violation of a legalized claim, it will be followed of necessity by some of the bad results of law-breaking. There will be a certain weakening of the authority of the law, especially as these acts are deliberate on the part of persons who are well competent to judge and calculate the results of their conduct. Whatever influence may be brought to bear prior to the passing of the measure into law, it is in the interests of good order and effective government that all citizens should maintain, uphold and respect the authority of the law. That the supremacy of the law as a whole should be honored is more important for the due development of persons as citizens and in political and social relations, than that an evil affecting a section, even an important section, should be remedied by the violation of the law.[4] If this movement continues to grow, one serious result will follow, viz.: that our police-courts will come to be regarded as somewhat more respectable for criminals, and for those with whom the officials of the law are having continual trouble. The presence of "Resisters" in the courts to answer to the charges of non-payment, whilst it may have something of the element of martyrdom, is likely to make the disgrace of appearing before the magistrates somewhat less in the eyes of criminals. If this objection is more fanciful than real, then must we adduce another argument. If "Passive Resistance" under the circumstances is right for those who believe in it, nevertheless some bad effects must be experienced, and we can hardly calculate what the end will be, or estimate the lengths to which these results may reach. Rightly or wrongly, there are sincere persons who conscientiously object to "secular instruction" as it is called, and they object not less emphatically to moral teaching without religion, and religion without dogma. This position may be unreasonable, but it may be a truly conscientious one. In the event of the "Passive Resisters" succeeding

[4] *Vide* "Principles of Political Obligation," by T. H. Green, Section 144.

in turning the tables on their opponents, they will have given them direct encouragement, on their part, to "resist." If then each party, as it comes to be a minority, is to "resist" the measures passed by the majority, in relation to religious questions, something approaching to political chaos is before us.

It may be argued that the right has to be done regardless of consequences, and that if we were to stop to consider the direct or indirect bad results or attendant circumstances of our actions, all moral effort, and especially, moral reform, would be paralyzed. An act is to be judged according to its own inherent rightness, and the consequences are beyond the limits of our responsibility. Nevertheless, the results of our conduct, in so far as they may be reasonably forecast, must be a determinant to us amongst others as to the rightness of that conduct. They fall within the scope of our "intentions," using the term in the legal sense. The rightness of our conduct cannot be wholly judged without regard to results. There are some acts, more particularly those of cardinal rank, which may be undertaken without pausing to consider their results, the reason being that we are already convinced that their results must ultimately influence for good the morals of the community, and not because their results are ignored. "Passive Resistance," however, involves conduct on the part of citizens that is of a public character, and cannot but have far-reaching results upon others, in consequence of which these results must be taken into account.

We can deal with the argument better as we study the reason that forms the final justification, beyond which there can be no appeal. "We must obey God rather than man." It is not, perhaps, necessary to inquire *why* we must obey God rather than man; the whole question of the categorical imperative is herein raised. The plain man who believes in the Christian religion would doubtless reply that we are commanded in the Scriptures so to do. In the abstract, or rather as a principle, the will of the Divine Being would be regarded as paramount, and as superior to any human ordinance. There is not, however, in this case a clear issue. It means the facing of two evils from the nonconformist standpoint. The non-

conformist conscience is in a dilemma. There is, at least, a certain degree of right on the side, both of Resisters and Non-resisters, to entitle each to respect from the other side.

Let us then assume that it is our duty to obey God rather than man. Why we should do so we may state to be based upon an intuition. The will of God for us, let us say, is that we should realize the best of which we are capable, the ideal contemplated in this case from the point of view of citizenship, and also as to our responsibility to the rising generation and the future of our country. If we have to "obey God," it is clearly in no private capacity in this case, nor is it in the assertion of a private right. It is the will of the Divine with respect to the handling of an objectionable law. What that will is cannot be determined by means of an intuition. The proper view of our duty has to be arrived at as the result of the balancing of considerations; and the estimation of probable consequences must enter into the calculation. The question is not to be settled in the same manner as a temptation to commit a breach of fundamental morality, with an instant and final negative, regardless of consequences. The command of God is heard in the legalized demand itself and by means of human law and institutions. Whatever the mystic may say with regard to his conscience and its demands, morality can recognize no call to a duty which disregards the obligations of the law and the claims it lays upon the individual citizen. These might be laid aside at the call of a higher duty, it is true; but in determining the higher duty in a case of this sort, legal obligations must enter in. To throw the matter into a more concrete form, it may be fairly reasoned that it is the duty of a conscientious citizen to pay an unjust charge if he has tried in vain to prevent the measure passing into law, on the ground that he is no longer responsible for the expenditure of public funds, after he has done his utmost to control that expenditure by legalized means, through legislation, and by doing his part in the appointment at the polls of candidates who may be trusted to carry out those principles which he as an elector holds.

The case assumes a somewhat different complexion when we

bear in mind in what consists the sovereign power of modern England. "Passive Resistance" sets on one side the teaching of St. Paul, that "the powers that be are ordained of God." These powers are resisted on the ground that they no longer represent the authority of God in civil affairs. Their authority is superseded by the authority of conscience. This reasoning, however, disregards the fact that the ultimate authority and the sovereign power of England at the present time, is the goodwill of the citizens as a body. Unless we can charge the main body of citizens with having no conscience in the matter, such a course of action as "Passive Resistance" is to set up the conscience of the individual against the collective conscience, or, at least, to make the conscience of the minority superior to that of the majority. If the sovereign power is that authority which the citizens, as a whole, habitually obey, and if the government of our country can only be upheld as the whole body of citizens are willing that it should continue and are agreed loyally to support the laws when once they have been duly passed, then ought the collective conscience, or the conscience of the majority, to be recognized within certain limits, as indicating the duty of citizens and the will of the Supreme Ruler, in civil affairs. We would go so far as to say that, in this respect, *vox populi* is *vox Dei*. There is, in short, no personal or individual right in a matter of political obligation, on the ground of morality, to stand against or to resist the collective will or conscience of the majority, when once the proposals have passed from the legislative to the administrative stage.

It has been asserted throughout the course of this controversy that the Education Act of 1902 does not fairly represent the will of the people, inasmuch as the electorate was never consulted on the subject, and the Government forced the Bill through the House of Commons on the strength of a majority returned to bring the war in South Africa to a termination. There having been no "mandate" from the constituencies to deal with this question, the people are, so the argument runs, released from their obligation to submit, and,

under the circumstances, "Passive Resistance" is the least objectionable form of resistance.

We can imagine the reply to be that there never is, in a General Election in England, an unequivocal and distinct pronouncement on any definite question before the country, nor is there at any time a single, clear, or unmistakable issue upon which the country gives its voice. It might also be said that, whilst there may be one outstanding question which mainly determines the majority, yet an election is never fought on that issue alone. There is always the general line of policy which belongs to each of the respective parties, and in an election regard must always be had to it. It might fairly have been conjectured beforehand that the Conservative Party would bring in, sooner or later, a bill dealing with education, in conformity with its relation to the State Church. Let us grant, however, for the sake of argument (and not that we necessarily commit ourselves to that view), that the Government of Great Britain, having been returned to power on a war vote, has presumed upon its huge majority to force a measure through the legislature in an unconstitutional manner, and has thus abused its immense strength by taking advantage of the weakness of its opponents. On that view of the matter we have an instance of the tyranny of the majority, which, of course, is quite possible in a democratic state. Two questions would then arise. Making all allowance for the subtle influence of vested interests, where they exist, for re-actions in public opinion and for accidental circumstances, is not an Opposition, to some extent, responsible in a modern community for its own weakness, especially if it is lacking in unity and enthusiasm? When an Opposition has a good cause and can present a united front, it is seldom, if ever, possible that a tyrannical government can fly in the face of strong public opinion, even though its exponents are in a minority, without the risk of swift and sure retribution.

Whether this be accepted or not, the question remains whether it is right and in the interests of law and order, and conducive to the well-being of the citizens as a whole, and good government, that tyranny should be met by lawlessness?

Would not this tend to make "confusion worse confounded," if generally adopted. This position of affairs might afford a substantial argument in favor of the "Referendum," but in the present condition of party government, it would generally be considered by the most thoughtful persons of either party preferable in the interests of the community that those that compose the minority should always bide their time until they can, by regular and constitutional methods, remove their grievances, on the peril of making the "remedy worse than the disease." This argument has thus been briefly dealt with, because it is almost always used to strengthen the position of the "Passive Resisters." It has many other implications of a political character which we have no room in this paper to discuss. Nevertheless, we are not, I think, entitled to regard this as the main argument of the Resisters, for the reason that the grievance would exist, even though there had been an appeal to the country on the issue of Education. There would still remain a case for Resistance on the ground that these persons are called upon definitely to pay for the instruction of the children in public schools in religious dogma in which a portion of the community do not believe, and they would probably "resist" all the same. This political aspect of the question is adduced as an additional argument to strengthen the attitude taken in "Resistance"; but, as the writer has indicated, he does not see that such ground of justification can be maintained, nor, as before stated, does he consider that it has any justification on moral grounds.

We may take, however, yet another view of the matter. There may be ecclesiastical or religious grounds for refusing to pay the rate, but these lie beyond the scope of this discussion. A man may be convinced in his own mind that the voice of conscience bids him to "resist," as the most effectual protest against what he regards as false doctrine or ecclesiastical aggression. He may be absolutely incapable of justifying himself on moral grounds, or he may even be prepared to admit that some bad moral results may accrue from his action, and yet feel that it is his duty to "resist." It may be impossible to convince him that he is in error, because he main-

tains it is a matter of religious conviction, and to be settled between himself and his God. We cannot, of course, make any headway against reasoning of this kind, even though we may be thoroughly convinced that, from an ethical point of view, the position is wrong.

Let it be understood, therefore, that we pass no opinion as to the religious or ecclesiastical aspect of the case. If, however, the "Resisters" have made up their minds on this point that they must "resist" in spite of argument and consequences, then a new question for ethics is raised. We have the spectacle of a number of earnest persons, women no less than men, who are prepared to suffer in their pockets and to be committed to prison for their principles, and with no material or private end to serve. Right or wrong those principles may be, yet in an age of moral indifference, and when the moral sense is seldom really stimulated or roused, these "Passive Resisters" set the example of a certain form of heroism that refuses not to suffer for conscience's sake. The same may be claimed, of course, for law-breaking Ritualists, who are at the opposite extreme in Christian doctrine. Thus "Passive Resistance" will have the further effect of keeping the whole subject, the religious and moral instruction of the young, prominently and vividly before the public, until a satisfactory solution to the problem is found. The very interest that attaches to such subjects will have a moral value of its own.

We may conclude by saying that "Passive Resistance" has no support on ethical lines alone. The writer is of opinion that it cannot be justified on ethico-political grounds. Nevertheless, on the assumption that it has any support in the religious convictions of the individual (upon which assumption no opinion is here offered), it may possess some moral value, such as will always attach to the movements that are carried out with moral seriousness and sense of moral responsibility. In any case, certain evil results are inevitable, and it is an open question whether, on the whole, more evil than good may not be the net result.

J. G. James.

Yeovil, England.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PEOPLE.

In the realm of physical health the teachings of Nature, with its stern mercy and merciful punishment, are showing men gradually to avoid the mistake of unhealthful homes, and to clear fever and malaria away from parts of earth otherwise so beautiful. Death that arises from foul sewage, bad plumbing or vitiated air we no longer attribute to "Acts of God," but to "Misdeeds of Man," and so work to correct this loss. But if we have escaped Mediævalism to some extent in the care of physical health, we certainly have not in the higher realm of the economic and spiritual development of people. Here the world rests, and is largely contented to rest, in a strange fatalism. Nations and groups and social classes are born and reared, reel sick unto death, or tear forward in frenzied striving. We sit and watch and moralize, and judge our neighbors or ourselves fore-doomed to failure or success, not because we know or have studied the causes of a people's advance, but rather because we instinctively dislike certain races, and instinctively like our own.

This attitude cannot long prevail. The solidarity of human interests in a world which is daily becoming physically smaller, cannot afford to grope in darkness as to the causes and incentives to human advance when the advance of all depends increasingly on the advance of each. Nor is it enough here to have simply the philanthropic impulse—simply a rather blind and aimless desire to do good.

If then we would grapple intelligently with the greater problems of human development in society, we must sit and study and learn even when the mad impulse of aimless philanthropy is striving within, and we find it easier to labor blindly, rather than to wait intelligently.

In no single set of human problems is this striving after intelligence, after real facts and clear thinking, more important than in answering the many questions that concern the American Negro. And especially is this true since the basic axiom

upon which all intelligent and decent men, North and South, white and black, must agree, is that the best interests of every single American demand that *every Negro make the best of himself.*

But what is good and better and best in the measure of human advance? and how shall we compare the present with the past, nation with nation, and group with group, so as to gain real intelligent insight into conditions and needs, and enlightened guidance? Now this is extremely difficult in matters of human development, because we are so ignorant of the ordinary facts relating to conditions of life, and because, above all, criteria of life and the objects of living are so diverse.

And yet the desire for clear judgment and rational advance, even in so intricate a problem as that of the races in the United States, is not hopeless. First of all, the most hopeful thing about the race problem to-day is, that people are beginning to recognize its intricacy and be justly suspicious of any person who insists that the race problem is simply this or simply that—realizing that it is not simply anything. It is as complex as human nature, and you do well to distrust the judgment of any man who thinks, however honestly, that any one simple remedy will cure evils that arise from the whirling wants and longings and passions of writhing human souls.

Not only do we to-day recognize the Negro problems as intricate, but we are beginning to see that they are pressing—asking, *demanding* solution; not to be put off by half measures, not answered by being handed down in thinly disguised yet even larger form to our children. With these intricate and pressing problems before us, we ask searchingly and often for the light; and here again we are baffled. An honest gentleman from the South informs us that there are fully as many illiterate Negroes to-day in the South as there were at Emancipation. We gasp with astonishment, and as we are asking "Where then is all our money and effort gone?" another gentleman from the South, apparently just as honest, tells us that whereas nine-tenths of the Negroes in 1870 could *not* read and write, to-day fully three-fifths of them *can;* or, again, the

Negroes themselves exult over the ownership of three hundred million dollars worth of real estate, while the critic points out that the Negroes are a burden to the South, since forming a third of the population they own but one-twenty-fifth of the property.

Such seemingly contradictory propositions and others even more glaring, we hear every day, and it is small wonder that persons without leisure to weigh the evidence find themselves curiously in the dark at times and anxious for reliable interpretation of the real facts.

Much of this befogging of the situation is apparent rather than real. As a matter of fact, the statements referred to are not at all contradictory. There are to-day more illiterate Negroes than in 1870, but there are six times as many who can read and write. The real underlying problem is dynamic, not static. Is the educational movement in the right direction, and is it as rapid as is safe? or, in other words, What is satisfactory advance in education? Ought a people to learn to read and write in one generation or in a hundred years? How far can we hasten the growth of intelligence, avoiding stagnation on the one hand, and abnormal forcing on the other? Or take the question of property ownership: it is probably true that only a twenty-fifth of the total property of the South belongs to the Negro, and that the Negro property of the land exceeds three hundred million. Here, again, brute figures mean little, and the comparison between black and white is misleading. The basic question is, How soon after a social revolution like emancipation ought one reasonably to expect the appearance of habits of thrift and the accumulation of property? Moreover, how far is the accumulating of wealth indicative of general advance in moral habits and sound character, or how far is it independent of them or in spite of them?

In other words, if we are to judge intelligently or clearly of the development of a people, we must allow ourselves neither to be dazzled by figures nor misled by inapt comparisons, but we must seek to know what human advancement historically considered has meant and what it means to-day,

and from such criteria we may then judge the condition, development and needs of the group before us. I want then to mention briefly the steps which groups of men have usually taken in their forward struggling, and to ask which of these steps the Negroes of the United States have taken and how far they have gone. In such comparisons we cannot, unfortunately, have the aid of exact statistics, for actual measurement of social phenomena is peculiar to the Nineteenth century—that is, to an age when the culture Nations were full-grown, and we can only roughly indicate conditions in the days of their youth. A certain youth and childhood is common to all men in their mingled striving. Everywhere, glancing across the seas of human history, we note it. The average American community of to-day has grown by a slow, intricate and hesitating advance through four overlapping eras. First, there is the struggle for sheer physical existence—a struggle still waging among the submerged tenth, but settled for a majority of the community long years ago. Above this comes the accumulation for future subsistence—the saving and striving and transmuting of goods for use in days to come—a stage reached to-day tentatively for the middle classes and to an astounding degree by a few. Then in every community there goes on from the first, but with larger and larger emphasis as the years fly, some essay to train the young into the tradition of the fathers—their religion, thought and tricks of doing. And, finally, as the group meets other groups and comes into larger spiritual contact with nations, there is that transference and sifting and accumulation of the elements of human culture which makes for wider civilization and higher development. These four steps of subsistence, accumulation, education and culture-contact are not disconnected, discreet stages. No nation ever settles its problems of poverty and then turns to educating children; or first accumulates its wealth and then its culture. On the contrary, in every stage of a nation's growing all these efforts are present, and we designate any particular age of a people's development as (for instance) a struggle for existence, because, their conscious effort is more largely expended in this direction than in others; but despite this we

all know, or ought to know, that no growing nation can spend its whole effort on to-day's food lest accumulation and training of children and learning of their neighbors—lest all these things so vitally necessary to advance be neglected, and the people, full-bellied though they be, stagnate and die because in one mighty struggle to live they forget the weightier objects of life.

We all know these very obvious truths, and yet despite ourselves certain mechanical conceptions of society creep into our everyday thought. We think of growing men as cogs in some vast factory—we would stop these wheels and set these others going, hasten that department and retard this; but this conception applied to struggling men is mischievously wrong. You cannot stop the education of children in order to feed their fathers; the children continue to grow—something they are bound to learn. What then shall it be: truth, or half-truth, good or bad? So, too, a people may be engaged in the pressing work of accumulating and saving for future needs—storing grain and cotton, building houses, leveling land; but all the time they are learning something from inevitable contact with men and nations and thoughts—you cannot stop this learning; you cannot postpone it. What then shall this learning—this contact with culture—be? a lesson of fact or fable? of growth or debauchery? the inspiration of the schools or the degradation of the slums? Something it must be, but what? The growth of society is an ever-living, many-sided, bundle of activities, some of which are emphasized at different ages, none of which can be neglected without peril, all of which demand guidance and direction. As they receive this, the nation grows; as they do not, it stagnates and dies.

Whence now must the guidance and direction come? It can come only from four great sources: the precepts of parents, the sight of Seers, the opinion of the majority, and the tradition of the grandfathers; or, in other words, a nation or group of people can be taught the things it must learn in its family circles, at the feet of teachers and preachers, by contact with surrounding society, by reverence for the dead Hand—for that

mighty accumulation of customs and traditions handed down generation after generation.

And thus I come to the center of my theme. How far do these great means of growth operate among American Negroes and influence their development in the main lines of human advancement?

Let me take you journeying across mountains and meadows, threading the hills of Maryland, gliding over the broad fields of Virginia, climbing the blue ridge of Carolina and seating ourselves in the cotton kingdom. I would not like you to spend a day or a month here in this little town; I should much rather you would spend ten years, if you are really studying the problem; for casual visitors get casual ideas, and the problems here are the growth of centuries.

From the depot and the cluster of doubtful houses that form the town, pale crimson fields with tell-tale gullies stretch desolately away. The whole horizon looks shabby, and there is a certain awful leisure in the air that makes a westerner wonder when work begins. A neglected and uncertain road wanders up from the depot, past several little stores and a post-office, and then stops hesitatingly and melts away into crooked paths across the washed-out cotton fields. But I do not want you to see so much of the physical as of the spiritual town, and first you must see the color line. It stands at the depot with "waiting room for white people" and "waiting room for colored people," and then the uninitiated might lose sight of it; but it is there, there and curiously wandering, but continuous and never ending. And in that little town, as in a thousand others, they have an eleventh commandment, and it reads "Thou shalt not Cross the Line." Men may at times break the sixth commandment and the seventh, and it makes but little stir. But when the eleventh is broken, *the world heaves.* And yet you must not think the town inhabited by anything inhuman. Simple, good hearted folks are there—generosity and hospitality, politeness and charity, dim strivings and hard efforts—a human world, aye, even lovable at times; and one cannot argue about that strange line—it is simply so.

Were you there in person I could not take you easily across

the line into the world I want to study. But in spirit let me lead you across. In one part of the town are sure to be clustered the majority of the Negro cabins; there is no strict physical separation; on some streets whites and blacks are neighbors, and yet the general clustering by color is plain. I want to take you among the houses of the colored people, and I start not with the best, but with the worst: a little one-room box with a family of eight. The cabin is dirty, ill-smelling and cheerless; the furniture is scanty, old and worn. The man works when he has no whiskey to drink, which is comparatively seldom. The woman washes and squanders and squanders and washes. I am not sure that the couple were ever married formally, but still they'll stick together in all probability for life, despite their quarreling. There are five children, and the nameless child of the eldest daughter makes the last member of the family. Three of the children can spell and read a bit, but there's little need of it. The rest of the family are in ignorance, dark and dense. Here is a problem of home and family. One shudders at it almost hopelessly, or flares in anger and says: why do these people live like animals? Why don't they work and strive to do? If the stranger be from the North he looks suspiciously at the color line and shakes his head. If he be from the South he looks at it thankfully and stamps his foot. And these two attitudes are in some respects typical. We look around for the forces keeping this family down, or with fatalistic resignation conclude that nothing better is to be expected of black people. Exactly the same attitude with which the man of a century or so ago fought disease: looked about for the witch, or wondered at the chastening of the Lord; but withal continued to live in the swamps. There are forces in the little town to keep Negroes down, but they do not wholly explain the condition of this family. There are differences in human capabilities, but that they are not based on color can be seen in a dozen Negro homes up the street. What we have in degraded homes like this is a plain survival from the past.

What was slavery and the slave trade? Turn again with me even at the risk of hearing a twice-told tale and, as we have

journeyed in space to this little southern town, so journey again in time, back through that curious crooked way along which civilization has wandered looking for the light. There was the nineteenth century—a century of material prosperity, of systematic catering to human wants, that men might eat, drink, be clothed and transported through space. And with this came the physical freeing of the soul through the wonders of science and the spread of democracy. Such a century was a legitimate offspring of the eighteenth century, of the years from 1700 to 1800, when our grandfathers' grandfathers lived —that era of revolution and heart searching that gave the world George Washington and the French Revolution. Behind the eighteenth century looms the age of Louis XIV of France, an age of mighty leaders: Richelieu, Gustavus Adolphus, and Oliver Cromwell. Thus we come back on the world's way, through three centuries of imperialism, revolution and commercial democracy, to two great centuries which prepared Europe for the years from 1600 to 1900—the century of the Protestant Reformation and the century of the Renaissance. The African Slave trade was the child of the Renaissance. We do not realize this; we think of the slave trade as a thing apart, the incident of a decade or a century, and yet let us never forget that from the year 1442, when Antonio Gonzales first looked upon the river of Gold, until 1807, when Great Britain first checked the slave trade, for three hundred and sixty-five years Africa was surrendered wholly to the cruelty and rapacity of the Christian man-dealer, and for full five hundred years and more this frightful heart disease of the Dark Continent destroyed the beginnings of Negro civilization, overturned governments, murdered men, disrupted families and poisoned the civilized world. Do you want an explanation of the degradation of this pitiful little nest perched in the crimson soil of Georgia? Ask your fathers and your father's fathers, for they know. Nay, you need not go back even to their memories.

In 1880 a traveler crossed Africa from Lake Nyassa to Lake Tanganyika. He saw the southern end of the lake peopled with large and prosperous villages. The next traveler who

followed in 1890 found not a solitary human being—nothing but burned homes and bleaching skeletons. He tells us that the Wa-Nkonde tribe to which these people belonged, was, until this event, one of the most prosperous tribes in East Central Africa. Their people occupied a country of exceptional fertility and beauty. Three rivers, which never failed in the severest drought, ran through their territory, and their crops were the richest and most varied in the country. They possessed herds of cattle and goats; they fished in the lake with nets; they wrought iron into many-patterned spear-heads with exceptional ingenuity and skill; and that even artistic taste had begun to develop among them was evident from the ornamental work of their huts, which were unique for clever construction and beauty of design. This people, in short, by their own inherent ability and the natural resources of their country, were on the high road to civilization. Then came the overthrow. Arab traders mingled with them, settled peacefully among them, obeyed their laws, and gained their confidence. The number of the traders slowly increased; the power of the chief was slowly undermined, until, at last, with superior weapons and reinforcements, every vestige of the tribe was swept away and their lands laid in red ruins. Fourteen villages they razed from the ground and, finally, seizing more slaves than they could transport, drove the rest into the tall dry grass and set it on fire; and in the black forest was silence.

This took place in the nineteenth century during your lives, in the midst of modern missionary effort. But worse was the tale of the eighteenth century and the seventeenth century and the sixteenth century, and this whole dark crime against a human race began in 1442 when the historic thirty Negroes landed in Lisbon.

Systematic man-hunting was known in ancient times, but it subsided as civilization advanced, until the Mohammedan fanatics swept across Africa. Arabian slavery, however, had its mitigations. It was patriarchal house service; the slave might hope to rise and, once admitted to the household of faith, he became in fact, and not merely in theory, a man and a

brother. The domestic slavery of the African tribes represented that first triumph of humanity that leads the savage to spare his foe's life and use his labor. Such slaves could and did rise to freedom and preferment; they became parts of the new tribe. It was left to Christian slavery to improve on all this—to make slavery a rigid unending caste by adding to bondage the prejudice of race and color. Marauding bands traversed the forests, fell upon native villages, slew the old and young and drove the rest in herds to the slave market; tribe was incited against tribe, and nation against nation. As Mr. Stanley tells us, "While a people were thus subject to capture and expatriation, it was clearly impossible that any intellectual or moral progress could be made. The greater number of those accessible from the coast were compelled to study the best methods of avoiding the slaver and escaping his force and his wiles; the rest only thought of the arts of kidnapping their innocent and unsuspecting fellow creatures. Yet, contradictory as it may appear to us, there were not wanting at the same time zealous men who devoted themselves to Christianity. In Angola, Congo and Mozambique, and far up the Zambesi, missionaries erected churches and cathedrals, appointed bishops and priests who converted and baptized; while at the mouth of the Congo, the Niger and the Zambesi their countrymen built slave baccaroons and anchored their murderous slave ships. Europeans legalized and sanctioned the slave trade; the public conscience of the period approved it; the mitred heads of the church blessed the slave gangs as they marched to the shore, and the tax-collector received the levy per head as lawful revenue."

The development of the trade depended largely upon the commercial nations, and, as they put more and more ruthless enterprise into the traffic, it grew and flourished. First came the Portugese as the world's slave trader, secured in their monopoly by the Bull of Demarcation issued by Pope Alexander VI. Beginning in 1442 they traded a hundred and fifty years, until Portugal was reduced to a province of Spain in 1580 and her African settlements neglected. Immediately the thrifty Dutch began to monopolize the trade, and held it for a

century, until Oliver Cromwell deprived them of it. The celebrated Dutch West India Company intrigued with native states and gained a monopoly of the trade in Negroes from 1630 to 1668. They whirled a stream of cargoes over the great seas, filled the West Indies, skirted the coasts of America and, sailing up the curving river to Jamestown, planted the Negro problems in Virginia in 1619. Then the English scented gain and bestirred themselves mightily.

Two English slave ships sailed from Plymouth in the middle of the sixteenth century, but the great founder of the English slave trade was Sir John Hawkins. Queen Elizabeth had some scruples at the trade in human beings, and made Hawkins promise to seize only those who were willing to go with him—a thing which he easily promised and easily forgot. This Sir John Hawkins was a strange product of his times. Brave, ruthless, cruel and religious: a pirate, a man-stealer and a patriot. He sailed to Africa in the middle of the sixteenth century, and immediately saw profits for English gain. He burned villages, murdered the natives and stole slaves, and then, urging his crew to love one another and serve God daily, he sailed merrily westward to the Spanish West Indies in the good ship called the "Jesus," and compelled the Spaniards to buy slaves at the muzzle of his guns.

Thus the English slave trade began under Queen Elizabeth, was encouraged under James I, who had made the translation of our Bible, and renewed by Oliver Cromwell, the great Puritan, who fought for it and seized the island of Jamaica as a slave market. So kings, queens and countries encouraged the trade, and the English soon became the world's greatest slave traders. New manufactures suitable to the trade were introduced into England, and the trade brought so much gold to Great Britain that they named the pieces "guineas" after the slave coast. Four million dollars a year went from England, in the eighteenth century, to buy slaves. Liverpool, the city where the trade centered, had, in 1783, nine hundred slave ships in the trade, and in eleven years they carried $76,000,000 worth of slaves to America, and they did this on a clear profit of $60,000,000.

These vast returns easily seduced the conscience of Europe. Boswell, the biographer of Dr. Johnson, called the slave trade "an important necessary branch of commerce," and probably the best people of England were of this opinion, and were surprised and indignant when Clarkson and Wilberforce began their campaign.

Gradually aroused by repeated and seemingly hopeless assaults, the conscience of England awoke and forbade the trade, in 1807, after having guided and cherished it for one hundred and fifty years. She called for aid from America, and America apparently responded in the statutes of 1808. But, true to her reputation as the most lawless nation on earth, America made no attempt to enforce the law in her own territory for a generation, and, after that, refused repeatedly and doggedly to prevent the slave trade of the world from sailing peacefully under the American flag for fifty years—up until the very outbreak of the civil war. Thus, from 1442 to 1860, nearly half a millennium, the Christian world fattened on the stealing of human souls.

Nor was there any pretence of charity in the methods of their doing. The capture of the slaves was organized deceit, murder and force; the shipping of them was far worse than the modern shipping of horses and cattle. Of this middle passage across the sea in slow sailing ships, with brutal sailors and little to eat, it has often been said "that never in the world before was so much wretchedness condensed in so little room." The Negroes, naked and in irons, were chained to each other hand and foot, and stowed so close that they were not allowed more than a foot and a half each. Thus, crammed together like herrings in a barrel, they contracted putrid and fatal disorders, so that those who came to inspect them in the morning had frequently to pick dead slaves out of their rows and unchain their corpses from the bodies of their wretched mates. Blood and filth covered the floors, the hot air reeked with contagion, and the death rate among the slaves often reached fifty per cent., not to speak of the decimation when once they reached the West Indian plantations.

The world will never know the exact number of slaves trans-

ported to America. Several thousand came in the fifteenth century, tens of thousands in the sixteenth, and hundreds of thousands in the seventeenth. In the eighteenth century more than two and one-half millions of slaves were transported, and in 1790 Negroes were crossing the ocean at the rate of sixty thousand a year. Dunbar thinks that nearly fifteen millions were transported in all.

Such was the traffic that revolutioned Africa. Instead of man-hunting being an incident of tribal wars, war became the incident of man-hunting. From the Senegal to St. Paul de Loanda winding, beaten tracks converged to the sea from every corner of the Dark Continent, covered with the blood of the foot-sore, lined with the bleaching bones of the dead, and echoing with the wails of the conquered, the bereaved and the dying. The coast stood bristling with forts and prisons to receive the human cattle. Across the blue waters of the Atlantic two hundred and fifty ships a year hurried to the west, with their crowded, half-suffocated cargoes. And during all this time Martin Luther had lived and died, Calvin had preached, Raphael had painted and Shakespeare and Milton sung; and yet for four hundred years the coasts of Africa and America were strewn with the dying and the dead, four hundred years the sharks followed the scurrying ships, four hundred years Ethiopia stretched forth her hands unto God. All this you know, all this you have read many a time. I tell it again, lest you forget.

What was slavery to the slave trade? Not simply forced labor, else we are all in bondage. Not simply toil without pay, even that is not unknown in America. No, the dark damnation of slavery in America was the destruction of the African family and of all just ideals of family life. No one pretends that the family life of African tribes had reached modern standards—barbarous nations have barbarous ideals. But this does not mean that they have no ideals at all. The patriarchal clan-life of the Africans, with its polygamy protected by custom, tradition and legal penalty, was infinitely superior to the shameless promiscuity of the West Indian plantations, the unhallowed concubinage of Virginia, or the prostitution of

Louisiana. And these ideals slavery broke and scattered and flirted to the winds and left ignorance and degradation in their train.

When the good New England clergyman thought it a shame that slaves should herd like animals, without a legal marriage bond, he devised a quaint ceremony for them in which Sally promised Bob to cleave to him. For life? Oh no. As long as "God in his providence" kept them on the same plantation. This was in New England where there was a good deal more conscience than in Georgia. What ideal of family life could one reasonably expect Bob and Sally to have? The modern American family (considering the shame of divorce) has not reached perfection; yet it is the result of long training and carefully fostered ideals and persistent purging of the socially unfit.

As I study this family in the little southern town, in all its degradation and uncleanness, I cannot but see a plain case of cause and effect. If you degrade people the result is degradation, and you have no right to be surprised at it. Nor am I called upon to apologize for these people, or to make fun of their dumb misery. For their condition there is an apology due, witness High Heaven; but not from me.

Upon the town we have visited, upon the state, upon this section, the awful incubus of the past broods like a writhing sorrow, and when we turn our faces from that past, we turn it not to forget but to remember; viewing degradation with fear and not contempt, with awe and not criticism, bowing our head and straining willing ears to the iron voice

> ". . . . . of Nature merciful and stern.
> I teach by killing, let others learn."

But the Negroes of the South are not all upon this low level. From this Nadir they stretch slowly, resolutely upward, by infinite gradation, helped now by the hand of a kindly master or a master's son, now by the sacrifice of friends; always by the ceaseless energy of a people who will never submit to burial alive.

Look across the street of your little southern town: here is a better house—a mother and father, two sons and a girl. They are hard-working people and good people. They read

and write a little and, though they are slow and good natured, they are seldom idle. And yet they are unskilled, without foresight, always in debt and living from hand to mouth. Hard pressed they may sink into crime; encouraged they may rise to comfort, but never to wealth. Why? Because they and their fathers have been trained this way. What does a slave know of saving? What can he know of forethought? What could he learn even of skill, save in exceptional cases? In other words, slavery must of necessity send into the world of work a mass of unskilled laborers who have no idea of what thrift means; who have been a part of a great economic organization but had nothing to do with its organizing; and so when they are suddenly called to take a place in a greater organization, in which free individual initiative is a potent factor, they cannot, for they do not know how; they lack skill and, more than that, they lack ideals!

And so we might go on: past problems of work and wages, of legal protection, of civil rights and of education, up to this jaunty, little yellow house on a cross street with a flower-bed struggling sturdily with the clay, with vines and creepers and a gleam of white curtains and a decorous parlor. If you enter this house you may not find it altogether up to your ideals. A Dutch housekeeper would find undiscovered corners, and a fastidious person might object to the general scheme of decoration. And yet, compared with the homes in the town, white or black, the house is among the best. It may be the home of a Negro butcher who serves both sides the color line, or of a small grocer, a carpenter, a school teacher or a preacher. Whatever this man may be, he is a leader in a peculiar sense—the ideal-maker in his group of people. The white world is there, but it is the other side of the color line; it is seen distinctly and from afar. Of white and black there is no mingling in church and school, in general gatherings. The black world is isolated and alone; it gets its ideals, its larger thoughts, its notions of life, from these local leaders; they set the tone to that all-powerful spiritual world that surrounds and envelopes the souls of men; their standards of living, their interpretation of sunshine and rain and human hearts, their thoughts

of love and labor, their aspirations and dim imaginings—all that makes life *life*.

Not only does this group leader guide a mass of men isolated in space, but also isolated in time. For we must remember that not only did slavery overthrow the Negro family and teach few lessons of thrift and foresight; it also totally broke a nation from all its traditions of the past in every realm of life. I fear I cannot impress upon you the full meaning of such a revolution. A nation that breaks suddenly with its past is almost fatally crippled. No matter how crude or imperfect that past may be, with all its defects, it is the foundation upon which generations to come must build. Beauty and finish and architectural detail are not required of it, but the massive weight of centuries of customs and traditions it must have. The slave trade, a new climate, a new economic regime, a new language and a new religion separated the American Negro as completely from his fatherland as it is possible for human agencies to do. The result is curious. There is a certain swaying in the air, a tilting and a crumbling, a vast difficulty of adjustment—of making the new ideas of work and wealth, of authority and right, fit in and hitch themselves to something gone; to the authority of the fathers, the customs of the past in a nation without grandfathers. So, then, the Negro group leader not only sets present standards, but he supplies in a measure the lack of past standards, and his leading is doubly difficult, since with Emancipation there came a second partial breaking with the past. The leader of the masses must discriminate between the good and bad in the past; he must keep the lesson of work and reject the lesson of concubinage; he must add more lessons of moral rectitude to the old religious fervor; he must, in fine, stand to this group in the light of the interpreter of the civilization of the twentieth century to the minds and hearts of people who, from sheer necessity, can but dimly comprehend it. And this man—I care not what his vocation may be—preacher, teacher, physician, or artisan, this person is going to solve the Negro problem; for that problem is at bottom the clash of two different stand-

ards of culture, and this priest it is who interprets the one to the other.

Let me for a moment recapitulate. In the life of advancing peoples there must go on simultaneously a struggle for existence, accumulation of wealth, education of the young, and a development in culture and the higher things of life. The more backward the nation the larger sum of effort goes into the struggle for existence; the more forward the nation the larger and broader is the life of the spirit. For guidance, in taking these steps in civilization, the nation looks to four sources: the precepts of parents, the sight of seers, the opinion of the majority and the traditions of the past.

Here, then, is a group of people in which every one of these great sources of inspiration is partially crippled: the family group is struggling to recover from the debauchery of slavery; the number of the enlightened leaders must necessarily be small; the surrounding and more civilized white majority is cut off from its natural influence by the color line; and the traditions of the past are either lost, or largely traditions of evil and wrong.

Any one looking the problem squarely in the face might conclude that it was unjust to expect progress, or the signs of progress, until many generations had gone by. Indeed, we must not forget that those people who claimed to know the Negro best, freely and confidently predicted during the abolition controversy—

1. That free Negroes would not, and could not, work effectively.
2. That the freedman who did work, would not save.
3. That it was impossible to educate Negroes.
4. That no members of the race gave signs of ability and leadership.
5. That the race was morally degenerate.

Not only was this said, it was sincerely and passionately believed, by honorable men who, with their forefathers, had lived with the Negro three hundred years. And yet to-day the Negro in one generation forms the chief laboring force of the most rapidly developing part of the land. He owns twelve

million acres of land, two hundred and fifty million dollars worth of farm property, and controls as owner or renter five hundred millions. Nearly three-fifths of the Negroes have learned to read and write. An increasing number have given evidence of ability and thoughtfulness—not, to be sure, of transcendent genius, but of integrity, large knowledge and common-sense. And finally there can be to-day no reasonable dispute but that the number of efficient, law-abiding and morally upright black people in this land is far larger than it ever was before, and is daily growing. Now these obvious and patent facts do not by any means indicate the full solution of the problem. There are still hosts of idle and unreliable Negro laborers; the race still, as a whole, has not learned the lesson of thrift and saving; fully seventy-five per cent. are still fairly designated as ignorant. The number of group leaders of ability and character is far behind the demand, and the development of a trustworthy upper class has, as is usually true, been accompanied by the differentiation of a dangerous class of criminals.

What the figures of Negro advancement mean is, that the development has been distinctly and markedly in the right direction, and that, given justice and help, no honest man can doubt the outcome. The giving of justice means the recognition of desert wherever it appears; the right to vote on exactly the same terms as other people vote; the right to the equal use of public conveniences and the educating of youth in the public schools. On these points, important as they are, I will not dwell. I am more interested here in asking how these struggling people may be actually helped. I conceive that such help may take any one of four forms:—

1. Among a people deprived of guiding traditions, they may be furnished trained guidance in matters of civilization and ideals of living.

2. A people whose family life is not strongly established must have put before them and brought home to them the morals of sane and sanitary living.

3. The mass of Negro children must have the keys of knowledge put into their hands by good elementary schools.

4. The Negro youth must have the opportunity to learn the technical skill of modern industry.

All these forms of help are important. No one of them can be neglected without danger of increasing complications as time flies, and each one of them are lines of endeavor in which the Negro cannot be reasonably expected to help himself without aid from others. For instance, it cannot be seriously expected that a race of freedmen would have the skill necessary for modern industry. They cannot teach themselves what they themselves do not know, and consequently a legitimate and crying need of the south is the establishment of industrial schools. The public school system is one of the foundation stones of free republican government. Negro children, as well as other children, have right to ask of the nation knowledge of reading, writing and the rules of number, together with some conception of the world in time and space. Not one Negro child in three is to-day receiving any such training or has any chance to receive it, and a decent public school system in the South, aided by the National government, is something that must come in the near future, if you expect the race problem to be settled.

Here then are two great needs: public schools and industrial schools. How are schools of any sort established? By furnishing teachers. Given properly equipped teachers and your schools are a foregone success; without them, I care not how much you spend on buildings and equipment, the schools are a failure. It is here that Negro colleges, like Atlanta University, show their first usefulness.

But, in my list of ways in which the Negro may legitimately be helped to help himself, I named two other avenues of aid, and I named them first because to my mind they are even of more importance than popular education. I mean the moral uplift of a people. Now moral uplift comes not primarily from schools, but from strong home life and high social ideals. I have spoken of the Negroes' deficiency in these lines and the reason of that deficiency. Here, then, is a chance for help, but how? Not by direct teaching, because that is often ineffective and it is precluded in the South by the color line.

It can be done, to my mind, only by group leadership; by planting in every community of Negroes black men with ideals of life and thrift and civilization, such as must in time filter through the masses and set examples of moral living and correct thinking to the great masses of Negroes who spend but little of their life in schools. After all the education of men comes but in small degree from schools; it comes mostly from the fireside, from companionships, from your social set, from the opinion of each individual's little world. This is even more true of the Negro. His world is smaller. He is shut in to himself by prejudice; he has, by reason of his poverty, little time for school. If he is to learn, he must learn from his group leaders, his daily companions, his social surroundings, his own dark world of striving, longing and dreaming. Here, then, you must plant the seed of civilization. Here you must place men educated, not merely in the technique of teaching or skill of hand, but above and beyond that into a thorough understanding of their age and the demands and meaning of modern culture. In so far as the college of to-day stands for the transmission from age to age of all that is best in the world's deeds, thoughts and traditions, in so far it is a crying necessity that a race, ruthlessly torn from its traditions and trained for centuries awry, should receive back through the higher culture of its gifted children some of the riches of the great system of culture into which it has been thrust. If the meaning of modern life cannot be taught at Negro hearthsides because the parents themselves are untaught, then its ideals can be forced into the centres of Negro life only by the teaching of higher institutions of learning and the agency of thoroughly educated men.

W. E. Burghardt DuBois.

Atlanta University.

IS VIVISECTION JUSTIFIABLE?

I.

It might reasonably be supposed that nothing new now rests to be said about a question which has been so often and so hotly discussed in the past as this, and has again and again temporarily become a theme of public interest. A little consideration, however, must show that the controversy has been confined almost entirely to parties in whom it is impossible not to suspect a certain degree of prejudice,—namely, those who practice vivisection and those who claim to be protectors of animals. It has, moreover, been carried on under the unsatisfactory conditions in which one side denounces the other as an ignorant, sentimental folk, whose enthusiasm for the immediate welfare of the animal world blinds their eyes to truthfulness and to the benefits of vivisection while, the "protectors of animals," on the other hand, insist that vivisectors have about the same right to be heard upon the justifiability of vivisection as a bird-catcher on the propriety of cooking larks or of wearing osprey feathers.. Vivisection is to their mind merely a passing fashion, for which unmerited academic position and the mistaken sanction of those occupied in scientific research form the attractive recompense. It is clear, then, that the subject can be treated with the necessary impartiality only by one who, while sympathetic towards dumb creatures and having adequate knowledge of modern biological science, does not engage in the practice of vivisection; who, if he desire adequate competency, should have some general acquaintance with the principles of ethics and have had a training in psychology that will help him to gauge the probable extent and intensity of animal suffering.

Two distinct questions have to be answered. Is vivisection moral? Is vivisection useful? The former question clearly deserves consideration before the latter, for, if once vivisection be proved immoral, its utility can hardly remain a matter of serious concern.

II.

Of those opposed to vivisection on the ground of its immorality, there is a small section whose views may be conveniently stated at once, as they can then be dismissed with little further consideration. These people consider that the animals of this world are specially placed under man's protection by the Divine Will. They regard it as sinful and as an abuse of our superior intelligence for man to give pain to animals for any purpose whatever. They would, if possible, refuse to avail themselves of the discoveries obtained by such means, classing them, as did Miss Frances Power Cobbe, with the results obtained by "robbery, perfidy or any other crime between man and man." The end, they declare, never justifies the means. Now, to those who uphold this variety of anti-vivisectionist opinion, there is absolutely nothing to be said. Their standpoint rests on religious faith, which is naturally impregnable to argument. Were they only consistent; did they, for example, refuse to slaughter cattle or to poison vermin for the sake of increasing their creature comforts, one could not but respect their attitude.

This, which may, for brevity's sake, be styled the "religious" view, is the extreme form of another, more generally held and regarded, perhaps, as the "common sense" view. It permits the infliction of a certain amount of pain upon animals, provided that the gain to man is sufficiently great. It countenances the operation of castration, so crudely performed on millions of animals annually, on the ground that man obtains thereby better beasts of burden and finer quality of flesh and wool. It justifies the introduction of horses into the battlefield, because cavalry are indispensable in warfare. A salmon may be "played," a fox or stag may be hunted, because sport is man's instinctive recreation and because the skill or the social pleasures involved are sufficiently great. But vivisection is intolerable, as its results are incommensurably small compared with the suffering produced. Such, no doubt, is the attitude of the majority of anti-vivisectionists,—an attitude which only a careful estimate of the resulting pains and gains of vivisection can confirm or condemn.

These two views, the "religious" and the "common-sense," as they have here been styled, are alike obtained from the "zoocentric" standpoint; that is, where vivisection appears immoral because of the suffering which must inevitably be inflicted on the animal world. But there is another and totally different point of view from which the subject may be regarded, the "anthropocentric" standpoint, which condemns vivisection, not so much on account of the *pain* endured by the animals, as on the ground of the *cruelty* involved; that is, the effect produced by animal suffering upon man. This third view may, perhaps, best be designated "naturalistic."

The question here arises, Who, in the absence of scriptural authority (rejected by naturalism), has a right to condemn as immoral a practice which is confined to a small but intelligent section of a community? It is well recognized that nearly every walk of life sanctions certain acts which in the other walks would be deemed immoral. Different communities, different sections of communities, frame their own systems of morality. The ethical codes of the company-promoter, the farm-hand or the slum-dweller differ both from one another and from that of the general population, just as, on a larger scale, the morality of the savage is different from that of the European. May not vivisection in this way be regarded as a moral act by physiologists and pathologists and as an immoral act by other people? In this event, have the latter the right to interfere with the practice? Most certainly they have. For, even if vivisection has not a deteriorating effect on the natures of those engaged in it, even if it does not render them callous and insensitive to the sufferings of others (a protasis which will be examined immediately), yet the general community may legitimately intervene on the ground that it is harmful for them to feel that such suffering is being inflicted in their midst.

At his examination before the Royal Commission on Vivisection in 1875, Dr. Klein was asked (Q. 3539), "When you say that you only use them [anæsthetics] for convenience' sake, do you mean that you have no regard at all for the sufferings of the animals?" And his reply, "No regard at all," has been widely held to prove the utter heartlessness of those who experi-

ment on living animals. Yet not only is Dr. Klein perfectly right, but—as everyone who knows them can testify—vivisectors are not less kind and sympathetic than any other body of men. The truth lies in the fact that everyone lives a life of multiple personalities. The man of business is one person at his office; he is another in the heart of his family. The thoughts of the botanist, when dissecting flowers, are not those he has when admiring a beautiful landscape. The surgeon and the vivisector before the operating table have to banish all regard for the victim of their knife. Sympathy would be not only useless, but positively detrimental to the success of their work. All attention has to be concentrated on the operation which mature consideration has previously dictated.

Indeed, there is no ground for suspecting that vivisection has a baneful effect on the temperament of those that practice it. The question remains, then, Has the public a right to intervene on account of the cruel acts which, it feels, are being perpetrated? And thus the further question arises, How much pain does vivisection produce? It is well understood that two kinds of experience of very different origin are included under the word "pain." In one sense, pain is opposed to pleasure, and has reference to the general tone of consciousness, called feeling. Thus, we are pleased at success, pained at bereavement; an animal is pleased at the sight of food, pained when chased by the foe. In the other sense, pain is the result of appropriate stimulation of almost any sensory nerve in the body. Common parlance distinguishes these two kinds of pain as "mental" and "physical." Now, there is little evidence of mental pain in the subjects of vivisection. Again and again dogs have been observed to wag the tail or lick the hands of the operator, even immediately before the beginning of the experiment. Shortly after the severest operation an animal is generally ready to eat its food. With regard to physical pain, it is desirable to consider somewhat fully the object of vivisection experiments, before an estimate of the amount involved can be arrived at.

Vivisection is employed to throw light either on healthy (physiological) or on morbid (pathological) processes. The prime aim of physiological experiment, broadly speaking, is to

place the animal under the most natural conditions attainable. Pain itself is hardly ever the object of study. It is detrimental to the purposes of physiological experiment and is studiously avoided. Every effort is made to diminish it, even in those cases where organs or parts of organs are removed from the body in order to test their function by a process of elimination; in such operations an anæsthetic is always administered. "In no case has a cutting operation more severe than a superficial venisection been allowed to be performed without anæsthetics"[1] during recent years in this country. Surgery is strictly aseptic. Should sepsis set in, the law requires that the animal be killed. Pain is obviously detrimental to physiological experiment because of the accompanying disturbances in muscular action by which we commonly recognize it. Changes in the calibre of the blood vessels, changes in the force and frequency both of the heart-beat and of the respirations, cries and bodily movements,—these are the signs of pain. Clearly, all, in various degrees, impair the success of physiological research, and are to be avoided. But, while they are all *concomitants* of pain, it must never be forgotten that they are by no means sure *evidence* of pain. Cries and muscular movements, apparently indicative of pain, may occur during operation on man, when the subject is perfectly under the influence of an anæsthetic. They may be evoked from an animal when its cerebral hemispheres are no longer connected with the rest of the nervous system. Nor are these concomitants a sure *measure* of pain. Man is only too prone to suppose that the behaviour that he observes in others implies the presence of the same state of feelings in them as would induce the same behaviour in himself. When an animal manifests the appropriate signs, the sentimentalist at once leaps to the conclusion that it must suffer just the feelings of distress which would be his under similar conditions. Errors of this kind are so well known to students of mental phenomena that they have been termed "the psychologist's fallacy." Now, there is abundant evidence to show that, even in man, wide

[1] Reports of the Inspector of experiments performed on living animals (Acts 39 and 40 Vic. C. 77) 1901, 1902. A similar sentence occurs in Reports 1899 and 1900.

differences in sensibility to pain exist, varying according to race and civilization. The natives of the Torres Straits, for instance, who have been expressly examined in this respect, proved to be about as half as sensitive to pain as Englishmen.[2] How much more obtuse, then, must be the suffering of animals, who differ in mental build from man immeasurably more than the races of men differ from one another!

Moreover, those areas of the body, stimulation of which can produce painful sensations, are far less numerous than might be supposed. It is true that, when inflamed, almost any part may become painful. But, under non-inflammatory conditions, most, if not all, the internal organs may be handled painlessly. Thus, Sir Charles Bell wrote of the human brain, "I have had my finger deep in the anterior lobes of the brain, when the patient, being at the time acutely sensible, and capable of expressing himself, complained only of the integument."[3] The recent experiments of Professor Lennander on man have confirmed the view that the human viscera and their supporting peritoneum are wholly insensitive to pain. Bichat long ago wrote that he had seen dogs tearing their peritoneum and devouring their own intestines, which had protruded from a hole in the abdominal wall. Considerations of this kind only show what control the layman should exercise over the springs of his natural pity, when he reads of seemingly painful, but really painless, experiments upon the internal organs of living animals, which physiologists of this country compulsorily, of others voluntarily, put under the influence of an anæsthetic during such operations.

It is not to be denied that some pain must ensue during physiological experiments, and it may be urged with reason that the amount of pain must be considerably greater when vivisection is performed for pathological ends. This objection gains apparent support from the fact that the greater number of vivisections performed by pathologists in this country require

[2] Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to the Torres Straits. Cambridge, 1903. Vol. 2, p. 195.

[3] Quoted in "Experiments on Animals," by Stephen Paget. London, 1903. P. 75, footnote.

a license, known as Certificate A, which permits experiment without an anæsthetic. It has, however, been already explained that no operation more severe than the section of a superficial vein is allowed to take place with this certificate. Of the 12,776 vivisections performed with Certificate A last year, 7,854 were merely inoculations, the chief objects of which were to diagnose various diseases in animals and man (no less than 153 referred to the detection of rabies), to examine milk for the bacillus of tuberculosis, hair for the bacillus of anthrax, to test the safety of atmospheric air and sewage, to standardize antitoxins for the purpose of protecting animals and man from disease. A large proportion of such experiments must have been absolutely negative. The air or the milk, for example, must have been often healthy, and the inoculated animal suffered no more pain than was involved in the needle-prick. Moreover, the law of the country compels the vivisector to kill the animal when the object of the experiment is completed, if, as is sometimes inevitable, pain ensues from inoculation. Even when it dies of a drug or a toxin, the pain of such a well-fed animal cannot exceed that of a poisoned, uncared-for rat or house-mouse.

In fine, not only is the pain of vivisection reduced to its lowest limits, not only do the interests of the experimenter and the law compel him to take good care of the animal, but the severity of animal suffering is far less than the lay mind would naturally suppose, and there is no reason to believe that vivisection renders the operator indifferent to the feelings of others.

III.

It is, fortunately, needless to examine the second part of the problem, namely the utility of vivisection, at such length as the first. The necessary material has been ably and impartially published by Stephen Paget in his "Experiments on Animals," and may be directly consulted by those who wish to investigate the subject without prejudice. Foremost among the results of modern vivisection stands our vast progress in the study of micro-organisms and their relation to the prevention and cure of disease. Now, certain essentials have to be rigidly fulfilled, before any micro-organism can be definitely proved to be a

factor in the production of a disease. The bacillus must be constantly present in all cases; it must be isolated and cultivated outside the body; it must produce a similar disease *when introduced into another organism,* in which, again, the presence of the bacillus must be proved. Bacteriology, then, *depends upon* vivisection. By means of inoculation, not only is the absolute proof established of the dependence of disease upon the micro-organism, but antitoxins—certain chemical substances which are elaborated in the blood of appropriately inoculated animals by nature for the purpose of resisting the disease—have been isolated for use, to the enormous benefit of animals and mankind. As Stephen Paget points out (*op. cit,* p. 289), "in Cape Colony alone, so far back as 1899, almost half a million cattle had received preventive treatment against rinderpest." Tuberculosis in cattle has been likewise checked by the use of tuberculin. The severity and fatality of typhoid fever, and especially of diphtheria, have been unquestionably reduced by the use of the appropriate antitoxin. Similar success has attended the antitoxin treatment of Mediterranean fever, which for so long defied every known drug. Hardly a failure is on record from the treatment of snake-bite. The value of vaccination in small-pox is universally recognized by those competent to judge. And even where bacteriological research has yielded no cure, its influence has been scarcely less striking. The remedy for tuberculosis has still to be found, but untold good has already resulted from the discovery that a bacillus lies at the root of the disease. Precautions are now taken (rightly or wrongly, it remains to be seen) against tuberculous meat and milk, a more sanguine view of consumption of the lungs is entertained, the sputa are disinfected and the patients are isolated at any early stage of the disease. Contrast this condition of affairs with the present attitude towards cancer of the causes of which we are totally ignorant, or towards diabetes of which vivisection has so far taught us something, but not everything of the ætiology. Experiments on living animals are at this moment being performed, to preserve animals and men from these dread diseases. Who, in the name of reason and humanity, would forbid them?

Heroes have not been wanting who have offered their own persons for experiment to advance pathological knowledge. In the researches upon yellow fever, several individuals were experimentally inoculated. The transmissibility of bovine tuberculosis to man has been similarly tested. A martyr met his death, demonstrating the contagiousness of Peruvian Sore. Two Englishmen, to prove the connection of the mosquito with malaria, submitted their bodies to be bitten by mosquitoes which had been sent here from Italy after having been fed upon the blood of malarious patients. If legislation can stay experiments on living animals, it is powerless to prevent voluntary experiment of man on himself. The first use of a new drug, the first performance of a new operation, are not these experiments of man on man? Should the invaluable anti-plague *bouillon* have been tested on men, instead of on rabbits, before its introduction as a national remedy? Or should men, instead of monkeys, have been experimentally fly-bitten, in order to obtain proof that the tsetse-fly transmits to men the micro-organism of sleeping sickness; the *Anopheles* mosquito, the micro-organism of malaria; the *Culex* mosquito, that of yellow fever and of elephantiasis? Havana is practically rid of yellow fever for the first time in history, and malaria is fast disappearing in similar fashion from its haunts, wherever stagnant pools are properly treated so as to make them serve no longer as the breeding places of mosquitoes.

It is almost needless to give further examples of the value of vivisection experiments. The experimental determination of the functions of various parts of the cerebral hemispheres, especially in the monkey, has led to successful operations in certain forms of epilepsy and cerebral tumor where the affected area can be accurately localized, inspected and removed. The discovery of the meaning of the sounds of the heart was aided by the modification of one or other sound in animals by experimental means. Vivisection has completely changed our views of the relation of the internal organs of the body to the general economy. Indeed, as Charles Darwin declared, "I cannot think of any one step which has been made in physiology without that aid."

It has been said that these various advances might have been made without the aid of vivisection, but history shows plainly enough how in the absence of experiment men cling to authority rather than admit the discovery of new facts. In his address at the last year's Medical Congress at Cairo, Professor Bouchard declared that "the empiricism of older days has given us nearly all our drugs, among which are several which cure, . . . the use of which we have learnt by happy accident."[4] Fortunately, "happy accident" and mediævalism no longer content us: the modern spirit requires accurate and systematic investigation. It is true that quinine was known to cure malaria long before the *plasmodium malariae* was found, but the discovery of the *plasmodium* and our knowledge of its life-history have enabled us to administer the drug for men rationally and efficiently.

A favorite quotation in anti-vivisectionist literature is culled from the works of the great English vivisector, Sir Charles Bell: "Experiments have never been the means of discovery." This sentiment is broadly true in one sense. Experiments are rarely performed with a view to discovery, and rarely lead to it by accident. No scientific investigator would say, "Let us make this experiment and see what we can discover." He frames a theory on the basis of the facts already known to him, and he proceeds to confirm or to reject this theory by an appeal to experiment. It is in this way that knowledge advances. Without experiment it must stagnate.

Apart from all question of its morality and utility, vivisection leads directly to increased wisdom. Apart from the fact that the useless disconnected knowledge of to-day becomes the useful co-ordinated knowledge of the morrow, any rational mode of research which yields new results is imperishable. With all its power Legislation can never quench the thirst after Truth, or extinguish the race of Martyrs. As long as retrograde and progressive sections co-exist in the same community, so long will the efforts of the reactionary always be felt within it. There will be always some to maintain the geocentric theory

[4] Lancet, Feb. 7, 1903.

of the universe or the seven-day theory of creation, however clear the evidence to the contrary; always some to believe that the Fall of Man comes from the Fruit of Knowledge. These are the real opponents of Vivisection.

C. S. MYERS.

GONVILLE AND CAIUS COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.

PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES' INTERPRETATION OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.*

The increasing consideration shown to empirical reality is strikingly illustrated in the recent attempts of certain investigators to establish, on empirical ground, the belief in immortality. In a somewhat different sphere we find a similar effort on the part of some who are endeavoring to replace Naturalism and Absolute Idealism by a Pluralistic Idealism not very distant from Polytheism. It is in connection with this attempt that "The Varieties of Religious Experience" chiefly deserves attention. It is in many respects a marvelous book, well deserving the abundant and high praises it has received. But some of its principles and its chief conclusion are so unusual and of such pregnant consequences to Science and Religion, that they ought not to be allowed to pass without further discussion.

I confess that the admiration I have for the author of the "Principles of Psychology" and the gratefulness I feel for his many valuable contributions to Psychology, make it particularly unpleasant to keep my mind, for the purpose of this paper, upon the weak points of his book. I cannot even have the satisfaction of beginning with something like the fine appreciative review of Professor Flournoy in the Revue Philosophique, as I would try to do if space permitted.

*"The Varieties of Religious Experience," being the Gifford Lectures for 1901-1902.

Professor James has been known so far, almost exclusively, as a psychologist. In this book he treats psychologically of a number of religious experiences. Most readers suppose, therefore, naturally enough, that they have in hand a more or less systematic treatise on the psychology of religious life. The author, however, does not make that claim; he gives us his work as a "crumb-like" contribution to the dawning *Science of Religions.* Unfortunately, he restricts its task to the elimination (by comparative and historical criticism and by confrontation with the results of natural science) of the local and of the accidental, of old incrustations in dogma and worship and of the doctrines now known to be scientifically absurd or incongruous. The result to be expected from this science is, the "extraction from the privacies of religious experience of some general facts which can be defined in formulas upon which everybody may agree." That is, he tells us, "the laborious attempt" upon which he has been engaged.

Had he been able to keep within the strict limits of a science of religions so narrowly defined, the outcome of his effort would have been no more than what it seems to be when he sums up, in the concluding lecture, the uniform deliverance in which religions all appear to meet:—

1. A sense that there is something wrong about us as we naturally stand.

2. A sense that we are saved from the wrongness by making proper connection with the higher powers.

The second proposition includes a three-fold belief: (1) in a more spiritual universe of which the physical world is a part and from which it draws its chief significance; (2) in union or harmonious relation with that higher universe as our true end; and (3) in prayer or inner communion with the spirit thereof—be that spirit "God" or "law"—as a process wherein work is really done, and spiritual energy flows in and produces effects, psychological or material, within the phenomenal world.

Many will be of opinion that these conclusions might have been taken as already sufficiently well established by the philosophers of religion who have labored at the same task. Fortunately for us, the author of the "Principles of Psychology"

could not limit himself to a delineation of the universal features of religion, and one could not do him a greater injustice than to take this summary as a measure of the value of the lectures. His purpose, we take it, was not so much to contribute to the science of religions, as defined by him, as to take a further step[1] in the preparation of a startling system of Pluralistic Idealism soon to be completed and made public, and nowhere has Professor James' rare personality found freer, fuller and more brilliant expression than in these studies, at once ethical, psychological and philosophical.

Of late, and on several occasions, Professor James has given fragmentary utterance to a Pluralistic Idealism, in which his passionately individualistic soul, enamored of the fullness and picturesqueness of life, could find affective as well as logical satisfaction. In the phenomena studied by the Society for Psychic Research, he had already seen intimations, if not proofs, of the interference in human life of spiritual agents. Was there no such indication in religious experiences? Would not religious life yield its support to the hypothesis that the universe is, in fact, a *multiverse* of spiritual beings? "The Varieties of Religious Experience," I venture to affirm, was prepared primarily as an answer to this query, for it is a survey, not of religious life as a whole, but of that portion of it which seemed to promise a favorable answer to that question. The lectures consist essentially of a description and appreciation of two classes of religious phenomena (conversion and mystical experiences) to which is added, in conclusion, forty pages of philosophical speculation. The real outcome of the volume for the author—and it should be the outcome for the reader also—is, as far as the facts are concerned, that "there is actually and literally more life in our total soul than we are at any time aware of," and that "the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come." It is, moreover, touching the interpretation of the facts, that "the further limits of our being plunge into an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible and

[1] See "The Will to Believe" and his "Ingersoll Lecture on Immortality."

merely 'understandable' world." It plunges into a realm of spiritual agents, with whom we come in contact, at certain points of our being, and from whom "higher energies filter in."

When this is admitted to be the animating spirit of the work, one understands the omission from it of a type of religiosity not so striking and, philosophically, less interesting than the mystical, but much more common and probably as influential over human life. It is the type of which Calvin and Jonathan Edwards may be taken as illustrious instances, and the ordinary believers in a transcendent personal God as the commonplace representatives. For these people God and man never fuse together as the essential mystical doctrine would have it. The Sovereign Lord remains, beyond and outside of man, the Judge and Dispenser of punishments and rewards. With this distant, majestic Maker man can maintain only objective relations. It is, I presume, the failure to take into account the objective type of religiosity that has led Professor James into the unqualified statement that "personal religious experience has its root and centre in mystical states of consciousness." Strictly construed, this affirmation denies religious experience to the large mass of people, Christians and others, who never "mix it up" with their God, to the cold, dispassionate, logical, but often aggressive and grimly earnest individual whose transactions with God retain throughout the mark of externality. They are the spatially-minded people, hard-wed to the physical world, for whom the essence of the mystical experience can be but sheer nonsense.

One understands also, according to our interpretation of his purpose, how it happened that, of all men, Professor James should have taken on this occasion such a narrow view of the science of religions. One would have expected of him at least some vigorous utterance as to the particular task, and the great possibilities, of the so-far neglected Psychology of Religion. No one could have done as much as he for its advancement. Why he chose to define the science of religions so as to include in it no more than a part of the customary philosophy of religion, is a question to which I find no other answer.

So far we have dealt only with side issues. The "Varieties of Religious Experience" is, as already said, primarily an attempt to fasten on facts of religious experience a transcendental hypothesis. It purports to give empirical intimations in support of an hypothesis involving the existence of extra-human personalities. Our chief task, to which we now turn, is, therefore, the criticism of this alleged evidence.

Professor James is, of course, as fully aware as any representative of Naturalism, that the sudden moral transformations and the mystical phenomena which he studies may be claimed to be the results of unconscious, subliminal activities, *i.e.*, may be of purely subjective origin. He is even of opinion that the most important step forward in the science of psychology during the past forty years lies precisely in the discovery of the subconscious. And yet the subjective hypothesis leaves him unsatisfied. There are portions of these experiences which seem to him to remain outside its sphere of influence. One might ask why the author of the "Principles of Psychology" did not attempt a further extension of a principle of explanation already consecrated by the reclaiming of extensive portions of life heretofore surrendered by science to devils and angels, *i.e.*, multiple personality, the varied psychic manifestations of hysteria and of other nervous disorders. One of the clearest impressions one gets from the book is, that he does not desire to help out science. Psychologist turned metaphysician, his interest now lies in a ground of explanation which, as Kant says, "lifts us above the necessity of investigating nature." Professor James' peculiar empiricism is one which calls for the repetition of Kant's remark, in the "Discipline of Pure Reason," that transcendental hypotheses "do not advance reason, but rather stop it in its progress; that they render fruitless all its exertions in its own proper sphere, which is that of experience. For when the explanation of natural phenomena happens to be difficult, we have constantly at hand a transcendental ground of explanation which lifts us above the necessity of investigating nature."

For how much does the subconscious hypothesis satisfactorily account and what remains over? If we follow our

author in his exposition of the meaning and scope of the subliminal,[2] we shall have what seems to be a definite answer to the first part of the question.

There is in man not only the ordinary primary consciousness, but, in addition, a set of memories, thoughts and feelings which are outside of the primary consciousness, but yet must be classed as conscious facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs. This subliminal or transmarginal region "is obviously the larger part of each of us, for it is the abode of everything that is latent and the reservoir of everything that passes unrecorded or unobserved. It contains, for example, such things as all our momentarily inactive memories, and it harbors the spring of all our obscurely motived passions, impulses, likes, dislikes and prejudices. Our intuitions, hypotheses, fancies, superstitions, persuasions, convictions and, in general, all our non-rational operations, come from it. It is the source of our dreams. . . . In it arise whatever mystical experiences we may have, and our automatisms, sensory or motor; our life in hypnotic and 'hypnoid' conditions, if we are subject to such conditions; our delusions, fixed ideas and hysterical accidents, if we are hysteric subjects; our supranormal cognitions, if such there be, and if we are telepathic subjects. . . . In persons deep in religious life, as we have now abundantly seen,—and this is my conclusion,—the door into this region seems unusually wide open; at any rate, experiences making their entrance through that door have had emphatic influence in shaping religious history" (pp. 483-484). "The most important consequence of having a strongly developed ultra-marginal life of this sort is, that one's ordinary fields of consciousness are liable to incursions from it of which the subject does not guess the source, and which, therefore, take for him the form of unaccountable impulses to act, or inhibitions of action, of obsessive ideas, or even of hallucinations of sight and hearing . . ." (p. 234). One could not be more explicit and hardly more inclusive. The sudden disappearance of old vicious habits, the coming to the front of likes

[2] A considerable portion of the second lecture on Conversion is devoted to this topic. See pp. 230-243, 483-4, and again p. 512.

and dislikes until then unknown or not tolerated; unusual feelings, transes, automatic writing and other automatism, hallucinations, as well as various other functional disorders of sensibility and of motility,—in short, the facts observed in conversion and in the various mystical experiences are, or at least may be, the product of subconscious life. This subjective explanation is the one the psychologists endorse unanimously, I suppose.

It would seem after this that, for Professor James, the question of the *modus operandi* is closed; that he is irrevocably committed to a recognized principle of explanation. And yet it is not so. The door into the extra-human world he has apparently so well closed with one hand is forthwith reopened with the other: "But if you, being orthodox Christians, ask me as a psychologist whether the reference of a phenomenon to a subliminal self does not exclude the notion of the direct presence of the Deity altogether, I have to say frankly that as a psychologist I do not see why it necessarily should. The lower manifestations of the subliminal, indeed, fall within the resources of the personal subject. . . . But just as our primary wide-awake consciousness throws open our senses to the touch of things material, so it is logically conceivable that if there be higher spiritual agencies that can directly touch us, the psychological condition of their doing so might be our possession of a subconscious region, which alone should yield access to them. The hubbub of the waking life might close a door which, in the dreamy subliminal, might remain ajar or open" (p. 242).

For this ingenious contribution to a scientific explanation of the doctrine of predestination, Theologians ought to return thanks: he is predestined to be saved who chances to have a well-developed subliminal life, for then God will be able to reach him. But what will the empirical Philosophers say to this proof of Professor James' open-mindedness? They will say "the transcendental hypothesis remains a mere play of the imagination until you point out in human experience such phenomena as cannot be accounted for on the ground of explanation, acceptable to you as well as to us. Tell us what

you call the lower manifestations of the subliminal, and show us the higher. It will then be time for us to consider whether the naturalistic hypothesis is not sufficient." Professor James would, I believe, profess unreserved agreement with these would-be detractors. And he might use the opportunity to remind them that in metaphysics he is a sceptic and that he terms himself a radical empiricist. After this answer nothing would be left for the objector but to ask again that the so-called higher experiences be produced.

How many such have been vouchsafed to him we are not told. He refers to but one; the one of greatest convincing power, we may well suppose. It is an experiment with nitrous oxide. With an admirable and quite justifiable broadness of mind, Professor James classifies the drunken consciousness together with religious states as mystical,[3] because it possesses the four marks by which he would identify mystical states, *i.e.*, ineffability, noetic quality (these two bring about the feeling of illumination), transiency, and passivity. This experiment with a drug, or rather his way of regarding it, is at the root of his "overbelief;" it is the pivotal point of the discussion; the key to his argument. Nitrous oxide, we are told, stimulates the mystical consciousness in an extraordinary degree. Depth beyond depth of truth seems revealed to the inhaler. One conclusion which was forced upon him at the time is, that "our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. . . . No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded." So far we can all follow him. The particular forms of consciousness realized in dreams, in various forms of intoxication, in trances, etc., differ from the ordinary consciousness and ought to be taken into account in psychology and philosophy. What of it? Nothing to his purpose unless those experiences be interpreted in his own, to our mind, illegitimate, way. They all converge,

[3] "The drunken consciousness is one bit of the mystic consciousness." (P. 387.)

he tells us, towards a kind of insight to which he "cannot help ascribing some metaphysical significance. The keynote of it is, invariably, a reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictions and conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, here melted into unity. Not only do they, as contrasted species, belong to one and the same genus, but one of the species, the nobler and better one, is itself the genus, and so soaks up and absorbs its opposite into itself. I feel as if it must mean something like what the Hegelian philosophy means, if one could only lay hold of it more clearly" (p. 388).

Truly the new beatitude is a hard saying: "Blessed are the intoxicated, for to them the kingdom of spirits is revealed!" Observe that this mysterious insight justifies itself only in and to the artificial mystic state of mind: "To me the living sense of its reality only comes in the artificial mystic state of mind." One would look in vain anywhere in the whole extent of the book for any elucidating addition to the foregoing statements. Whatever is, and may be, apprehended by the ordinary rational consciousness in the remarkable religious and non-religious happenings put before the reader, has been, with perfect candor, surrendered to the enemy, and the only empirical excuse for supplementing the subjectivistic hypothesis with a transcendental one is the alleged existence of experiences declared unintelligible to the ordinary, rational consciousness.

At the close of the lectures on Mysticism our author sets down, more formally than he had done before, his position in regard to the authoritativeness of the claim of supernaturality made for the mystical consciousness. They are, to my mind, the most important propositions of the book, both from the point of view of psychology and of philosophy. They constitute a new and momentous step in the fulfillment of the task Professor James seems to have undertaken, *i.e.*, our deliverance from the bondage of the senses and reason, by extending to regions beyond their pale the legitimately believable. They are three in number: —

1. Mystical states, when well developed, usually are, and

have a right to be, absolutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they come.

2. No authority emanates from them which should make it a duty for those who stand outside of them to accept their revelations uncritically.

3. They break down the authority of the non-mystical or rationalistic consciousness, based upon the understanding and the senses alone. They show it to be only one kind of consciousness. They open out the possibility of other orders of truth, in which, so far as anything in us vitally responds to them, we may freely continue to have faith.

If the authority claimed for these states of consciousness was to be proved unfounded, absolutely nothing would remain, in the sphere of life considered in the "Varieties of Religious Experience," to give one the right of indulging in Professor James' overbelief. If, on the other hand, we are to abide by these conclusions, the judgment of absurdity and irrationality commonly passed by the ordinary consciousness upon mystical, insane, and drunken dreams would have to be declared altogether irrelevant, for the reason that they would belong to other aspects of consciousness. Each aspect of consciousness would be its own judge of reality. Let us, therefore, devote the rest of this paper to the consideration of these propositions.

Psychic life is a very complex affair. Its constituents cannot, generally, be dealt with together. In the present instance it seems an error to have treated the mystical states as a whole, instead of discriminating between what is immediately presented to consciousness and the interpretation of it furnished by the intellect; between, for instance, a group of sensations and feelings, and the belief, arising from them, in spiritual powers having a particular existence of their own.[4] The absolute authority over the subject of what is merely given—the sensations, the feelings, the volitional attitudes—cannot be denied. When the participant in the new beatitude speaks of entrancing feelings, of visions, of voices, of levitation, he is not, of course, to be contradicted. Neither is he to be gainsaid when he

[4] The fact that primitive experience may be described as involving, at once, subject and object does not in the least affect the present argument.

mentions the feelings of repose, of safety, of vastness, of union, of illumination; nor when he draws attention to the increased courage and moral vigor frequently resulting from the higher mystical states. These experiences are, on their merely subjective aspects, absolute; they are not amenable to the criticism of any form of consciousness whatsoever. So far we are in full agreement with Professor James.

The matter is altogether different when causal relations and other inferences are considered. When we are told, in addition, that the ecstatic feelings are due to God's descent into the believer; that Christ was actually, bodily, present; that the feelings of repose, of vastness, of illumination and the increased ethical power, imply the existence of a world of spiritual existences, we pass beyond experience into the field of rationalistic elaboration. These and every other product of mental activity, as far as they go beyond the mere presented, are amenable to the criticism of every and any form of rational consciousness, because the canons of logical interpretation cannot be conceived to vary from one to another state of consciousness. The principle of logical contradiction, for instance, remains valid throughout experience.

Does Professor James deny this? I, for one, do not see how his statements, taken at their face value, could mean anything but a denial. Has he not written, for example, "the mystic is, in short, invulnerable and must be left, whether we relish it or not, in undisturbed enjoyment of his creed?" If he tells us, almost in the same breath, that the intellectual contents of mysticism may be almost anything, "what comes must be sifted and tested and run the gauntlet of confrontation with the total context of experience, just like what comes from the outer world of sense," it is because he has in mind, for the moment, the practical value of mysticism and no longer the objective truth of its deliverances, for he adds, "its value must be ascertained by empirical methods, so long as we are not mystics ourselves." He would therefore say, it seems, to the person fresh from a Christian conversion: "You claim to have been saved by God's Grace and the power of Christ's atonement. I, who have not had your experience, have not the right

of contradiction. The authority of your mystical consciousness breaks down the authority of my rationalistic consciousness. But, on your side, you have no right to claim that I ought to accept the deliverance of your particular experience." And this same answer he would have to make to everyone who could claim the advantage of a form of consciousness other than the ordinary, whatsoever it might be. Mutual toleration could not well go further. The running rats and twining snakes of delirium tremens would stand unimpeachable together with the doctrinal beliefs and hallucinations of saints and the dreams of sleeping life. And yet, although I do not see how he can consistently escape this conclusion, I believe he would, as a matter of course, give another answer to the Convert; he would somehow make the above distinction between immediate experience and its interpretation, and subject the latter to the test of the more rational consciousness, as he calls it himself. It is, in fact, what he did with the surviving portion of his own nitrous oxide dreams when he declared it "the veriest nonsense." If I were asked, what is it, after all, which he holds to be invulnerable, I could not do better than draw attention to the terms in which he sums up the deliverances of the mystical consciousness. "The keynote of it is invariably a reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictoriness and conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were melted into unity;;" the mystical states "tell of the supremacy of the ideal, of vastness, of union, of safety and of rest." Is that, and that alone, the "invulnerable" message? If so, I shall venture to remark that as Professor James formulates it, it is not as it is given by the mystical consciousness. It has been brought to the bar of the more rational consciousness to rid it of what appears to him its irrational adjuncts. In doing this, he has set aside his own objectionable principle. It would, in that case, have been the part of consistency to submit to the ordinary consciousness everything going beyond immediate experience. If the words reconciliation, unity, vastness, safety, are intended to describe immediate experiences and nothing more, they cannot, of course, contain any metaphysical implication whatsoever; they are mere sub-

jective impressions. And, if they are interpreted so as to include the metaphysical implications so dear to Professor James, it becomes the right of the more rational consciousness to pass in last instance upon their pertinence. It seems as though Professor James held that metaphysical implications need not be rational.[5]

In the field of interpretation the more rational consciousness is supreme simply because it is more rational than any other known to man. That the ordinary consciousness is the more rational is not, I believe, a mooted point. No one who need be taken seriously has yet ascribed to intoxication, religious ecstasy, sleep, etc., a greater degree of rationality than to the ordinary consciousness.

The following four reasons seem to me to account satisfactorily for the impression of illumination in religious ecstasy:—

1. As mental activity decreases with the deepening of the mystical trance, the feelings and desires belonging to the subject and those ascribed by him to God, are no more held separate. All desires and tendencies opposed to His will, as understood by the subject, disappear, and nothing remains but the bond of love and of common intent. St. Theresa says, for instance, "My Orison did not take place in my head; it was an Orison of enjoyment and of possession in the will . . . all distinctions disappeared, there was nothing but a desire for deeper love, without the presence of any motive or ground for loving." The impression of intimacy resulting from the fusion of the divine and human feelings and purposes would readily lead uncritical people to the belief that there had been intellectual penetration of the divine mystery, even though they should be aware of the fact that in the higher degrees of Orison the mind is inactive. St. Theresa, for instance, tries to give intellectual form to the very revelation she has declared to be entirely in the realm of the feelings and of the will. Her most successful attempt is ludicrous enough: "I shall say then that the Divinity is like a diamond, superlatively clear and much larger than the world; or like a mirror similar to the one in

[5] Cf. "Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 73.

which the soul was shown me in the preceding vision, only so much more sublime that I have no words to describe it."

2. The clearer understanding of God's will after the ecstasy and the greater ability to perform it is a second reason. The reinforcement of the desires in accord with God's will is the natural result of a trance dominated by the idea of God.

3. Tauler, in a sermon for Whitsunday, indicates a third and frequent cause of the feeling of illumination: "When all the powers of the soul are collected and turned inwards, it often happens that some eternal truth presents itself with irresistible clearness. This happens not infrequently in morning sleep just before awakening." That a feeling of illumination frequently happens in sleep and usually, then, just before awakening, is well known to the psychologist. But, ordinarily, nothing remains on awakening but the feeling of a glory that is no more, the feeling of having entered the Holy of Holies, or the feeling of having encompassed the deepest philosophical mysteries. Nothing but the supposed after-tastes of such dim fancies remain when the intellect returns to its task. The psychology of this illusion is clear enough. Three things only are necessary to its production: (a) the absence of those ideas which, in waking life, would resist the premature solution of a great problem; (b) a feeling of ease and of power, due, in part, at least, to the circumstance just mentioned; (c) an affective condition compounded of the tender feelings and of something akin to awe. The first and the second of these conditions occur commonly in sleep. The third is the unfailing accompaniment of the mystical trance, because it is dominated by the thought of the Great Lover.

4. The auditory and visual hallucinations with which the mystic is at times favored. God speaks to him comforting and guiding words. But the moral guidance he receives is so evidently within the possibilities of ordinary mortals, that one cannot think of ascribing to it, on the ground of content, an extra-subjective origin.

For these reasons the religious mystic is convinced that God reveals Himself to him. As he finds, however, that he cannot give definite verbal form to the supposed revelations, he is

naturally enough, driven to believe in a mysterious faculty, above reason, to which the Revealer addresses Himself. Ruysbroeck, for instance, affirms, in the "Mirror of Eternal Bliss," that "When manifesting Himself the Father elevates the soul above the reason, in the Void without image. There the soul is simple, pure and without any content; and in this pure vacuity the Father brings forth His divine light. In this light neither the reason, nor the senses, nor observation have any share." In the new garb under which Professor James offers us this old doctrine—let me call it a superstition—the "Faculty above reason" to which the Revealer addresses himself has become the Subliminal.

It may be that the favor with which Professor James looks upon the quasi-polytheistic hypothesis finds its empirical warrant in provinces of life other than the religious. I do not know what these provinces may be. The conclusions of Meyers, Hodgson and Hyslop have "somewhat impressed" him, but, in his opinion, the facts are still lacking to prove spirit return. The truth of the matter is, that Professor James' belief is not the outcome of an empirical investigation of religious experience, but a conviction based upon considerations not yet anywhere satisfactorily set forth and supported by some of those "reasons of the heart," *que la raison ne connait pas,* on which Pascal fell back in his attempted apology for the Christian faith. His is one of the conceptions for which, in the "Will to Believe," he claimed the right of belief on affective, utilitarian ground, provided they be free from logical contradiction. Let the reader turn to the last pages of the concluding lecture beginning with the words, "The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that the world of our present consciousness is only one out of the many worlds of consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must contain experiences which have a meaning for our life also," etc.; let him recall the frequency and earnest impatience with which our author utters his aversion to the abstractions of Science—those hollowest things in life—and the conviction with which he proclaims that the world of generalized objects which the intellect

contemplates, is without solidity or life compared with the pinch of one's individual existence and destiny, and he will know on what kind of food Professor James' overbelief is sustained.

It is from the religious sphere of life that the most compelling "reason of the heart" comes. Had Professor James been content to use his consummate art merely to exhibit the needs of Religion, in the interest of the hypothesis on which he chose to make his own "personal venture," no one could have found just cause for complaint. But these Gifford Lectures are not so much an exposition of those needs as an attempt to make it appear that a particular belief, which would satisfy them, is empirically justifiable. I am almost willing to describe this attempt as "unfair" because, although everything tangible has been admitted by him to remain within the limits of the individual, there is spread throughout the book, with marvelous skill, the mysterious, imaginary shadows of spirit-agents. So that a work providing no empirical basis whatsoever for spirit-intervention is, nevertheless, made—I do not say intentionally—to cast the great weight of a mass of impressive facts in favor of that hypothesis. The perfect candor of the author, so evident when he makes definite statements as to his attitude, does not much mend matters. The bewitched reader is not in a position to give them their full value. In one of the very first lectures (the Reality of the Unseen), a most interesting and valuable chapter, the reader is almost unavoidably thrown into the temper of the materializing seance and easily imagines that the author adduces the recorded impressions of the presence of persons actually absent as a *proof* of spirit intervention, although he recognizes here also the validity of the purely subjective explanation. The atmosphere of the rest of the volume does not tend to dispel the superstitious mood into which the uncritical reader is thrown at the very start. Ghosts pop out of the very places he has just shown you to be empty. The experiences with which he deals are not alone to blame for this effect. Even simple, natural things become mysterious in passing through the hands of the prestidigitator.

If Professor James' philosophical understanding of life in

general involves, for reasons not given in these lectures, the existence of Spiritual Beings, could he not, at least, do without the intervention clause? I do not see what advantage accrues from it to Professor James' Individualism, neither how that hypothesis can be a gain to a Pluralistic Idealism intent upon preserving individual freedom and moral dignity.

As to the practical value to religion of the hypothesis, one could only pity the temperamental believer who should be induced to give up his *bona fide* omnipotent God for agents who cannot do better than crawl in through the subliminal door when it happens to be open; agents whose power is limited to the execution of a nameless work of supererogation left over after the observable and describable in human experience has been performed by the subject himself in his subliminal depth. What a fall this would be from the belief in the omnipotent Christian God, or even in the mighty Dieties of the Greeks!

In so far as the question involved in the present discussion is concerned, the status of empirical knowledge may be summed up thus: The progress of the physical sciences during the past thirty years, has added nothing that could affect one's opinion about it. On the contrary, the advance of the psychological sciences during the same time, has in many ways increased and modified the knowledge on which philosophical systems are built. But, instead of producing anything that would strengthen the belief in extra-human spirit-agents *influencing human destinies,* psychology has made intelligible, conformably to the rest of our organized knowledge, most, if not all, the striking phenomena which have been the empirical props of the popular faith in spiritism, whether Christian or not. We refer to anæsthesias, analgesias, hallucinations, monitions, trances, the sense of illumination in ecstasy, etc., including the facts considered in Professor James' lectures. In making this statement, I do not forget the work of the Society for Psychical Research. Its achievements may be declared to have been so far, and without prejudice of the future, absolutely inconclusive with regard to spiritism.[6] They

[6]See my criticism of Prof. Hyslop's exhaustive report on Mrs. Piper's trances in this journal, October, 1903.

have, however, served directly or indirectly to make more definite the *intra-human* explanation of many phenomena previously not well understood.

The establishment, on empirical evidence, of spirit-communication is a remoter possibility than ever before. "The Varieties of Religious Experience" provides further evidence in support of this affirmation.

It may not be useless to add that the rejection of spirit-interference does in nowise commit one to Materialism. It leaves a clear field to Absolute, as well as to many forms of Pluralistic, Idealism.

JAMES H. LEUBA.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

WORDSWORTH'S IDEAL OF EARLY EDUCATION.*

IT is a healthy sign of our time that in all the leading departments of humane study we are coming more and more to distrust commentators and dispensers of second-hand knowledge—the school-men of science—and turning with a fresh interest, not unlike the revival of learning itself, to the sources of first-hand inspiration. "Many are the thyrsus bearers, but few are the mystics," and it is the mystics and their scriptures that we are being taught in these days to search for ourselves—to pass from the commentator to the text, from the theological to the religious writer, from the sociologist to the seer.

Such a seer in education is Wordsworth. Others write about education. Wordsworth gives us the story of his own, the steps by which a great heart and mind reached a view happiness. Anything which enables us to realize their mean- of things, a feeling for nature and the world of men which was to him, and might, he believed, some day become to all, a source of abiding peace and happiness. It is this which

* Paper read before the Educational Society, Cardiff, December 4, 1903.

makes his "Prelude," with its amazing depth and fineness of psychological insight, perhaps the greatest, certainly the most interesting, modern treatise on education which we possess. Its teaching rests, as on twin pillars, on his view, first of man in general, and, secondly, of the child who is the father of the man.

1. Wordsworth is, in the best sense, the Poet of Democracy. His name stands for the discovery, or rather, the re-discovery, that the simplest things—the things that all men have in common: birth and death, rest and labor, parents and children, home and country—are the most important factors in human happiness. Anything which enables us to realize their meaning (such as wholesome surroundings and the best kind of books) is of essential human value. On the other hand, anything which seems to estrange us from them, like a great deal that is artificial and vicious in modern industry and civilization, is the enemy of true peace and of all real enjoyment of life.

These ideas, it may be said, were common to the leading writers of his time, and by this time are commonplaces. This is true, but what distinguishes Wordsworth and places him above all his contemporaries and all commonplaces is, that he sought to make clear to himself and to others the reason of the undying freshness of simple things. He found it in the fact that they are not really things at all, but the most universal language in which the mind that animates nature and human life speaks to our minds: the points at which we stand in closest union with it, and therefore with one another. From this doctrine, which Wordsworth accepted from Berkeley, or, at any rate, held in common with him, flowed the ideas which are familiar to the reader of his more popular poems. Nature and human life are one: the laws that bind the Heavens are the same as that which binds one human being to another. To be in touch with these laws, whether in the speculations of a Kepler or the piety of a Westmoreland alesman, is to be in touch with the sources of our own inmost being: it extends and deepens our hold upon life, it tranquilizes the soul, strengthens the will and permeates the character. It even reacts upon the body and moulds the features with a reflection of the underlying harmony of things.

Wordsworth is usually described as a Nature poet, his ideas as the "return to nature." But it would be more accurate to describe them as the return to Spirit, and the form he gave them widely separates him from Rousseau and other leaders of the nature school. To one to whom these truths were not only intellectual convictions, but practical principles, tested and proved in a life uncommonly full of hardship and trial,[1] no ideal of education could appear for a moment tolerable which failed to lay the main stress on the development in the soul of the capacity to draw upon these secret sources of power. As compared with this—still more put in the place of it—all other objects were bound to appear hopelessly inadequate and unworthy. Yet, when he looked round about him at the ideals held most in honor in the high places of education, any serious care for it seemed precisely what was lacking. "A thousand projects," so John Morley describes the time, "all taking for granted that ignorance is the disease and useful knowledge the universal healer; all of them secular, all dealing with man from the outside; none touching the imagination or the heart."[2] The leaders of the prevailing Utilitarian philosophy had just succeeded in 1828 in crowning their educational achievements by the foundation of the London University. Yet Wordsworth was profoundly dissatisfied. "We have no guarantee," he writes, summing up his objections to the whole movement, "in the social condition of these *well-informed* pupils for the use they will make of their power and their knowledge. The scheme points not to man as a religious being; its end is an unworthy one, and its means do not pay respect to the order of things."[3]

2. We shall better appreciate the meaning of this criticism, and especially the better part of it, if, having said so much of Wordsworth's view of man, we turn now to what he held about the child. His starting point here, as in the case of man, is the

[1] M. Legouis, in his recent monograph on Wordsworth, disposes of the common view that Wordsworth was singularly happy in the external circumstances of his life.

[2] "Life of Gladstone," I, 156.

[3] "Prose Works," Vol. III.

wholeness of the child's nature. The child is one with Nature; he is one in himself. From the first it followed that there exists in the child's mind a natural responsiveness to the deeper tones of the world in which he lives—a pre-established harmony between the soul and the impressions that education seeks to deepen and develop in it.

> "Our childhood sits,
> Our simple childhood sits upon a throne
> That hath more power than all the elements."

Those who know most of children under normal circumstances, their amazing imperviousness to evil and their equally amazing affinity to good, will be the most ready to agree. But it is necessary to emphasize the point here, as Wordsworth's teaching with regard to it has been lamentably misunderstood. It is commonly thought that he believed in the pre-existence of the soul, and that the child comes into the world out of a state of innocence, compared with which all earthly life is but a sleep and a forgetting:—

> "Heaven lies about us in our infancy,
> Shades of the prison-house begin to close
> Upon the growing boy."

If taken seriously such a doctrine can only mean the futility of all schemes of education which are not directed to the prolongation of prenatal innocence—the preservation of the soul from the obliterating impressions of the senses. Whether Wordsworth at any time held the doctrine of pre-existence, we need not here inquire. It is sufficient for our present purpose to notice that the application of it to the child's mind is altogether foreign to the teaching of the "Prelude." There are lines here which, like those above quoted, seem to recall it. But what the poet wishes to bring out is not the weakening and blinding effects of experience, but "the happy adaptation to the universe" which, as M. Legouis explains, imparted to the child, in Wordsworth's view, "an initial impulse in his journey along the path which leads most surely to the noblest ends of human life."

This natural adaptation, however, is only the beginning. The feeling for the truth and beauty of things—the admiration, hope and love by which we live when we truly live at

all—are no prenatal endowments, but require to be developed in the soul of the child, and for this development Wordsworth has no more miraculous means to suggest than the familiar, though much misunderstood and neglected, method of habit and association. His doctrine involves nothing more recondite than the familiar psychological truth that isolated feelings grow into sentiments and prevailing habits of mind through the unconscious deposits of repeated experience and the associations they leave behind. If you hold, as he does, that love of his natural environment—parents and home, work and play, animals and his fellow-men—is the foundation of all true happiness in a man, and if you would seek to lay this foundation deep in the mind of the child, what you have to see to first and foremost is to make provision for these living deposits. In their fully developed form—love of Nature and Humanity, as we find them in the poet and saint—they stand for our life at its highest; but they have very simple beginnings in the vivid sensations of which every child is capable—the sound, the sight, the taste, the smell and feel of things about it; the services of its fellow creatures to its primitive wants; the pleasant background that Nature and simple types of human life, shepherds and sailors, ploughers and fishers, producers and carriers, form for its own imitations of them: its soldiery and sailoring, its hunting and fishing, its riding and coaching, its making and carrying. It is out of such raw material and not from any prenatal vision that deeper sentiments develop in us:—

> "Truths that wake
> To perish never;
> Which neither listlessness nor mad endeavor,
> Nor Man nor Boy,
> Nor all that is at enmity with joy,
> Can utterly abolish or destroy."

The whole of the "Prelude" is an exposition of this simple but forgotten truth. It might be called a Treatise on the Association of Ideas—one of the few readable ones. The most characteristic passages of the poem are those in which the poet narrates incidents in his own life which formed the soil out of which in due time sprang—

> "The passions that build up our human soul;"

the boat he untied from the shore of the lake, his skating by night, his meeting with an old soldier by a gateway on the road, a blind beggar in a crowded London thoroughfare, his waiting for a cart by misty wayside bush—dramatic narratives in which nothing happens except in the soul. And as though he would leave no room for misunderstanding on this head, he sums up his teaching for us in the lines:—

> "And thus
> By the impressive discipline of fear,
> By pleasure and repeated happiness
> So frequently repeated, and by force
> Of obscure feelings, representative
> Of things forgotten, these same scenes so bright,
> So beautiful, so majestic in themselves,
> (Tho' yet the day was distant) did become
> Habitually dear and all their forms
> And changeful colors by invisible links
> Were fastened to the affections."[4]

These passages are all the more significant, as one of the most characteristic of them[5] occurs in close connection with a vigorous attack on the current ideal of education, to which we may now return.

What is involved in such a view as to early education? First and foremost that by early contact with nature and human life in its simpler forms, children should have the amplest opportunity of forming for themselves the associations out of which the sentiments, on which we have been discoursing, spring. Education here, as at all other vital points, must be self-education. Nothing can take the place of the self-appropriation, the inwardizing by the soul of its own first-hand impressions. For this process leisure, freedom from distraction and officious interference, fuss and worry, are from the first essentials. It was Wordsworth's profound reverence for the natural workings of the child's mind, in connection with the material furnished by wholesome natural and social surroundings, that explains the somewhat amusing distrust with which he regards the attempts of enthusiastic educationalists of his own time to found a system of infant schools. To Wordsworth this mis-

[4] "Prelude," II, 602 foll. Cf. II, 235-244. [5] V, 364.

directed enterprise, aiming, as it did, at separating the child just at the most impressionable age from its proper environment, seemed to be nothing short of the sin against the Holy Ghost—Nature, itself, cried out against it. He describes, in sober wrath and true Wordsworthian blindness to the humor of the situation, a Lancashire town, "in which, about nine o'clock in the morning the streets resound with the crying of infants wheeled off in carts and other vehicles (some ladies lending their carriages for this purpose) to their school prisons." Bell's system, then coming into vogue, only added heinousness to the offense against childhood. Shenstone's schoolmistress, by her winter fire and in her summer-garden seat, he will back against all Dr. Bell's sour-looking teachers in petticoats that he has ever seen. Nature had been shut out of these infant penitentiaries. The attempt to reintroduce her by pictures stuck up against walls and such mummery, was a mere parody of her teaching: "a moment's notice of a red-breast pecking at the winter's hearth is worth them all." What he would have said of the lions and tigers, the leopards, giraffes and still more blood-curling monsters that commonly embellish the walls of infant schools at the present day, is mercifully veiled from us.

This was his first objection to the current practice: the too early severance of the child from the objects and events which formed the natural stimulus of its growing powers. All that was really valuable in early school education, the development of attention, imagination and memory, he held, could be far better obtained by leaving children alone:—

> "Attention springs,
> And comprehensiveness and memory flow
> From early converse with the works of God
> Among all regions; chiefly where appear
> Most obviously simplicity and power."

The second count in his indictment of the popular system followed from his views of the unity of the child's nature in itself. Instead of paying proper regard to its essential wholeness, it seemed to encourage an unnatural severance of one part from another. Power was sacrificed to knowledge, taste and character to intellectual precocity; the aim being rather to show

what a child can do than to prepare it for what it will be called upon to do. It was against this one-sidedness in education and the abortion that was its product, that he directed his keenest satire. Here is his account of the terrible infant, to the wholesale manufacture of which Mr. Edgeworth and his co-adjutors were devoting an ability and an enthusiasm worthy of a better cause:—

> "Ships he can guide across the pathless sea,
> And tell you all their cunning; he can read
> The inside of the earth and spell the stars;
> He knows the policies of foreign lands;
> Can string you names of districts, cities, towns,
> The whole world over light as beads of dew
> Upon a gossamer thread; he sifts, he weighs,
> All things are put to question; he must live
> Knowing that he grows wiser every day,
> Or else not live at all, and seeing too
> Each little drop of wisdom as it falls
> Into the dimpling cistern of his heart—
> For this unnatural growth the trainer blame.
> Pity the tree."

If we ask what Wordsworth would substitute, his answer is merely an extension to the first school years of what he has already claimed for earlier childhood:—

> "Meanwhile old grandame earth is grieved to find
> The playthings, which her love designed for him,
> Unthought of: in their woodland beds the flowers
> Weep and the river-sides are all forlorn.
> Oh! give us once again the wishing-cap
> Of Fortunatus, and the invisible coat
> Of Jack the Giant-killer, Robin Hood
> And Sabra in the forest with St. George.
> The child whose love is here at least doth reap
> One precious gain that he forgets himself."[6]

To the same effect are the suggestions he writes to an anxious parent in one of his later letters. After denouncing the mistake of overrunning the child's infancy with moralizing books, he goes on to explain that formal education must begin "by putting the child in the way of acquiring, without measure or limit, such knowledge as will lead him out of himself; such knowledge as is interesting for its own sake; things known

[6] V, 315 foll.

because they are interesting, not interesting because they are known; in a word, by leaving him at liberty to luxuriate in such feelings and images as will feed his mind in silent pleasure. This nourishment is contained in fairy tales, romances, the best biographies and histories, and such parts of natural history relating to the powers and appearance of the earth and elements, and the habits and structure of animals as belong to it not as an art or science, but as a magazine of form and feeling."[7] Here, as elsewhere, what Wordsworth is concerned to bring home is, that education from first to last is concerned with the production of a state of mind. If this is right, all else will be right. If it is wrong, no technical acquirements can compensate for the loss. This explains his indifference to details of later education. He is concerned with first principles. The application to details of school curriculum is for others.

One subject, however, closely connected with his view of higher education, calls for a word of notice. It is commonly thought that he is an enemy of science. "Wordsworth," says Leslie Stephen, "hates science because it regards facts without the imaginative and emotional coloring."[8] This is incredible. It would be strange if one, who laid so much stress on the insight of the soul into the laws and unities of things, should have failed to see in science one of the chief sources of this deeper insight. What is repellent to the poet is neither science nor its applications, but the partiality and exclusiveness of much that claims the name of science.

True science retains—

> "Among least things
> An undersense of greatness; sees the parts
> As parts but with a feeling for the whole."

"Admiration and love," he elsewhere declares, "to which all knowledge truly vital must tend, are felt by men of real genius in proportion as their discoveries in natural philosophy are enlarged." Nor has any poet more finely told us how the most abstract of sciences may feed these higher emotions:—

---

[7] "Prose Works," Vol. III, p. 332.

[8] Quoted by Mr. Spence Watson in his admirable paper on "Wordsworth's Relation to Science" in the publications of the Wordsworth Society.

"From the same source I drew
A pleasure quiet and profound, a sense
Of permanent and universal sway,
And paramount belief; there recognized
A type for finite natures of the one
Supreme Existence, the surpassing life,
Which—to the boundaries of space and time,
Of melancholy space and doleful time,
Superior, and incapable of change,
Nor touched by welterings of passion—is
And hath the name of God."[9]

While thus acknowledging the aid to insight that science gives, the poet would not have been a poet had he not insisted that the higher kind of knowledge came from poetry. "Poetry," he writes in the Observations prefixed to the Lyrical Ballads, "is the first and last of all knowledge—it is as immortal as the heart of man. If the labors of men of science should ever create any material revolution, direct or indirect, in our condition and in the impressions which we habitually receive, the poet will sleep then no more than at present; but he will be ready to follow the steps of the man of science, not only in those general indirect effects, but he will be at his side carrying sensation into the midst of the objects of the science itself. The remotest discoveries of the chemist, the botanist or mineralogist will be as proper objects of the poet's art as any upon which it can be employed, if the time should ever come when these things shall be familiar to us, and the relations under which they are contemplated by the followers of these respective sciences shall be manifestly and palpably material to us as enjoying and suffering beings. If the time should ever come when what is now called science, thus familiarized to man, shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh and blood, the poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and will welcome the being thus produced as a dear and genuine inmate of the household of man."

So Wordsworth conceived of education rounding into self.

[9] Prelude, VI, 29 foll. To which we may add his well-known lines to the statue of Newton in Cambridge.

"With his pensive and silent face
The marble index of a mind forever
Voyaging thro' strange seas of thought alone."

Beginning in a genuine feeling from the appearances of things —passing through first the imaginative then the analytical handling of them—ending in the reinterpretation of the results of science by poetry, "the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge."

Such an ideal, having as its object not man as an intellectual machine, not man as a wage-earner or even as a citizen, but man as a religious being, challenges comparison with our common views, both as to the end and means of education.

1. As an ideal of the end, it may appear to some sufficiently remote from anything that we commonly regard as either possible or desirable. Theoretically teachers and parents alike acknowledge the supreme importance of religion, but seriously and continuously to treat the child as primarily a religious being scarcely crosses our minds. The reason is doubtless partly that, in spite of a hundred years of progress, we hardly yet realize what Wordsworth means by religion. We are still boggling over theological points, and still possessed by the idea that religion is a "subject" capable of being taught by Scripture and Catechism, perhaps with something of the same perverse optimism that led our fathers to believe that the scientific spirit could be inculcated by committing to memory selected passages of Dr. Brewer's "Guide to Science."

But it is time we put the question seriously to ourselves: What is the side of man's nature that is most closely connected with his permanent happiness, and is most worthy of our care? Do we really live by admiration and love, and has the child a right to be prepared from such a life? Or is the life for which we seek to prepare him something quite other in its essence? Granting (as who dare in heart deny?) that the poet's view is Gospel truth, is any of us really satisfied with the net result of our schooling and colleging: the deadness to the best things in nature and in human life with which the average youth and girl are apt to be turned out—the secularity and parochialness of their interest in a world that everywhere appeals to the spiritual and the cosmic? And have we not to admit that the fault for it is, at least in part, our own coming from our half-heartedness in accepting the Wordsworthian doctrine in all its

fullness and veracity? Perhaps if we were more willing to do so, we might find that "the religious difficulty" is a self-made one, and that the question how to teach religion is bound up with the wider question how to teach at all.

There is crying need for some unanimity on this subject among our educators. We live in a secular age. From all sides it is dinned into us that education should be more practical; that our position, as a productive and commercial nation, demands the complete reorganization of our system in the interest of industrial and administrative efficiency. How much of it all are we to believe? I hope we shall believe a good deal of it. The practical man has a way of going pretty straight to the point when things are wrong. He knows where the shoe pinches. In the present instance parents and teachers, it is to be hoped, will take to heart what he has to say as to the shortcomings of present-day education. But it is to be hoped, at the same time, that we shall largely discount his claim to prescribe the means to make them good. What teachers mainly want at such a time is to keep their heads and to believe in themselves and in the great guidance they have from the prophets of their art. This is unmistakable whether we take it from Wordsworth or not. "There is nothing to be gained, but everything to be lost, from putting any nearer or narrower object in the place of the wider and more distant. The best industrial, as the best religious education, cannot be separated from the best education in general—indeed is identical with it. 'Seek ye first the kingdom of man and his happiness, and all these things will be added unto you.'"

2. On the second question also, that of the means, there is necessarily much in Wordsworth's theory that seems out of touch with our own time. In its details, as well as in its want of details, Wordsworth's ideal is the ideal of an earlier, a narrower, a more leisurely, and, withal, a less strenuous world than ours. It is an ideal that is better suited for Hawkshead or Bowness than for the crowded city populations of the present day. Few, for instance, would be found to advocate an extended and more unrestricted familiarity with its city environment at the basis of a child's education. Yet changing what

requires to be changed, Wordsworth's main contention seems to me to contain the most essential word for the educational reformer of our own day as well as his. To put it in a sentence: the aim of the teacher is, in the last resort, to procure in the child a condition of mind (which is also a condition of feeling and will) in respect to the objects that are brought before it. As this condition is one into which the child must initiate itself by an inward process of assimilation, it requires time and an atmosphere of large leisureliness, the antithesis of the crowded time-tables—the everlasting drill and pressure that are apt to characterize even the infant departments of our schools. Method, of course, there must be even in these; but might it not, for the younger children, be a method which exists far more in the mind of the teacher and far less in time-tables and directions for the scholars, than at present? Such an ideal implies the highest skill and intelligence on the part of the teacher, and this is the reason for the claim sometimes put forward without much lucidity that the best teachers should be assigned to the infant departments. In the upper classes there must, of course, be routine with its accompaniment of drill and direction. But here, too, the principle is the same. Nothing can be effectively learnt, learnt, that is, so as to become its own, and thus the fertile soil of fresh thoughts and feelings which is not appropriated by the whole mind. And for this again, far more leisurely (I do not say less peremptorily exacted), progress in acquisition at the earlier stages of an art or science, than is commonly thought necessary, is essential. All this is generally admitted by us in theory. Teachers, I notice, commonly applaud one another when they announce such sentiments. But when they are asked why they do not practice what they preach, they commonly fall back upon the plea that the time is wanting, and the time is wanting because the whole system is bad. There is truth in this, but not so much as is supposed; not enough wholly to exonerate us.

There was a time when social reformers blamed the Government for all the evils that civilized flesh is heir to. By and by they discovered that they, themselves, were, or might, become the Government. Since that fateful discovery government has

been changed and has, on the whole, become an instrument of progress. It sometimes strikes one that it may be the same with educational, the most important of all kinds of reform. The system is, in many ways, bad, but parents and teachers, after all, are themselves the system, or they may, by greater unity of feeling and organization amongst themselves, become it. Even as things are, if any group of them, who became convinced of the incontrovertible soundness—ethical and psychological—of the view for which Wordsworth stands, had the courage to take their professional and parental lives in their hands and lead the way in a bold attempt to apply it, something, after all this education talk, might be really done in the way of practical reform—more faithful regard to the nature of man as a religious being, and to the true order of things.

JOHN H. MUIRHEAD.

BIRMINGHAM, ENGLAND.

NOTE: Some striking testimony on the value of the whole Wordsworthian contention comes to hand from a teacher whose brilliant and almost unparalleled success gives her authority peculiar weight, in the recent published "Story of My Life," by Helen Keller, pp. 319 and 376. "I am beginning to suspect all elaborate and special systems of education," writes Miss Sullivan. "They seem to me to be built on the supposition that every child is a kind of idiot who must be taught to think. Whereas if the child has hidden somewhere in his being noble capacities which may Let him go and come freely, let him touch real things and combine his impressions for himself, instead of sitting indoors at a little round table while a sweet-voiced teacher suggests that he built a stone wall with his wooden blocks, or make a rainbow out of strips of colored paper or plant straw trees in bead flower-pots. Such teaching fills the mind with artificial association that must be got rid of before the child can develop independent ideas out of actual experiences. . . . I believe every child has hidden somewhere in his being noble capacities which may be quickened and developed, if we go about it in the right way; but we shall never properly develop the higher nature of our little ones while we continue to fill their minds with the so-called rudiments. Mathematics will never make them loving nor will the accurate knowledge of the size and shape of the earth help them to appreciate its beauties. Let us lead them during the first years to find their greatest pleasure in Nature. Let them run in the fields, learn about animals and observe real things. Children will educate themselves under right conditions. They require guidance and sympathy far more than instruction."

"WHAT SHOULD BE THE ATTITUDE OF TEACHERS OF PHILOSOPHY TOWARDS RELIGION?" A REPLY.

In the number of this JOURNAL for April, 1903, appeared an article on this question by Professor Royce. The question, in one form or another, has probably given more or less serious perplexity to a large number of minds, perhaps to a larger number than the writer had immediately in view. It may be regarded, therefore, as forming a real problem in practical Ethics; and any contribution which Professor Royce may make to the solution of the problem, is sure to be welcomed by those who know the work he has done in the teaching of philosophy.

In the solution of the problem there is obviously room for individual diversities of opinion and practice, and therefore no individual can easily represent every aspect of the question involved. For that reason, without any disrespect to Professor Royce, it may be contended that there are some aspects of the question which he has not adequately represented in his discussion. At all events, it may not be without interest to discuss the question from another's point of view.

In doing so it is desirable to avoid complicating the issue unnecessarily by any controversy about the sense, in which the term Religion is to be understood; and, therefore, for the nonce, Professor Royce's definition may be accepted. "By Religion," he says, "in its higher sense, I mean the consciousness of practical relations to a real, but at present unseen, spiritual order, whose authority as furnishing the rule for our conduct is conceived as absolute, and whose worth and dignity we recognize as above every other worth and dignity known to us. . . . I expressly define the general term," he adds, "so that Buddhism and Christianity, the so-called Ethical Religions of some modern teachers, and the more positive creeds of tradition, equally fall within the scope of my definition" (p. 280). The abstract merits of this definition it would be unfair to discuss. It is offered, not as a definition of Religion

in itself, but merely to serve a specific purpose; and for that purpose it may be adopted as sufficiently serviceable. I shall only emphasize, as Professor Royce does, the intentional comprehensiveness of the definition, as this is of essential moment in considering whether teachers of philosophy may find a spiritual home in any of the religious communities which the definition includes.

There is another term, equally prominent in his question, on which Professor Royce has unfortunately not been quite so definite. The question refers, not to men in general, but to teachers of philosophy in particular. Who are to be included under this designation? Here, again, to avoid needless complications, Professor Royce's statement may be accepted, so far as it goes. Without attempting to define philosophy in technical form, he explains that "there are two things, and two only, that the philosopher, as philosopher, can contribute towards training humanity to do better its work of striving after a sound religious consciousness. These things are: (1) Clearness of thought about religious issues, and (2) a judicial spirit in the comparison, in the historical estimate, and in the formation of religious opinions" (p. 282). I take it that the former of these is implied in the very possibility of the latter; and, consequently, in this discussion we may speak of the function of the philosopher as being simply to maintain towards religion that mental attitude which is commonly characterized as *judicial* or, by a Greek equivalent, *critical*

The question raised, as we have seen, is limited explicitly to teachers of philosophy. Is this limitation to be understood in the narrowest professional sense as including only those members of the teaching staff in educational institutions, to whom the designation in question can be technically applied? Such a limitation is obviously based on a purely external aspect of men's occupations in society, and has no intrinsic connection with the question at issue here. Under such a limitation the discussion would be rendered wholly futile; it could not grapple with the central principle involved, but would inevitably run off into side issues of trivial import in regard to conventional proprieties, local usages and other points of a similar nature.

Any conclusion thus reached would be of value to an exceedingly small fraction of the human race, and even to a comparatively small number of educated men, while the vast majority of those with whom the question is a practical problem, would find their perplexity unremoved. It may seem unnecessary to make this explanation, for Professor Royce evidently had no intention of restricting his discussion within the limits indicated. He uses, in fact, the terms "philosopher" and "teacher of philosophy" interchangeably, implying that he has not merely the professional teacher in view. But his own demand for clearness in philosophical thinking must form the justification for being thus explicit. To give the discussion of his question any philosophical value, it is indispensable that we should be perfectly clear as to the persons to whom the question refers.

For this purpose it is surely by no means superfluous to keep in mind that the philosophical spirit, as defined above, is not a prerogative vested exclusively in the professional teachers of philosophy. There is good ground in educational science for the contention that all teachers, whatever their specialty may be, should be imbued with the critical catholicity of the philosophical spirit. Indeed the contention may be widened to the extent of insisting that education should in general aim at the development of that spirit in all men; and the culture, which results from any education, may be said to be defective in proportion as it fails to develop that spirit. Teachers of philosophy themselves often find that their best students—those who have caught the philosophical spirit most fully—go into all sorts of occupations,—theology, law, medicine, applied science, literature, manufactures, commerce. These do not abandon their philosophical tastes and habits of thought entirely in their practical occupations. Moreover, may it not be said that religion develops, in an unreflective form, that spiritual endeavor which becomes reflective in philosophy, to reach the divine, that is, the universal and eternal point of view. The difference, however, between religion and philosophy, if taken absolutely, is a mere abstraction of thought; in actual life religion shades away into philosophy by innumerable

gradations which cannot be indicated by any sharp line of demarcation. The result is, that all through general society we meet with men whose thinking is governed more or less effectively by the critical spirit of philosophical culture. But, as no man liveth to himself, it is impossible for these men to avoid exerting an influence upon others. Consciously or unconsciously they become teachers. They leaven society with the spirit of their own thought, and they do so sometimes more extensively and more intensively than the professional teachers of philosophy. This seems to be eminently the case in English-speaking communities. What Professor Seth Pringle-Pattison says, specially of Scotland, holds good, not only of Great Britain and her colonies in general, but also of the United States. Speaking of Reid, he observes: "His works were addressed to the reading portion of his countrymen generally—to his old students, in great part, and the ministers of religion, into whose ranks many of them had doubtless passed. . . . What Scottish philosophy has lost in scientific precision, may have been compensated for, in part, by the greater influence which it has exerted upon the body of the people—an influence which has made it a factor, so to speak, in the national life."[1]

This wider diffusion of philosophical influence seems to me wholly beneficial. It may fairly be questioned whether it does not react beneficially on philosophy itself by keeping it in more intimate touch with the realities of nature and of life. But whatever may be the influence of the outside world on philosophy, all philosophical teachers are agreed on the desirability of bringing its influence to bear on the outside world so as to mould thereby the intellectual and moral and religious life. As philosophical teachers, they will interpret the function of teaching in its most thorough significance. They will include under it every kind of influence by which the mental life may be trained. As it is those who *do* the truth rather than those who merely *speak* it, that come to the light themselves and lead others to it most effectively, the philosopher will endeavor

[1] *Scottish Philosophy*, pp. 125-6.

to exert an educational influence, not only by his words, but also by his deeds. How? 'Tis on this question mainly that I regret to part company with Professor Royce. "For the rest," he says, "I, myself, am glad when, under the conditions as they exist to-day, the philosophical teacher's convictions are such that he sees his way to avoid all connection with any sect or form of the visible church." For this preference two reasons are given: (1) "that a personal relation to the visible church has to-day a value which concerns chiefly the man engaged in certain practical philanthropic tasks;" (2) that "the philosopher, by holding aloof from the visible church, helps himself to maintain in himself and to display to his students that judicial spirit which I have insisted upon as his especial possession" (p. 285). Now, while it may be acknowledged that there are local and other conditions which must modify the individual's action in regard to religious society as well as on other subjects, to me it seems that the course which Professor Royce views with gladness is rather one to be adopted only with profound regret as a last unwelcome necessity, to be justified only when imposed on the philosophical teacher by the stress of circumstances which he cannot control.

I take it that Professor Royce vindicates his preference mainly on the second of the reasons which he pleads. That reason claims that the course advocated is helpful, if it is not necessary, to enable the philosophical teacher to maintain and display the judicial spirit which is his especial possession. But is that spirit inevitably prejudiced by connection with some "sect or form of the visible church," when that church is widened so as to comprehend Buddhism and Christianity and the so-called Ethical Religions, as well as the more positive creeds of tradition? 'Tis true that all the thoughts and sentiments and actions of men are influenced by their associations. The bias, arising from association with fellowmen, is one that can never be evaded except in the life of an absolute solitary, and the solitary simply brings himself under the influence of other associations which are generally much more detrimental to a healthy intellectual life. Religion is not distinguished by imparting any abnormal intensity to social influences. There

is, therefore, no special reason for evading the bias of human fellowship in religious life more than in other spheres of human activity. Certainly there are some spheres,—politics, for example,—where the bias of association with a party leads at times to results quite as calamitous as any religious sectarianism. If, therefore, the only effective, or the most effective, method of maintaining the judicial impartiality of the philosopher were that preferred by Professor Royce, the result would be that men, aiming at an impartial attitude, would be prevented from uniting with their fellows in the promotion of any common object, if such union might bring them into conflict with another party.

But a man does not necessarily surrender the spirit of a philosophical critic by taking one side in a controversy, nor does he, with certainty, maintain that spirit by refusing persistently to take any. Suspension of judgment is, indeed, imperative for the critic or judge when he begins his work, but is for him a means, not an end. This it is that distinguishes the critic from the sceptic. With the sceptic—the absolute sceptic, at least—suspended judgment is the end of all inquiry. But the very function of the judge is to pronounce judgment *(jus dicere)*, and there could be no more flagrant violation of the judicial temper than a judge who refuses to pronounce judgment when the evidence appears to him conclusive. Some thought of this it may have been that led Professor Royce to explain that the philosophical teacher, in one aspect at least of his work, is a mediator rather than an appellate judge. I confess I fail to appreciate the point of the distinction. The mediator may, from sheer honesty, be forced to take one side very unmistakably, or he may distribute the right and the wrong pretty evenly between both parties, or he may refuse to enter into the merits of the dispute at all, seeking to convince the parties that the matter is not worth quarreling about, and that the wise course for both would be simply to " let bygones be bygones." But whatever attitude he may adopt it involves a judgment on the case. From that he cannot escape; for it should not be overlooked that suspension of judgment is a judgment itself. It is a judgment to the effect that the evi-

dence available is inconclusive. Such a judgment is an eminently valuable attitude of mind; it is the only attitude compatible with intellectual virtue as long as the evidence appears inconclusive. But the man who maintains this attitude does not thereby avoid committing himself to a judgment on the question at issue; he commits himself to the very serious judgment that the evidence *is* inconclusive. Moreover, unless he has betaken himself to the life of a hermit, he brings himself inevitably into association with those who maintain his own attitude; and such association must be expected to exert the same influence, for good or for evil, as the association of those whose attitude is different.

It is not, however, assumed by Professor Royce, that in order to maintain critical impartiality, the philosophical teacher must be without convictions of his own on the subject of religion. On the contrary, it is admitted not only that he will have convictions, but that he will express them (p. 284); and it is not denied that a man's conduct will, in general, be taken as a more effective expression of his convictions than any language he can use. But a man's religious convictions must commonly find their most prominent expression in his practical relation to the religious institutions of the community in which he lives; and, as we have seen, it does not follow that he surrenders his critical impartiality by joining one religious society any more than by holding himself aloof from all. It may, indeed, be pleaded that, though the critical attitude would not thus be necessarily abandoned, it might be lost in the eyes of men,—that the philosopher might be misinterpreted,—be compromised, and his influence as a teacher might be impaired, if not destroyed. But it must, on the other hand, be borne in mind that a man does not escape misinterpretation by avoiding such connection; he may, at times, be thereby even more seriously misinterpreted. He cannot hold himself entirely aloof from the active religious life of his fellows without thereby exciting the suspicion of hostility, or of what may be worse than honest and earnest hostility, an indifference that is frivolous in thought and frivolous in feeling. Am I wrong in believing that Professor Royce would cheerfully run the risk of any misinterpre-

tation which might arise from his connection with a religious society of his choice rather than the risk of being confounded with those who maintain an attitude either of hostility or of indifference? Certainly the language is very explicit in which he assigns "the highest worth to religion among the interests of humanity" (p. 281).

The truth is, that the attitude of aloofness entails disadvantages of its own, and these are often quite as perilous to critical impartiality as practical devotion to a religious cause. The highest order of minds, indeed, may rise above such disadvantages, but our discussion cannot assume that philosophical teachers all take rank in this order. Professor Royce certainly claims for them no prerogative of exemption from the common frailties of intellectual life. In his view, "as religious inquirers, they are extremely fallible" (p. 282). Their estimate, therefore, of religious life from an outside point of view must often be liable to the prejudice arising, if not from positive antipathy, at least from an estrangement of that sympathy which is indispensable to a truly critical appreciation.

But it would seem as if an active sympathy with religious society were imperatively required of a philosopher who places religion, with Professor Royce, among the highest interests of humanity. He does not, however, recognize this requirement. To him it seems that "a personal relation to the visible church has to-day a value which concerns chiefly the man engaged in certain practical philanthropic tasks" (p. 285). He admits, of course, that "these tasks are of the utmost social importance," but he contends that "they form no part of the philosopher's peculiar and social function" *(Ibid.)* The same may, however, be said of most other men. In fact, philanthropic tasks form, far less properly, any part of their peculiar and special function, just because their lack of philosophic culture often disqualifies them from grappling intelligently with the problems which those tasks involve. Moreover, though such tasks are not the philosopher's peculiar and special function, yet he is a man before he is a philosopher; and as a man he is bound to take a reasonable share in those philanthropic labors which form an important part of social virtue.

The contention of Professor Royce, with regard to the main value of religious association, seems to assume that religious life can be separated from philanthropic work; or, in other words, that there can be a genuine service of God distinct from the service of our fellowmen. To waive unnecessary discussion, let this be granted. It is true the noble apologue of Abou ben Adhem, which Leigh Hunt has put into English verse, would imply, when translated into tame prose, that the love of God, on scientific analysis, reduces itself to the love of our fellowmen. Still it is not necessary to deny that there is in the religious consciousness a veritable communion of the finite spirit of man with the Infinite Spirit of the Universe, and that there is ample justification for the quietist and the mystic indulging the joy of that communion. But it remains an unquestionable fact, that to the philosophical teacher, as well as to the great religious teachers of all the ages, there can be no reality in a love of God which does not realize itself in the loving service of mankind. It is surely significant that the very apostle who stands out most conspicuously among the writers of the New Testament as representative of the quietistic and mystical side of the Christian life, should burst into an unwonted intensity of language at the idea of attempting to divorce the love of God from the love of man. "If a man say, 'I love God,' and hateth his brother, he is a liar; for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" (1 John 4: 20.)

It requires no profound study in the history of religion to discover that one of the main tendencies towards degeneration of religious life has always been the development of a kind of religiosity which is offensively indifferent to the claims of social morality, substituting, for the enthusiasm of humanity with its philanthropic manifestations, a rigorous exactness of thought or of phrase on dogmatic questions, or a punctilious observance of ritualistic forms. But the task of the philosopher, as explained by Professor Royce, is to "contribute towards training humanity to do better its work of striving after a sound religious consciousness" (p. 282): and therefore that task must consist, partly at least, in counteracting that

tendency to corruption of the religious consciousness which has just been described. If the philosopher's attitude is that, not of the idle sceptic, but of the earnest critic, he must bring into the light of clear thought the impassioned message of the great religious seers; and there is no reason to believe that, in his case, that message will necessarily be obscured; on the contrary, it may gain an unmistakable significance, by his active participation in the philanthropic labors in which the churches manifest the vigor of their spiritual life.

J. CLARK MURRAY.

McGILL UNIVERSITY, MONTREAL.

BYRON VERSUS SPENSER.

Byron told Shelley that he could see nothing in Spenser; and he was probably sincere when he used this emphasis of negation; for though exaggeration both in feeling and ironical expression was characteristic of him, we need not suspect it in this particular case. Ideals, aims, methods, views of art and life, were so contrasted in Byron and in Spenser, that had they been contemporaries, a mutual indifference would have been certain to exist. As a subject of literary criticism, the contrasted aims and methods of these two poets are extremely interesting; and among the many inquiries they suggest may be noticed: what relation morality has to art?—how much of action, energy, passion, is present in each form of it?—how, finally, the older poetry triumphs—what special treasures of thought, feeling, and language it enshrines; and what triumphs and treasures of its own the later poetry contains? It is of course quite impossible to follow out these differing contrasts and relations of the old and the new poetry in the space of an article; but, granting that Spenser stands on a height inaccessible to many readers who often read and appreciate Byron, the inducement has proved overmastering for the present writer to attempt a two-fold appreciation which will perhaps be instructive if not expansive to taste and judgment.

Mr. Devey in his excellent "Estimates of the English Poets," speaking of Byron, points out "his dashing vigor, the intensity of force arising from his concentrated earnestness,—his absolute freedom from the fetters of prejudice." These few phrases perhaps summarize the whole of Byron's power and excellence—whether it be the swift vehemence of his Tales, the picturesqueness and brilliant reflectiveness of "Childe Harold," the declamatory strength of his dramas, or the combination of all these qualities together with keen satire in "Don Juan." With Byron the audacity and energy of youth was joined to the intellect of manhood and produced poetry such as had never been known to English literature—not by any means the highest and best poetry hitherto known, but the most effective, unmistakable, and accordingly popular poetry hitherto known. In reality, such vigor and passionate directness of poetic invention bring with them limitation of power and restricted rule in the kingdom of art. Little thought his lordship's eager admirers and imitators in the early decades of the last century that by studying and emulating his force of expression and varied originality of ideas they were fatally dimming and restraining their poetic taste and judgment. Byron is indeed inimitable; and with all the vogue he created, with all the devotion he inspired in the young and the emotional, no inheritor of his brilliant and effective powers has appeared; but brilliancy and effectiveness in poetic expression and invention, however fascinating and inspiring to most minds, never fail to restrict the free flight of imagination and to give a material aim to the mind's ideal faculty. So that, though no reader can withhold astonished admiration at the "grand bursts of reflection," the acute psychological analysis and the able historic summaries which diversify the passion and poetry of "Childe Harold," or at the witty satire and observant faculty which interweave themselves with the poetry and passion of "Don Juan," yet every reader who has studied the older poetry (native or classical) to any purpose must realize that the whole of this added acute reflection and intensely intellectual element is, so far as pure poetry is concerned, mere padding. It is only so acceptable and popular, together with

the accompanying poetry, because comparatively few people care for poetry pure and simple. Nor will it surprise those whose taste and appreciation have enabled them to follow the flights of great poets, to learn that this alternating poetry and fine declamation of Byrons' had in reality, with all its apparent verve and supremacy, less inspiration and weaker afflatus, needing every aid from early enthusiasm and from intoxicants.

Speaking of Byron's limitations, Mr. Devey notices his blighting cynicism which prevented any deep sympathy with others and greatly marred his success as a dramatist,—his ignorance and ignoring of the world of quiet human nature by the loss of which he shut himself out from the domestic affections and social interests—his making his home in the heart of the unquiet passions which destroyed harmony between the faculties of the soul and prevented the recognition of myriad sympathies that reveal a spiritual presence and essence in the material Universe. All this is quite true, and such self-exclusion from the large world of Shakespeare and Wordsworth implies serious deduction from the value of Byron's work. A poet with little sympathy for others, no charity, in whom religious and moral feeling towards domestic and social environment does not exist, so narrows his sphere that great and genial poetry is impossible to him. At the same time, if great poetry is denied him, powerful poetry is in his reach, should, as with Byron, high poetical endowment be his. Not only does Lord Byron gain strength of conception by the unity which his vigorous personality afforded, but the force and energy of evil in our world—its daring and unscrupulousness—its close affinity to the active qualities of our nature, if not its preponderance in most natures—its varied interest and creditable association with manliness and courage in the full-blooded type of men—all these advantages, so to speak, which evil has over good, make its choice as a constantly recurring subject and an inspiration for poetry a distinct source of power. Nor is this the whole account of Byrons' powerful poetry. Directness, owing to the unity of a vigorous personality, allowed haughty precedence over all others, and full representation given to pervading and energetic evil will account for his sup-

remacy in the delineation of passion, but Byron is equally powerful in the region of abstract thought and contemplative grandeur. On the evidence of such power, Mr. Devey calls him a great representative poet. "No meditative poem," he says, "deriving its topics from an objective source, ever accomplished half so much as 'Childe Harold.' The hero is brought into contact with every scene which suggests the most stirring events of the antique and modern world and the cast of his thoughts imparts dignity even to the ennobling associations he recalls. . . . The Fourth Canto is an unapproached marvel for abstract grandeur," etc. This is so; for Byron, with all his restless energy, and though he made his home in the heart of the unquiet passions, could at will command a peace while he dwelt meditatively with creative imagination on some great object or collective object (it is significant that he always required some outward and actual object to work upon), and while never losing sight of it, illumined and transcended it with noble thought and feeling. He knew of this power in himself and cherished it. The following stanza may be called the articles of his poetic faith:—

> "The beings of the mind are not of clay,
> Essentially immortal, they create
> And multiply in us a brighter day
> And more beloved existence: That which Fate
> Prohibits to dull life in this our state
> Of mortal bondage, by these spirits supplied,
> First exiles then replaces what we hate,
> Watering the heart whose earlier flowers have died
> And with a fresher growth replenishing the void."

This is the grand burst of reflection with which Byron varies his description of Venice. It expresses a law of the mind and the faith of his mind, as well as indicating his conceptual power. Yet with all its transcending force, its easy adequacy, its representative variety coming home to every intelligent mind, this highest range of Byron's genius cannot be identified with great poetry, but only with powerful poetry. The force, the beauty, the energy, the variety, the unity of conception belong to Byron's nature alone and not to universal human nature of which his is a part. His love of outward beauty, of the splen-

dors and grandeurs of outward forms, of physical beauty in man and much more in woman, is at once perceived to be shallow and untrue when it is clear that moral and spiritual beauty are completely ignored; his ardor and vividness and resource of expression, so delightfully clear, direct, and sufficing, are seen to be artificial and arbitrary almost to madness when the underlying and recurring motives are obviously, not enthusiasm, admiration, or love, but the most inveterate pride varied by intense scorn. The power of such conceptions of adored beauty in the outward forms of nature and of man, together with such eloquent, resourceful expression, certainly remains, but, as compared in its effect on our mind with that of truly great poetry, there is in Byron's creations only relative truth and limited appeal. Let us do him full justice by affirming that no poet equals him in the animated, brilliant, sincere delineation of outward beauty, grand circumstance, and dignified associations, all deepened and harmonized by rapid abstraction and a facility of pointed, unsuperfluous reflection never before so happily and effectively allied to color of image and glow of feeling. If the deep harmony and universal appeal of great poetry depended upon such ready and felicitous intellectual power, Byron would be the greatest of poets. But great poetry is of much more simple appeal; and this ubiquitous, coruscating reflection of Byron's is, so far as it is concerned, misleading and superfluous. It is, however, with the majority of readers, a most acceptable and agreeable interruption to pure poetry; and they cannot long endure the absence of any such relief in reading Spenser. Indeed the representative power which this grand reflection of Byron's confers has induced so good a critic as Mr. Devey to state decidedly that in his opinion Byron is to be placed above Spenser.

Spenser is certainly so great a contrast to Byron on this important point and many others that there are excellent reasons for setting the two together as the subject of this article. And having said so much already of Byron we will now pass on to speak of Spenser.

In Spenser, religious and moral principles, activities, precepts and sayings take an important place and constantly assert

themselves both in the design and the execution of his great poem. All the Cantos of the "Fairy Queen" are marshalled under books bearing such titles as, "The Legend of the Knight of the Red Crosse, or of Holiness" "The Legend of Sir Guyon, or of Temperance" "The Legend of Britomartis, or of Chastity" and so on. The characters or actors of the poem, their doings, adventures, and speeches, support these serious themes; the narrative of the poet always gives them place and emphasis. Spenser's beautiful proverbs, as we may call them, such as "Entire affection hateth nicer hands," "The noblest mind the best contentment has" are so many weighty and pithy comments of the same seriously moral kind. Nor do knightly principles and chivalrous sentiments, though of course very fully and frequently represented in Spenser, take the place of moral precept or become identified with morality and religion as there is no doubt they often do in Tennyson's "Idylls of the King." Spenser's knights are above all Christian knights and his Ladies Christian ladies who subordinate chivalry and its laws to Christianity and Christian morals; their poet, too, is above everything a Christian poet, who, with all his digression and episode never loses sight of his poem's elevated plan or fails to add divine graces to its worthier personages and to the speeches he puts in their mouths.

Thus the whole design and execution of Spenser's poetry show a marked contrast to the design and execution of Byron's poetry; he chose, as we observed, evil as a constantly recurring subject and an inspiration for his poems; and there can be no doubt that his work gains by that choice an energy and a general power of appeal to average men and women which is not to be found in Spenser. But (except in one direction to be presently mentioned), with so much advantage, all further gain ceases; and a serious deficiency reveals itself. Spenser by his choice of morality and religion as a subject and an inspiration has obtained ideal and imaginative results which, so far as poetry is concerned, infinitely outweigh the value of passion and energy; moral beauty in Spenser much enhances physical beauty; spiritual elevation greatly deepens and expands heroic action and character, while the broader

intellectual conception is more truly representative than that of Byron's with its ubiquitous reflection. Not all the modern poet's power of rapidly expanded abstraction, earnestness of will rather than feeling, and forcible diction can raise his subjects to the poetical level of the older poet's work; they are seen to be intellectual and individual rather than human compositions. Spenser's feeling is rich, grandly simple, varied, continuous; there is no apparent effort, no personal will put forth, the range of his imagination is absolutely free and self-sufficing; his thought and his fine diction are not allowed to interrupt this continuity of feeling, or to check this freedom of imagination by drawing attention to detail and bare or single inference. This has been objected to by some critics, who find Spenser too fluent, unrestrained, and indefinite; but any one who reads him carefully will find that there is wonderful pertinence and harmony in thought, feeling, image, and fancy,—that if the thought is subordinated and never much abstracted, it is, nevertheless, exerting its restraining and connective power with excellent effect, while the diction, though never sought for itself or prominent, renders Spenser the most felicitous of all poets in expression. But in Byron's alternate reflection and observation, brilliant as both are, we find nothing of this continuous yet beautifully harmonious and consistent flight of poetic invention. And his imaginative inferiority seems to spring from his rejection of moral and spiritual truth; in foregoing the inspiration of what is deepest and most influential over man's heart and intellect, he has lost the aid and guidance of the associated and mutually helpful faculties; he has left himself, therefore, only the chance and disconnected suggestions of the commoner mind and its worldly experience. All Byron's poetry will be found of detached, fitful character, bearing on it the stamp of a hasty, distracted mind, inartistic, alike in design and execution. It is true, however, that in parts and in disconnection he showed striking genius and power; this is especially the case where the sublime in nature, with all its lawlessness and confused violence, defiant of man and of man's thoughts and moral law, called forth the sympathy of his own lawless and defiant spirit. No poet has equalled

him in the delineation of vast destructive forces, of Alpine terrors and desolations, of oceanic and tempestuous violence; the similar rage and destruction of battle and shipwreck found in him an eloquent and delighted narrator. The misanthropy shown in his famous verses on the storm in the Alps and on the ocean, and his hearty thorough-going sympathy with forces that, unchecked, would put an end to society and the whole race of men, has been overlooked on account of the sublime poetry. In Don Juan, the much admired shipwreck and battle pieces are in reality still more corosive and inhuman because they are harmoniously set in the midst of immoral event and scoffing comment subversive of all social order. Byron was not only against society in the England of his day, but, like Timon, he would have arrayed and set to work every destructive force in the physical and moral world against all society. It is true, indeed, that he held fast to his own ideal—the individual energy and constructive thought of his own mind and to a true if vague conception of liberty; so that, amid all the parade of destructive force and scoffing license of Don Juan, the result is not barren negation and anarchy; but the spirits of discord and destruction there aroused would have been sufficient had they become operative to sweep away all society. Nevertheless, in spite of its almost insane rejection of moral rule and civil order, critics are probably right in saying that Don Juan is Byron's masterpiece, for in no other poem of his are the terrible and chaotic forces of nature in their sublimity alternated so energetically and consistently with the corresponding fury and wide-spread warring of evil principle and practice in the moral world. Furthermore, the knowledge of the world it displays, its Mephistophelian wit and shrewdness, its amazing variety, and its supple, easy movement of thought, as well as its direct English style, have received deserved praise and recognition.

But this power of delineating the sublime and the lawless in nature and man—this tremendous egotism which could deliberately conceive the ruin of the outer and of the social world while the idea of his own individual thought and liberty were preserved—was dearly bought, so far as poetry is con-

cerned (if indeed it did not indicate a most anti-poetic coldness of heart) by the sacrifice of the beauty and order of a world in harmony with the moral beauty and order of man. From an æsthetic or poetical point of view, nine-tenths of his masterpiece are disgusting and contemptible rubbish;—these nine-tenths, say his partial critics, were not meant to be poetry, no; but the point is that by no exertion of power could Lord Byron have made them poetry. The unflagging flight of Spenser is only possible when moral and spiritual truths are always present and often triumphant, where the external grandeur and beauty of nature are not placed either in contemptuous rivalry or in destructive conflict with man's life—as is always the case in Byron—but aid, illustrate, and accompany as friends his thought and deed, enabling the poet who responds to them to attain a richer yet deeper harmony of thought and expression; for neither is it so necessary to generalize by reflection where such genial, human, outward illustration is available; thus conception is richer; nor is the accompaniment of poetic diction at all intrusive where the thought is so eloquent and discursive; thus conception is deeper; in short, the mind's different faculties are mutually helpful with a balanced strength and an energy such as they never can have where moral and religious principle and influence are denied and suppressed. In conclusion, we propose to take some of the finest passages in Byron and in Spenser for comparison in order to bring out their poetic value in accordance with the views set forth in this article.

"But thou exulting and abounding river
Making thy waves a blessing as they flow
Through banks whose beauty would endure for ever
Could man but leave thy bright creation so
Nor its fair promise from the surface mow
With the sharp scythe of conflict—then to see
Thy valley of sweet waters were to know
Earth paved like Heaven. . . .

Brief, brave, and glorious was his young career—
His mourners were two hosts, his friends and foes;
And fitly may the stranger lingering here
Pray for his gallant spirit's bright repose;
For he was Freedom's champion, one of those

The few in number, who have not o'er-stept
The charter to chastise which she bestows
On such as wield her weapons; he had kept
The whiteness of his soul and thus men o'er him wept."

In these two stanzas we have very fine examples of Byron's treatment of inanimate beauty and of the beauty of character. It will be seen that though outward charm and outward relationship are eloquently conveyed with such adequacy of expression and choice, direct diction that they are very impressive; yet the heights of the ideal are not attained.

"Above me are the Alps
The palaces of Nature, whose vast walls
Have pinnacled in clouds their snowy scalps
And throned Eternity in icy halls
Of cold sublimity where forms and falls
The avalanche—the thunderbolt of snow
All that expands the spirit yet appals
Gather around these summits. . . .

Clear placid Leman, thy contrasted lake
With the wild world I dwell in is a thing
Which warns me with its stillness to forsake
Earth's troubled waters for a purer spring.
This quiet sail is as a noiseless wing
To waft me from distraction; once I loved
Torn ocean's roar, but thy soft murmuring
Sounds sweet as if a sister's voice reproved
That I with stern delights should e'er have been so moved.

It is the hush of night, and all between
Thy margin and the mountains, dusk, yet clear
Mellowed and mingling yet distinctly seen
Save darkened Jura, whose capt heights appear
Precipitously steep; and drawing near,
There breathes a living fragrance from the shore
Of flowers yet fresh with childhood; on the ear
Drops the light drip of the suspended oar,
Or chirps the grasshopper one good-night carol more."

The first of these shows Byron's mastery of the sublime where a powerful effect is gained without the aid of moral or spiritual principle and in defiance of both; the second and third stanzas show again his power of depicting the outwardly beautiful of Earths' loveliest scenes and at the summer season's loveliest hour; the details are of the choicest and the diction fine and clear.

"The moon is up, and yet it is not night;
Sunset divides the sky with her, a sea
Of glory streams along the Alpine height
Of blue Friuli's mountains; Heaven is free
From clouds but of all colors seems to be—
Melted in one vast Iris of the West—
Where the Day joins the past Eternity;
While on the other hand, meek Dian's crest
Floats through the azure air, an island of the blest.

"But thou Clitumnus, in thy sweetest wave
Of the most living crystal that was e'er
The haunt of river nymph, to gaze and lave
Her limbs where nothing hid them, thou dost rear
Thy grassy banks, whereon the milk white steer
Grazes; the purest god of gentle waters.
And most serene of aspect, and most clear;
Surely that stream was unprofaned by slaughters
A mirror and a bath for Beauty's youngest daughters.

And on thy happy shore a temple still
Of small and delicate proportion keeps
Its memory of thee, beneath it sweeps
Thy current's calmness; oft from out it leaps
The finny darter with the glittering scales
Who dwells and revels in thy glassy deeps;
While, chance, some scattered water lily sails
Down where the shallower wave still tells its bubbling tales."

These are glorious descriptions with choice examples demonstrating Byron's sensitiveness to external beauty which his intellect enhances so that they never cloy with sweetness nor become tedious with repetition.

"The Niobe of nations! there she stands,
Childless and crownless in her voiceless woe;
An empty urn within her withered hands,
Whose holy dust was scattered long ago;
The Scipio's tomb contains no ashes now
The very Sepulchres lie tenantless
Of their heroic dwellers; dost thou flow
Old Tiber thro' a marble wilderness,
Rise with thy yellow waves, and mantle her distress. . . .

He heard it, but he heeded not—his eyes
Were with his heart and that was far away
He reck'd not of the life he lost, nor prize;
But where his rude hut by the Danube lay,
There were his young barbarians all at play,

There was their Dacian mother—he their sire
Butchered to make a Roman holiday;
All this rushed with his blood—Shall he expire
And unavenged; Arise, ye Goths, and glut your ire."

These two stanzas represent Byron's power of calling up the pathetic; the ruin of the city, the death of the gladiator are alike hopeless and desperate and the darkest colors are not spared; passion energises but does not mitigate the despair; and the reckless invocations to yet further destruction which end each stanza—Tiber rising—the Goths arising, in pique or in vengeance, is characteristic of Byron's artistic limitation: the facts narrated—the death described, remain merely pictorial and the pathos remains superficial for want of moral and spiritual suggestions that would have deepened and humanized both.

"Tis sweet to hear
At midnight on the blue and moonlit deep
The song and oar of Adria's gondolier
By distance mellowed, o'er the waters sweep;
Tis sweet to see the evening star appear;
Tis sweet to listen as the night winds creep
From leaf to leaf; tis sweet to view on high
The rainbow based on ocean span the sky.

'Tis sweet to hear the honest watch-dogs bark
Bay deep-mouthed welcome as we draw near home.
Tis sweet to know there is an eye will mark
Our coming, and look brighter when we come.
Tis sweet to be awakened by the lark,
Or lull'd by falling waters. Sweet the hum
Of bees, the voice of girls, the song of birds.
The lisp of children, and their earliest words. . . .

Then rose from sea to sky the wild farewell;
Then shrieked the timid, and stood still the brave—
Then some leap'd overboard with dreadful yell
As eager to anticipate their grave;
And the sea yawn'd around her like a hell,
And down she suck'd with her the whirling wave,
Like one who grapples with his enemy,
And strives to strangle him before he die.

And first one universal shriek there rushed,
Louder than the loud ocean, like a crash
Of echoing thunder; and then all was hushed,
Save the wild wind and the remorseless dash

Of billows; but at intervals there gush'd,
Accompanied with a convulsive splash,
A solitary shriek, the bubbling cry
Of some strong swimmer in his agony."

These four stanzas from Don Juan, so contrasted in the peaceful beauty of the first two and the sublime terror and awful circumstance of the last two, must conclude our extracts from Byron. They are as fine as outward object and action, admirably selected and conveyed in passionately direct, choice diction, can make them; but the final grace and power of the larger, more ennobling moral and spiritual conception is denied them. For this imaginative, rather than objective, beauty, and powerful, expansive human conception, rather than inhuman sublime effect on the mind, we must look to Spenser:—

"It was a chosen spot of fertile land,
Amongst wide waves set, like a little nest,
As if it had by Nature's cunning hand
Been choicely picked out from all the rest,
And laid forth for ensample of the best;
No dainty flower or herb that grows on ground,
No arborett with painted blossoms drest
And smelling sweet, but there it might be found
To bud out fair and throw her sweet smells all around.

No tree whose branches did not bravely spring;
No branch whereon a fine bird did not sit;
No bird but did her shrill notes sweetly sing;
No song but did contain a lovely ditt.
Trees, branches, birds and songs were framed fit
For to allure frail mind to careless ease. . . .

Into that forest far they thence him led,
Where was their dwelling, in a pleasant glade
With mountains round about environed
And mighty woods which did the valley shade;
And like a stately theatre it made,
Spreading itself into a spacious plain;
And in the midst a little river played
Amongst the pumy stones which seemed to plain
With gentle murmur that his course they did restrain. . . .

As a tall ship tossed in troublous seas,
Whom raging winds threat'ning to make the prey
Of the rough rocks do diversely disease,
Meets two contrary billows by the way,
That her on either side do sore assay,

> And boast to swallow her in greedy grave;
> She scorning both their spites, does make wide way,
> And with her breast breaking the foamy wave,
> Does ride on both their backs and fair herself doth save."

These stanzas from the "Fairy Queen" are examples of various description—of landscape, forest, and sea. They are not so realistic—not so graphic—as Byron's description of scenery; they refer to no particular place, as his always do. A careless reader, or a reader prejudiced in favor of strong, personal feeling and expression (as Byron was) would doubtless prefer the poetry resulting from more material conception and more graphic expression. To them, as to him, Spenser must always seem tame and without point. But let any one consider what the sacrifices of pointed realism and expressive detail implies in Spenser. It implies a conceptual breadth that gives free and equable scope to all the human faculties—to thought, to imagination, to fancy, to observation. The varied continuity and large grouping of object and idea in Spenser is never found in the more brilliant Byron. To say nothing of such detached observation and thought as the above quoted stanzas on the wreck and on the sights and sounds of evening show, his most carefully wrought, ambitious descriptions of Rome, of Clitumnus, and of Lake Leman, show the same loosely linked or separate effects, successive, not unified. The result of such detachment is to make our faculties, higher and lower, equally valid, and never in perfect agreement, much less mutually helpful in the attainment of a grand human conception. But with Spenser the imagination is so free and the feeling so continuous, that sharp distinctive example and shrewdly dividing reasoning faculty, as well as mere style, are not perceived; the transitions are as easy as those of dreaming. Yet the strength and scope of the conception are very shortly afterwards evident when such associations, processional or otherwise, are presented as "The House of Holiness," "The Bower of Bliss," "The Gardens of Adonis," "The Procession of the Sins," "The Cave of Mammon." It is needless to say that there is nothing of such sustained associative power in Byron. Far from it; all his poetry is detached in conception and only connected in form by such threads of association as

a pilgrimage or a name; while his masterpiece, as it is called, reveals the contrary of large harmonious conception—discordant contradiction of ideas. We may say that no poet of truly intuitive and grand human conception could possibly have associated license and ribaldry, scoff and tavern jest, with eloquence and poetry as Byron did in "Don Juan."

A few more stanzas of the "Fairy Queen" may be quoted to show Spenser's highest ideal of moral and spiritual beauty and also his energy of idealized action. It will be seen that Byron, owing to his low ideal and rejection of morality and religion, has nothing to show approaching this divine idealism and ideal energy.

"Her ivory forehead, full of bounty brave,
Like a broad table did itself dispread,
For Love his lofty triumphs to engrave
And write the battles of his great godhead;
All good and honor might therein be read,
For there their dwelling was. And when she spake
Sweet words like dropping honey she did shed;
And twixt the pearls and rubins softly break
A silver sound, that heavenly music seemed to make."

The other three stanzas before and after this should be read describing the first appearance of the semi-divine Belphœbe:

"Then up arose a man of matchless might,
And wondrous wit to menage high affairs,
Who stirred with pity of the stressed plight
Of this sad realm, cut into diverse shares
By such as claimed themselves Brute's rightful heirs,
Gathered the princes of the people loose
To taken counsel of their common cares
Who with his wisdom won him straight did choose
Their king.

Fair Helena, the fairest living wight;
Who in all godly thews and goodly praise
Did far excel, but was most famous hight
For skill in music of all in her days,

Ne thine the kingdom, ne the sceptre thine;
But realms and rulers thou dost both confound,
And loyal truth to treason dost incline;
Witness the guiltless blood poured oft on ground,
The crowned often slain, the slayer crowned;
The sacred diadem in pieces rent
The purple robe gored with many a wound,

Castles surprised, great cities sacked and brent;
So mak'st thou kings and gainest wrongful government.

Most wretched man,
That to affections does the bridle lend.
In their beginning they are weak and wan,
But soon through suffrance grow to fearful end:
Whiles they are weak betimes with them contend:
For when they once to perfect strength do grow,
Strong wars they make and cruel battry bend
Gainst fort of Reason, it to overthrow;
Wrath, jealousy, grief, love, this Squire had laid thus low."

With this splendid energy of conception, human and moral in our eas, such as Byron, with all his power of depicting lawless sublimity, with all his command of passionate thought and of choice diction, was incapable of, we will now conclude.

J. KINDON.

MANCHESTER.

BOOK REVIEWS.

PRINCIPIA ETHICA. By George Edward Moore, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1903. Pp. xxvii, 232.

Though this is quite a short book, there can be little doubt that it is one of the most important works on Ethics that have been published in recent times. Its importance is due mainly to the extraordinary clearness with which some leading conceptions are discussed. Whatever may be thought of its results, it is certainly a model of philosophical method and lucid exposition.

Mr. Moore takes as his motto the saying of Bishop Butler—"Everything is what it is, and not another thing." His main contention is that Good—the fundamental conception of Ethics—is unanalysable, and consequently indefinable. We can no more say what we mean by it, in terms of anything else, than we can in the case of a particular color, such as yellow. Yellow is yellow, and good is good; neither of them is resolvable into anything else. Hence Mr. Moore urges that almost all ethical writers have gone astray at the very outset of their inquiries;

since almost all have made some attempt to define what good is. The most conspicuous cases of this mistake are those in which an attempt is made to identify good with some particular experience—*e. g.*, pleasure. This Mr. Moore calls the naturalistic fallacy. It is a very bad mistake; because we find, when we consider it, that good is not a particular experience, but rather a universal determination, like number. The more metaphysical writers on Ethics have generally been free from this blunder, but still they have nearly always attempted to show that good is something other than itself, and in this way have gone nearly as far astray as the naturalists.

Mr. Moore's view on this point is enforced by trenchant criticisms of Herbert Spencer, J. S. Mill, Green and his school, and others. Most of the points emphasized by Mr. Moore have already been brought out by other critics, but perhaps never so tersely and so clearly. The points against Mill in particular have probably never before been so thoroughly pressed home. Here, at least, his statements may well be accepted as the last word on the subject. His criticisms on the more metaphysical writers are also keen; but, naturally enough (as I happen to be one of those brought under the lash), they do not seem to me equally conclusive.

In contrast with these writers, Sidgwick is especially commended for his insistence on the independence of the conceptions expressed by the terms "Good," and "ought"; and one gathers from the preface that Mr. Moore finds himself still more closely in harmony with Franz Brentano on the general foundations of Ethics.

While, however, Mr. Moore maintains most emphatically that Good is indefinable, he is equally explicit in the contention that it is quite possible to give an account of *the* Good; and the latter part of his book is occupied with an attempt to set forth the nature of the chief objects to which the term can be strictly applied. Mr. Moore thinks that most previous writers have failed in their quest for such objects, owing to the fact that they have defined Good in a particular way, and have regarded nothing as being included in the Good except what answers to the definition that is put forward. But even Sidgwick, though he abstains from defining Good, falls into the same sort of error when he seeks to explain what the ultimate Good is. He also endeavors to show that only one kind of object—viz., pleasure—

can be accepted as a Good. Mr. Moore urges that there is no real ground for such exclusiveness, and even that pleasure, by itself, cannot be accepted as a complete Good at all. Further inquiry brings out the fact that the chief positive goods are personal affection and æsthetic enjoyment. Mr. Moore urges further that, though pleasure is not in itself a good, pain is an evil, and that, though knowledge is not in itself a good, it is an essential constituent in most great goods.

One of the most interesting incidental points in Mr. Moore's treatment is his conception of organic unity, which he explains in a striking and original way, and which he appears to regard as one of the points in which his general view is most definitely marked off from those of Sidgwick and Brentano. He considers that the idea of organic unity that has been put forward by recent writers is in some important respects confused. In particular, an organic whole has generally been understood to mean a whole of such a kind that a part of it has "no meaning or significance apart from its whole." "This doctrine," says Mr. Moore (p. 34), "must be utterly rejected. It implies itself that the statement 'This is a part of that whole' has a meaning; and in order that this may have one, both subject and predicate must have a distinct meaning." Rejecting this view of organic unity, Mr. Moore defines an organic whole as one that has a value different from the sum of the values of its parts; and of the conception, as thus defined, he makes very considerable use in the latter parts of his discussion.[1]

Now, it appears to the present reviewer that it is just at this point that both the strength and the weakness of Mr. Moore's position are to be found. The strength of his work lies here; it appears to be by means of this conception of organic unity that he has been able to get beyond the point of view of Sidgwick, with whom otherwise he has much in common. The value of things for Sidgwick, it seems fair to say, is simply the sum of those elements into which they can be resolved by analysis. Mr. Moore sees clearly that in many cases a real whole

[1] As I appear to be one of the group of writers to whom Mr. Moore is referring in the above criticism, and as he definitely mentions me at a later point as a representative of that school, I may perhaps be allowed to state that I am not aware of having ever said that in an organic unity the part has "no meaning or significance apart from the whole." In my "Introduction to Social Philosophy," I have discussed the conception at some length; but none of my statements, as far as I can see, amounts to this.

has a value that cannot be thus split up. But, on the other hand, the weakness of his position lies in this, that he regards this peculiarity of some real wholes as being found only in their relation to the idea of value. He does not recognize that a whole may, in other respects also, mean and be something more than the sum of its parts.

Now, this is a matter of considerable importance in its bearing on Mr. Moore's view of definition, which, by the bye, appears to be substantially that of J. S. Mill. Mr. Moore seems to think that we define a whole by analysing it into its constituent parts, and that what is not thus analysable is necessarily indefinable. But if there are such things as organic unities, an unanalysable part might be capable of definition with reference to the whole—*i. e.*, it might be defined by pointing out its place within the organism. Even yellow would seem to be definable in this way. For I suppose even Mr. Moore would admit that we are justified in saying that yellow is a color; and if we go on to add that it is the color that comes between red and green in the scale of pure color qualities, I do not see why this should not be regarded as a definition. No doubt yellow, as it exists apart from all reference to other colors, would not thus be defined. But yellow thus conceived is hardly the yellow that anyone would wish to define. Definitions have no meaning except for a thinking consciousness, and for a thinking consciousness at least yellow is a part or aspect of the color continuum. [2]

Now, Good could surely be defined in a somewhat similar way. We can connect it with conation, just as we can connect yellow with the scale of colors. Mr. Moore is probably right enough in objecting to most of the attempts that have been made to define Good in terms of Will or Desire; yet, if all reference to these were omitted, it may be doubted whether Good would retain any meaning for us at all. I am inclined to think that Mr. Moore begins at the wrong end in trying to understand the meaning of Good. He begins by thinking of

[2] It should be particularly noted that Mr. Moore, like J. S. Mill, appears to regard all definitions as nominal. When any one tries to define Good, Mr. Moore conceives that he is setting forth what he intends the term to mean. But surely most people who have defined Good—even Mill himself—have rather been trying to point out the essential characteristics of an aspect of experience which, in the concrete, they have assumed to be well enough known. They have been attempting, in short, to arrive at a real definition, and not merely to fix the meaning of a word.

the Good as that which has absolute value; but it is pretty certain that the original meaning of the Good in human experience is one that is distinctly relative. What is good is, in the first instance, what is good for something or other. It is only by after-reflection that we come to recognize that such mediate goods must have reference to some end to which they are means; and so we are led gradually to the conception of some Good which is not a means, but is valued purely in and for itself. What is good thus signifies, first of all, a means to some desired or desireable end, and afterwards some ultimate end involved or presupposed in desire. There are thus two meanings of Good, both connected, directly or indirectly, with desire, and both capable of being defined in relation to desire. It is no doubt wrong to say simply that Good is what is desired or willed; it might be truer to characterize it as the objective counterpart of desire or will, or as that which would satisfy desire. It is difficult to see how it could have any meaning for us at all apart from some such reference to conation.

Another point that appears doubtful in Mr. Moore's theory is his distinction between pleasure and consciousness of pleasure. It is no doubt true to say that we can distinguish what we mean by truth, and other objective contents, from the subjective part of their appearance in consciousness; and Mr. Moore deserves considerable praise for his insistence on this point, both here and in a recent article in "Mind." But can this be applied to the case of pleasure? Is not pleasure purely subjective? Does it *mean* for us anything more than it *is* as a simple fact of experience? There are, I think, several indications that Mr. Moore, while rightly emphasizing the antithesis between the subjective and the objective, has not sufficiently thought out the relations between the two.

Mr. Moore's criticism of metaphysical conceptions, as applied to Ethics, is also unsatisfactory. He complains—somewhat after the manner of Aristotle—that the metaphysical Good is eternal, and consequently throws no light on good as realized by human effort; but rather makes the latter unmeaning. This is true of some metaphysical conceptions, but not of all. According to some, what is eternal involves a process. In a sense, the nature of a tree is eternal; but this does not prevent trees from growing, nor does it enable them to grow into the skies. It is hardly necessary, however, to dwell on this; nor have we space to do

so to any purpose here. It may suffice to say that the only real difference between Mr. Moore and the metaphysicians seems to lie in his contention that Good cannot be defined. If once he recognized that it could be defined, it may be taken as certain that his definition would lead him into metaphysics; and, once he got well launched into that kind of speculation, one may well feel convinced that he would not lack the necessary ingenuity to get over the difficulty about eternity. Even as it is, his criticisms appear to be valid against the statements of many metaphysical writers.

A comparatively small point may be noticed in conclusion. We have seen that Mr. Moore calls attention to a certain want of parallelism between pain and pleasure in their relations to evil and good respectively. But surely it ought by this time to be recognized, by all who deal with psychological questions, that pain is not the opposite of pleasure. Pain seems clearly to be a special mode of organic sensation, which has no real opposite. Pleasure, on the other hand, means simply agreeable feeling, and its opposite is disagreeable feeling. If this were fully borne in mind by writers on Ethics, it would help to remove many troublesome paradoxes. In connection with this point, Mr. Moore rightly enough remarks that philosophers must not attempt to force an artificial symmetry. At the same time, philosophers must try to get an intelligible view of experience; and any arbitrary lack of symmetry undoubtedly interferes with this.

On the whole, it must, I think, be said that Mr. Moore's book is not free from blots. While we may accept Butler's saying that "Everything is what it is, and not another thing," we are probably justified in adding that it is never altogether without reference to another thing, and that it can seldom be properly understood without considering that reference. But we have much reason to be grateful to Mr. Moore for his keen criticisms; and even his more constructive efforts are full of stimulus and suggestion. Certainly every one who cares for Ethics ought to read his book.

J. S. Mackenzie.

University College, Cardiff.

UNFORSEEN TENDENCIES OF DEMOCRACY. By E. L. Godkin. Second Impression. Westminster: A. Constable & Co. Small octavo. Pp. vii, 265.

Of all the publicists who have reflected on contemporary Democracy, Mr. Godkin was perhaps the most informed, as he was certainly the most moderate. He neither holds with the optimist that there are short cuts to political happiness, nor with the pessimist that democracy is unteachable. "Experience counts with it for less than it used to count for under the old aristocratic governments;" but its own experience will in the end be its schoolmaster. The main purpose of these Essays, however, is not so much to describe democracy as to "describe some of the departures it has made from the ways which its earlier promoters expected it to follow." But as Mill suggested in the case of de Tocqueville, Mr. Godkin is perhaps too much inclined to attribute to the effects of democracy what are really the effects of civilization, and this in spite of his own caution against "giving only one cause for political effects." The "uniform failure to predict what democracy will say, or do, or think, under certain given circumstances," he says in one place, is "owing largely to the enormously increased number of influences under which all men act in the modern world;" and among these influences he assigns a first place to the "enormously increased facility for money-making which the modern world has supplied, and the inevitably resulting corruption." But that phenomenon, as Mr. Godkin admits, is not peculiar to a democracy. What, then, are we to understand by a "deduction" from Democracy? The answer to this question must depend upon the way in which we conceive the fundamental idea of Democracy. Mr. Godkin represents it simply as "the principle of equality;" but equality may be very differently understood. However understood, many of "the democratic tendencies" described by Mr. Godkin seem in no way deductions from, or consequences of, "the principle of equality." He himself dwells not only on the different conceptions of democracy in ancient and modern times, but also on the differences between American democracy on the one hand and Australian democracy on the other. In the latter case the main differences are to be found in two facts peculiar to Australia—"the adoption of the cabinet system from England, and the absence of a constitution containing restraints on legislation." Mr. Godkin's book would have been more correctly described as an inquiry into

the unforeseen tendencies, not of democracy, but of democracies: it is in effect a concrete description of some of the difficulties which democratic governments—that is, governments in which the whole community participates in the work of government—have under different conditions actually encountered, difficulties that are only partly inherent in the nature of democratic government as such.

Following out this line of inquiry, Mr. Godkin gives special prominence to the fact that "democracies have not shown that desire to employ leading men in the management of affairs which they were expected to show." In other words, democracies have not as yet solved the problem of combining administrative efficiency with popular control. This, of course, is not so much a reflection on democracy itself as upon the force and degree of political intelligence in a given democracy. But some evidence at least could be produced to show that "the wish of the people to control their own business" does, in proportion as it is a real and effective will, develop at the same time the recognition of the need of knowledge and the value of the expert. There is certainly nothing in the essence of Democracy which suggests either that one man knows as much as any other, or that government is any the less a science because it is controlled by the community as a whole.

"The disregard of special fitness, combined with unwillingness to acknowledge that there can be anything special about any man, which is born of equality, constitutes the great defect of modern democracy;" but this is not a characteristic of democracy, as such; it is not a logical consequence of its principle or idea, and the remedy for it is not less, but more, democracy. All that Mr. Godkin's studies tend to demonstrate is that democratic government is difficult; and it is difficult because, more than any other form of government, it depends upon ideas—makes a greater demand upon morality and intelligence. It is not, therefore, surprising that modern democracy has not as yet proved equal to its responsibilities: it means that the democratic idea is incompletely realized—that the collective intelligence is imperfectly developed or organized. As Mr. Godkin himself indicates, democracy is groping its way, and is by no means at the end of its resources or expedients: his criticisms, indeed, proceed on the assumption that there is a demand for a more excellent way; but the demand is only half-hearted. "The demand for good and enlightened government is as great as ever; but the desire for simple government, which can be carried on without drawing largely on the time and attention of the private citizen, is greater than ever."

"The refusal of respectable citizens to take part in the primaries" —*i. e.*, the "primary" meetings for the selection of candidates for office—to which most American writers ascribe the failures of American politics, is due, in Mr. Godkin's opinion, to "the increased industrial activity and complexity of private affairs"—to the importance which "private affairs have assumed as compared with public affairs." Mr. Godkin traces to this desire for economy of attention the familiar phenomena of "the nominating system," which he describes as "the great canker of American institutions." He is skeptical, however, of any "remedies" other than the great remedy which has been "one of the democratic characteristics"—the "popular determination" to find some better way. In other words, the cure for the evils of modern democracy is not less, but more, democracy.

The studies on "The Decline of Legislatures" and "The Peculiarities of American Municipal Government" are excellent examples of thoughtful and refined observation. Mr. Godkin suggests that the representative system, having been used for a century and found wanting, is likely to "make way in its turn for the more direct action of the people on the most important questions of government, and a much diminished demand for all legislation whatever." The last point is connected with Mr. Godkin's extreme skepticism, not only as to the value, but as to the necessity, of legislation in modern states. Necessary legislation is a rare thing: "the communities in our day seldom need a new law." This is a generalization that seems to have no wider or better foundation than American experience of State legislation. Mr. Godkin's observations on the history and condition of municipalities in America are still more restricted in their scope, though they are interesting enough.

The essay on the growth and expression of Public Opinion seems to us by far the most interesting and suggestive. It is full of admirable reflections, not only on the difficulty of "consulting a modern democracy," but also, and more particularly, on the position and influence of the modern press. Here Mr. Godkin speaks with special authority and instructiveness. On the other hand, the essay on Australian Democracy is admittedly "nothing more than a set of impressions formed from books"—and not always the best books; it also betrays, rather more than the other essays, the limit and the prejudices of the literary politician. His conception of socialism being that it is "essentially a form of domination over the whole individual by the constituted authorities, without consulting

him," it is not surprising that Mr. Godkin should regard it as merely the antithesis to "competition," or as a system devised for "the sinking of superiority" and the suppression of individuality.

Mr. Godkin's political essays are a good example of the best periodical literature of the time, but they have also the defects of their qualities—much of the observation is instructive, but it is also somewhat limited, and never goes particularly deep.

SYDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND. By Josef Redlich. Edited with additions by Francis W. Hirst. 2 vols. Pp. xxvi, 427, and viii, 435. London: Macmillan & Co.

Almost all the best accounts of existing social conditions in England have been produced in Germany. One reason is, no doubt, that England is unique both as the field in which modern industrialism first appeared and as a country whose cumulative social experience is unequaled. To study coral islands the naturalist goes to the Pacific; to study industrialism the foreigner has found it necessary to come to England, for a short time, at least. Another reason, however, for the number of German studies of British institutions and conditions is unquestionably the realistic trend of German economic and political thought, and its greater volume. But, whatever the explanation, the fact is undoubted. The only exhaustive study of the social changes which took place at the time of the industrial revolution is Adolf Held's,—Toynbee's essay is wider in scope and slighter in the social side, besides being unfinished,—the book most used in teaching the history and principles of the English Poor Law is Aschrott's; and there are the well-known works of Brentano, Schulze-Gaevernitz and Von Plener on Guilds and Trade Unions, Social and Industrial matters and Factory Legislation; some of which, however, it is satisfactory to remember, are now being supplemented by even more thorough English studies.

And now another work has just appeared in Austria—a detailed, exact and thoughtful work—on the subject of Local Government in England, by Josef Redlich, of the Faculty of Law and Political Science in the University of Vienna. Mr. F. W. Hirst has done the good service of translating it, or, rather, rendering it,

and adapting it by excisions and additions to English readers. Such alterations as have been made, Mr. Hirst informs us, "have been dictated by regard for the different atmospheres which the two versions must breathe. Explanations necessary in a German work upon English local government may not be required in an English work on the same subject. Details tedious to a German reader may be useful to an English one." The task which Mr. Hirst set himself has been performed in an eminently satisfactory way, as we should have expected from one qualified for the work by studies of his own on the same subject. One of Mr. Hirst's additions is a chapter on the recent Education Act; we refer to this in particular—and chiefly for benefit of the American reader—because the subject is a controversial one. The tone of the chapter is by no means markedly partisan; yet one rises from reading it with the impression that the government must have introduced the bill out of sheer naughtiness, an impression which may weaken when one remembers that Mr. Hirst is a politician, as well as a political scientist.

The scope of the book is wide. An historical treatment takes the first place. The center of interest in the work will be gathered from the fact that, while only 57 pages bring us up to the end of the eighteenth century, 161 pages are devoted to the growth of English Radicalism and its influence on the government of the country. The descriptive part which succeeds occupies more than 500 pages. The subjects dealt with are ranged as follows: Constitution and Government of Municipal Boroughs; The Structure and Working of County Councils; Urban and Rural District Councils; Parish Councils and Parish Meetings; The Local Administration of the Poor Relief and Education; The Structure and Working of the Central Authority in Local Government; The Position of Parliament and the Courts of Law in the System of Local Government. Dull matters, these, some would-be readers might be inclined to think, but they are, on the whole, dealt with in the fascinating manner which an absorbing interest seldom fails to impart, especially when it is combined with the skill in exposition which our authors display.

The second volume closes, except for tables of cases and statutes and the index, with a rending and tearing to pieces of all Gneist's most cherished and oft-repeated theories as to English self-government. Gneist held that self-government implied an association of political rights with personal duties, and contended

that it decayed when elected boards took the place of the Justices of the Peace and executive functions were handed over to paid officials. The institution of the boards marked the introduction of "commercial" self-government, which meant the selfish pursuit of local interests, as opposed to the dutiful performance of State functions. "State" and "Society" are set in antithesis by Gneist in Hegelian fashion, and this false contrast was doubtless responsible for many of his mistaken conclusions. It was natural, perhaps, for a Prussian official to see as perfect self-government, the mere localization of officialism, the assumption by local groups of executive functions. Thus, Gneist viewed with no little alarm a conception of taxation as more than a substitution for personal service, and foretold the ruin of a country which, through its commercial self-government, raised money to satisfy the needs of Society. Mistaken in several respects as to the real trend of recent English politics, and almost unpardonably wrong-headed in his interpretation of Mill, Gneist, with his great authority, has been responsible for the creation of a totally erroneous idea abroad of the essentials of English democracy. What readers have regarded, in consequence of the claims put forward by this great leader, among others, of the Historical School in Sociology, as the facts speaking for themselves, have been but the distorted impressions conveyed by them when forced into the schema of the Hegelian dialectic. The modern renascence in social studies, we should do well to remember, was not a pure reaction to history, but a reaction which took place in the direction of history for one reason, because it was associated with the acceptance of a new philosophy, for the application of which the facts of the past were requisite. Mr. Redlich's criticisms of Gneist are excellent, because they show not merely keenness of insight, but also an all-round understanding of the broad issue involved.

These two volumes will prove indispensable to all who would become fully acquainted with the nature and bearings of English Local Government.

S. J. CHAPMAN.

UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER.

WORLD VIEWS AND THEIR ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS. A syllabus of Lectures in Advanced Ethics. By W. R. Benedict, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Cincinnati. Cincinnati University Press, 1902.

I am glad to have an opportunity of calling attention to this little volume of a hundred pages, prepared as a syllabus accompanying collegiate lectures. No one would doubt for a moment that all systems of philosophy, or World Views, carry with them implications of the utmost significance for conduct; few would deny that one of the main *motifs* in the generation of philosophic systems has been the consciousness of certain ultimate issues as to morality, the possibility of rationally valuing life as worthy or unworthy. Such being the case, it is a striking fact that there is almost a total lack of literature upon the inherent bearings of philosophic standpoints and outlooks upon the moral problems of life. The great writers, Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, turn up, of course, both in histories of metaphysics as such, and in histories of ethics as such; but rarely do we have a consideration of what the metaphysical view means, *per se,* when translated into ethical equivalents. Professor Benedict's book is worthy of recognition as a sincere and rational attempt at just this translation.

Moreover, the way the test is undertaken is worthy of note. Self-imposed limitations practically exclude periods before Kant —an outcome specially to be deplored, I think, in the case of Spinoza, who is an unapproachable instance of an organic union of a typical World View with a typical theory of life; one which, while analogous in some regards to the Idealistic Monism, finally adopted and expounded by Professor Benedict, has its distinctive points. There is an account of the ethical implications of the systems of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer, occupying about half the volume, while the remainder discusses the ethical implications of systems as such: Dualism, and, under Monism, Materialism and Idealism. The historical account might perhaps be criticized on the ground that in the case of Fichte the treatment falls short of the ideal held in view in the book, and also of the possibilities of the case. It is brief and there is little rendering of Fichte's theory of knowledge and being into their ethical evaluations; Fichte's system might be made very fruitful as a type-case of an effort to construe the whole universe in terms of the moral standpoint as such.

Dualism is rejected on the ground that its ethical correlates are an unsolvable antagonism of good and bad, animal and spiritual, principles in man's life, whose logical outcome is ascetism, and an assumption of an arbitrary struggle of external forces. Materialism is welcomed in so far as it represents a movement toward unity; but is criticized on the ground that it attempts to define existence apart from existence-for-consciousness, which is impossible. Moreover, it is contended that science itself in its apparently most materialistic conquest, physiological psychology, really transcends materialism. "Matter has drawn very close to consciousness. Here, in the consciousness which brain makes possible, is the explanation of matter, the reason for matter, and the reason in matter" (p. 72).

It is impossible to summarize the idealistic Monism set forth by Professor Benedict, because the account is itself but the summary appropriate to a syllabus. It is in line with certain recent renditions of Hegel, notably Bradley's and Royce's, but is truer to Hegel, in the reviewer's mind, as well as more satisfactory in itself, in laying greater stress upon the *positive* significance of conflict and the suffering that attends it, in the constitution of an active and worthful universe, instead of tending to give a negative interpretation of conflict as due to the "finite" over against the complete, or to "appearance" over against Reality. It is to be hoped that Professor Benedict will give in ample form what he has set forth here in outline. Especially noteworthy is the temper in which Professor Benedict holds to the irrationality of a demand for finality—for absolute explanation—upon one side, while, upon the other, he insists upon the moral duty of adopting as a hypothesis that world-view which, all things taken into account, seems to serve relatively best the purpose of rationalizing existence and life.

JOHN DEWEY.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY IN ITS NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. By Henry Laurie, LL. D., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Melbourne. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons. 1903. Pp. viii, 344.

Professor Laurie has done both a real and a needed service to the history of philosophical thought by the publication of

this work. The full meaning and significance of Scottish Philosophy are becoming always more obscured by the German speculations and more recent theories which absorb the attention of the philosophical student to-day. The Scottish philosophy is to us a thing of the past, but it deserves to be studied, not only for its place in the history of philosophy, but because of the impulses it gave to modern thought in the case of men like Hume, Reid, Hamilton, and Ferrier. The excellence of Professor Laurie's work lies in this, that while doing sympathetic justice to the Scottish Philosophy of the past, he is yet in no sense impervious to the broader, fuller light of the philosophical to-day. In a word, his work is extremely well done, and no points of detailed criticism I may make are meant in the least to detract from the abundant credit I give to his work for freshness, acuteness, interest, and discriminating power. And the worst of that criticism shall come first. The book leads up, in its final issue, to a chapter on "recent developments," which I cannot accept as very complete or satisfying. Rightly enough, it makes due note of the "more universal character" of philosophy, as studied in Scotland to-day, in consequence of the mingling with "the fuller tide of European thought." The chapter is all right so far as it goes, but it does not go very far. No mention is made, for example, among these "recent developments" of the enormous amount of idealistic teaching that has taken place under the Gifford Lectures foundation—as by Prof. Wallace, Principal Caird, and Prof. E. Caird at Glasgow, Prof. E. Caird and the Rt. Hon. R. B. Haldane at St. Andrews, and Prof. Ward and Prof. Royce at Aberdeen. In a "national" development, one must not write as though Edinburgh were Scotland; nor must the lectures or books of resident professors be the only thing taken into account, far less potent in some instances than other agencies or influences. It seems to me strange that Prof. Laurie has not discussed the relation of these and like idealisms to the realistic philosophy of McCosh and the Scottish thinkers—a relation more interesting and suggestive than is here brought out under "recent developments."

Professor Laurie's historical chapters on individual thinkers are excellent, and make interesting reading. After a brief but careful Introduction, he begins with an account of Francis Hutcheson, of "moral sense" fame. Dr. Laurie says "the importance of his influence on later thought is not to be denied

Scottish philosophy inherited its psychological method from Hutcheson and his teachers. While outwardly attached to the empiricism of Locke, his affirmation of perceptions of beauty and virtue as ultimate and original was at least a premonition of the inquiry into first principles which was afterwards characteristic of the Scottish School." Passing over Andrew Baxter, we come to David Hume, "a thinker of the first importance who has left his mark, directly or indirectly, on all subsequent speculation." Professor Laurie's account of Hume is tolerably full and lengthy, and it is also very clear and careful, although I should not like to pronounce it the clearest statement or criticism of Hume's positions I have read in recent times. But it shows, beyond doubt—as indeed these chapters generally show —a painstaking and enlightened grasp of themes which he has carefully studied at first hand, and this is much. As I am writing in an ethical journal, I quote his words as to Hume's ethical position: "The value of Hume's ethical philosophy lies, not in its positive conclusions, but in its connection with the empiricism which preceded it, and in the light which it throws on later theories of Utilitarianism. He who can discern the limitations of an empirical philosophy, and the consequent failure of the solutions offered by the clear-sighted and clearly speaking Hume, will have little difficulty in penetrating the confusion of similar theories in more recent years." Passing Lord Kames, we come next to the chapter on Adam Smith, which, of course, dwells rather on his "Theory of Moral Sentiments" than on his "Wealth of Nations." Dr. Laurie notes the indebtedness of Smith, in working out his ingenious attempt to resolve morality into sympathy, to Hutcheson and Hume. Sympathy is described as an original principle of human nature, and a distinction is drawn between praise and praiseworthiness. But, as Dr. Laurie shows in working out the subject, we are forced beyond those facts of sympathetic feeling on which Smith professes to found his theory of morals. Nor has he, again, been able to show how sympathy of any kind can be "metamorphosed into a conviction of duty." The truth is, he has had to assume the imperative claims of duty, and, so doing, has had to go far beyond the facts of sympathetic feeling. But this "absent-minded scholar shows a wide and subtle knowledge of human nature, and never was a moralist more free from platitudes."

This brings us to Thomas Reid, the founder of what is commonly called the Scottish School of Philosophy. His was the

so-called philosophy of common sense. For Reid, holding reason and common sense to have one author, made it his business to reconcile them. His stress lay on the instinctive beliefs of men, since to him philosophy could only be founded upon these. Professor Laurie well describes how he opposed a philosophy of faith to the philosophy of scepticism, and insisted on the need of trusting certain first principles of human belief as ultimate. And Professor Laurie is right in describing Reid's philosophy as "the incongruous result of two methods of inquiry,—one, an appeal to common conviction; the other, the method of critical analysis. The first is unphilosophical and erroneous, since the truth which our beliefs contain can be tested only by submitting them to reflective thought; and in so far as he adopted the second method, he was only following in the footsteps of the philosophers who had preceded him, for this was the method of Descartes, of Locke, and of Berkeley."

Dr. Laurie discusses Reid's analysis of the facts of perception, and shows both how little original it was, and how far he had wandered from the unreflective thought he set out to conserve, in his ambiguous representations. Professor Laurie yet shows, at close of the chapter, the advance marked by Reid's philosophy, spite of its imperfections, as seen in the immediate effect it had on its own country, and in the preparation for Kant's deeper analysis, by its assertion of necessary truths. He rightly notes, also, what a powerful instrument it became in France, against prevailing sensualistic and materialistic philosophy, in the hands of Royer-Collard, Jouffroy, and Cousin. It is interesting, also, to be reminded of what Professor Sidgwick wrote so late as 1895, in *Mind*, that the student "may even now find profit in communing with the earnest, patient, lucid, and discerning intellect of the thinker who, in the history of modern speculation, has connected the name of Scotland with the Philosophy of Common Sense." And Dr. Laurie significantly adds, that "no one who has read the "Methods of Ethics" can have failed to notice the value attached by its author to common-sense beliefs as starting points for practice and for speculative investigation. " Reid was, after all, no small thinker.

But space limits forbid my going into detail with every thinker. Lord Monboddo, Adam Ferguson, Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, Thomas Chalmers, Sir William Hamilton, and James Frederick Ferrier, all have their interest and place well set forth by Professor Laurie. The chapter on Ferrier—whose

merits have lain too long unrecognized—is very interesting and welcome, as bringing into more general notice his significance for modern speculation. With this book of Professor Laurie in the one hand, and that by Professor Pringle Pattison on "Scottish Philosophy," with its fine comparison of the Scottish and German answers to Hume, in the other, the student will not fail to know what is most important for him to know of this interesting phase of philosophy.

KILMARNOCK, SCOTLAND.

JAMES LINDSAY.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY, with Other Lectures and Essays. By Robert Adamson, M. A., LL. D. Sometime Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1903. In two Volumes. Pp. xlxviii, 358, and xv, 330.

These volumes are edited by Prof. Sorley, who has prefixed to them an interesting and sympathetic memoir. The whole of the first volume is occupied with the lectures on the Development of Modern Philosophy, which are reproduced from the notes of students. The lectures on Kant formed part of a separate course, and are on a considerably larger scale than those on the Philosophers who precede and follow him. The historical lectures are followed by others entitled "Suggestions towards a theory of Knowledge based on the Kantian." The views put forward here are of great interest, but any attempt to give an account of them would take this notice more deeply into Epistomology than would be suitable for a Journal of Ethics.

The latter half of the second volume is occupied by a course of lectures on the "Principles of Psychology," any detailed notice of which would also be beyond the sphere of this paper. There remain the seven Essays and Addresses with which the second volume commences. These are, an Inaugural Address in the University of Glasgow, a lecture on Giordano Bruno, another on Psychology and Epistemology, an early fragment on Kant's view of Psychology, and addresses to popular audiences on Philosophy and the Social Problem, the Basis of Morality, and the Regeneration of Germany.

The address on Philosophy and the Social Problem contains some valuable criticism of the ideas of Organism and Development as applied to society. Of the first, Dr. Adamson says,

"undoubtedly no conception has more commended itself to our ordinary thinking. It was among the earliest, it is among the latest of the general ideas brought to bear on the social life. . . Yet I venture to say that the employment of the notion is always a sign of an unscientific stage of sociological thinking. No one would deny the historical value of the idea. . . . But it has to be borne in mind that the differences between the social life and that of an organized living being are far more important and go far deeper than the resemblances which at best are but superficial" (ii. 81).

With regard to the notion of Development the author does not deny that it may have some validity as applied to human history, but insists that "it is an intruder, and a uselessly disturbing intruder, to sociological inquiries (ii, 84). For, although, when events have happened, they may perhaps be profitably considered as the unfolding of a plan, yet the ground of our endeavor to bring about certain events can never reasonably be that they are included in the eternal plan, which cannot be certain till they have happened. In guiding or predicting action we must base our conclusion, not on the nature of the eternal plan, but on the human desire to bring about a state better than the present.

In the address on the Basis of Morality the main contention is that the idea of an absolute end is itself a derivative notion and cannot be taken as the ultimate foundation of morality. While rejecting much of Green's position, the author entirely agrees with him in the admission that all our definite conceptions of morality have to start with existing usage and law. What remains rather obscure is how, from this starting point alone, a start is ever to be made. After all, morality frequently find itself in the position of asserting that the present state of things is wrong. Now, is it possible to justify this assertion if we have no other basis for morality than the very state of things we are condemning? On this point the address gives us no guidance.

J. Ellis McTaggart.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

THE DATA OF JURISPRUDENCE. By William Galbraith Miller, Advocate. Edinburgh: Wm. Green & Sons, 1903. Pp. ix, 477.

This is the first volume of a treatise on jurisprudence. The title is a suggestive one. As Mr. Miller points out in his preface, he is attempting in this work rather to state the problem, "What is Law?" than at present to offer any solution. This cannot but be regarded as a step in the right direction; for, as Aristotle saw, to ask the right questions is an important help towards obtaining the right answers. The author expresses his attitude towards this problem as being that of the "common sense man." To the reviewer this seems an unfortunate expression. It is apt to call up in one's mind the philosophical doctrines of Reid and his followers. In other words, one would expect to find a number of "laws of nature" set forth as axiomatic and as being those to which positive laws should conform. But such is not Mr. Miller's position. He treats jurisprudence as a positive science, dealing with law as it is and not with law as it ought to be. His way of looking at law is closer to that of Sir Frederick Pollock than to German jurists of the *Naturrecht* school. His method is primarily historical, inductive. This seems the right method for jurisprudence. To adopt the *Naturrecht* attitude is to bring within the scope of jurisprudence questions which can only be properly dealt with in Ethics or Politics. We require a name for a science which treats of the form of law and investigates the general characteristics of existing laws and legal institutions. According to traditional English usage the term "Jurisprudence" has been appropriated to indicate such a science. Mr. Miller does well in pointing out the close connection of form and matter in law. "Law is a result of social life and has no meaning apart therefrom" (p. 28). The Austinian doctrine is too formal and analytical. Society cannot exist without rules of social order, which are binding on citizens as such. These rules make up law. Austin's analysis of the term "law" is really only an analysis of an English criminal statute. Such is the result of applying the historical method in jurisprudence, and such is substantially Mr. Miller's position. He analyzes and discusses the meaning of the principal legal conceptions, right, duty, status, etc., and endeavors to show the close interconnection between law and social organization. The book displays throughout evidence of wide reading and knowledge. Mr. Miller's knowledge of law is not confined to Scot's law. Illustra-

tions are drawn from English, Scandinavian, German, and Roman law, not to mention other systems. Politics and Ethics are also laid under contribution. A companion volume is promised on Abstract Jurisprudence.

W. F. TROTTER.

EDINBURGH.

A HISTORY OF FACTORY LEGISLATION. By B. L. Hutchins and A. Harrison. P. S. King & Son, 1903.

This book describes itself as an endeavor to expound the historical facts regarding a form of legislation on whose limits opinions still differ. "Whatever we may think of the policy of Factory Legislation," writes Mr. Sidney Webb in a Preface, "we must all regard it as an advantage to have the story told with honest exactitude, and it is as such an historical study that I venture to command this volume." Only rarely do the authors become opinionative, there being something more than a historical tone in the chapter on the "Women's Rights Opposition Movement;" in general, it is a clear and lucid exposition which certainly needed to be done, and for which we are indebted to them and the London School. There is no historical weariness in the style, and only one split infinitive.

The book appears to divide itself most easily into an earlier period, when Factory Legislation was still founded on only an "emotional, religious and charitable" basis; and a later period, when sanitary and other regulations have been studied from a scientific or quasi-scientific point of view. The former is a political history of a movement subject to numerous outside chances, especially to the competing Free Trade development; in the latter the appeal to theory emerges gradually. But over the whole of the nineteenth century, which embraces this general policy, checks, hinderances, evasions and omissions have continually been triumphed over, till nearly the entire manufacturing field has come within the law.

The authors are not content with what has been done. They are "conscious that they leave off with a note of interrogation. What prospect is there that the principle of collective control will be further strengthened and extended in the improvement of the conditions of industrial life, and the social and industrial efficiency of workers?" "The Factory Code is still the barest minimum,

and scarcely ever is there a discussion in Parliament on the subject that does not reveal that the masses of information and material that exist for the full economic justification of further measures, are practically unknown to all but a select few of our legislators." It is not quite evident what there is behind this protest. Some reforms in the dual control of Factory inspection are the main hint of the lines in which, in the authors' view, further progress might take place. It is for the reader to judge of this pessimistic conclusion; a reviewer of this History can only commend its patient thoroughness.

D. H. MACGREGOR.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

ANOTHER VIEW OF INDUSTRIALISM. By William Mitchell Bowack. London: T. Fisher Unioin. Pp. viii, 403.

The writer of this work set out with the intention of presenting economic phenomena in the social and spiritual elements in which they are involved.

"The ground plan of most political economists is limitation and exclusion. They never grade or merge their subject in the surrounding synthesis. They treat it solely as a thing apart, self-contained and sharply differentiated. There is, therefore, left in the mind of the student of political economy a sense of isolation from the living movements of the world around him—a wall of partition dividing him and his science from all that is living, ennobling and gladdening in modern thought and action."

In another place the author expresses his aim thus:—

"We say we present to the public another view of industrialism. Another view implies a particular standpoint. What is that standpoint? It is that of 'Will and Idea.' In the main it is the subjective of Schopenhauer."

This is somewhat grandiloquent and not altogether clear, particularly as no statement of Schopenhauer's position follows; but the author must be taken to mean that he proposes to look at social facts in a philosophical way.

The intention of the book is thoroughly good, and beyond question a sensible sociology, in which the philosophical point of view will not be ignored, is a pressing need; but we cannot feel that Mr. Bowack has added very much either to our knowledge or ways of regarding things. A great deal in the book is merely

a more or less exact statement of ordinary economic doctrines, and not infrequently clearness appears to us to have been sacrificed to an attempt to clothe simple ideas with an appearance of profundity. Thus:—

"Price is an equilibrium reflecting an antecedent equilibrium—an equilibrium of action, of natural forces stereotyped or attested in material forms. The equilibrium is generally described as the law of demand and supply. Demand is not a law; it is a force. Supply is not a law; it is a concrete fact. But the interdependencies of these phenomena are laws, such as that the one creates the other, that they gravitate to equilibrium, that their equilibrium constitutes one price, their perturbation a different but still correlated price. Now we say, apart from all process of conscious or volitional valuation, the demand and the supply of commodities themselves adjust prices, and they adjust prices by previously adjusting themselves."

Moreover, our author does not always seem to have grasped adequately the ultimate workings of the forces with which he is dealing. His analysis of credit and its functions, for example, does not cut very deep. Hence, no doubt, his recommendation of "a return to the principle of the real possession of capital on the part of those entering in business." "We propose that all business should be conducted on such principles. Buy nothing that you cannot pay cash for. Have nothing on your premises that does not absolutely belong to you. Sell for nothing but cash down."

If the philosophy of the book is occasionally rather obvious and long drawn out, though magnificently expressed, the work is, on the whole, not an unwelcome one. The reader is carried over the surface of society, looked at as a whole, and no doubt if he is born to be interested in society, regarded as phenomena to be shaped as well as explained, he will be led on to profounder studies all in good time. The book should leave the reader thinking, and to say that is to praise.

S. J. Chapman.

University of Manchester, England.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY OF ETHICS. By Warner Fite. New York, London and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903. Pp. xi, 383.

THE SOURCES OF THE DOCTRINES OF THE FALL AND ORIGINAL SIN. By F. R. Tennant, M.A., B.Sc., formerly Student of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. Cambridge: The University Press, 1903. Pp. 378.

CHRISTIAN SOCIALISM IN ENGLAND. By Arthur V. Woodworth, Ph.D. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1903. Pp. viii, 208.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN POLITY. By Henry Sidgwick. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1903. Pp. xxvi, 454.

ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS. By A. E. Taylor, Fellow of Merton College, versity, Montreal. London: Methuen & Co., 1903. Pp. xvi, 419.

THE NATURE OF MAN: STUDIES IN OPTIMISTIC PHILOSOPHY. By Elie Metchinkoff, Professor at the Pasteur Institute. The English Translation Edited by P. Chalmers Mitchell, M.A., D.Sc. Oxon., Secretary of the Zoological Society of London. London: William Heinemann; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1903. Pp. xviii, 319.

MAN'S PLACE IN THE UNIVERSE: A STUDY OF THE RESULTS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN RELATION TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY OF WORLDS. By Alfred R. Wallace, LL.D., D.C.L., F.R.S., etc. Third Edition. London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1904. Pp. xi, 330.

SOME POPULAR PHILOSOPHY. By George H. Long. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1903. Pp. vi, 113.

GOD AND THE AGNOSTICS, OR THE END OF THE AGE OF FAITH. By an Englishman. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1903. Pp. xxii, 383.

DER SINN DES DASEINS: STREIFZUGE EINES OPTIMISTEN DURCH DIE PHILOSOPHIE DER GEGENWART. Von Dr. Ludwig Stein, O.O., Professor der Philosophie an der Universität Bern. Tübingen und Leipzig: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Liebeck), 1904. Pp. xi, 437.

THE GROUNDWORK OF PSYCHOLOGY. By G. F. Stout, M.A. Camb. and Oxon., LL.D. Aberdeen, Fellow of the British Academy, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in St. Andrew's University, etc. Second Im- Oxford; John Frothingham Professor of Philosophy in McGill Uni- pression. (The University Tutorial Series.) University Tutorial Press, Ltd. London: W. B. Clive; New York: Hinds & Noble, 1903. Pp. vii, 248.

THE TARIFF QUESTION, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT. By J. Shield Nicholson, M.A., D.Sc., Professor of Political Economy in the University of Edinburgh. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1903. Pp. 65.

THE DEATH PENALTY. By Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner. (Reprinted from *The Humane Review.*) London: William Reeves, 1903. Pp. 14.

THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE ANCIENT WORLD. By Westel Woodbury Willoughby, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science in the Johns Hopkins University; Author of "The Nature of the State," etc. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; London and Bombay, 1903. Pp. xiii, 294.

TRANSITIONAL ERAS IN THOUGHT: With Special Reference to the Present Age. By A. C. Armstrong, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Wesleyan University. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1904. Pp. xi, 347.

Articles by writers in Great Britain should be sent to

Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, Pendene, Llanishen, Cardiff, Wales.

Books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to

G. E. Moore, M. A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.